The Chinese government has actively traded in the stock market through governmentsponsored institutions, the National Team, since the 2015 market crash. I adopt Koijen and Yogo’s (2019) demand system approach in China’s stock market to understand the impact of government participation. Estimation results indicate the government tilts towards large, less risky, and SOE stocks. During the crash, government participation indeed stabilized the market: the large-scale purchases reduced the cross-sectional market volatility of annual return by 1.8% and raised the market price by 11%. When the market ffuctuation returns to normal, the government acts more like an active investor; its price impact remains high but does not contribute to the cross-sectional volatility. Based on the theoretical framework of Brunnermeier et al. (2020), I investigate the interaction between the Nation Team and retail investors to reveal the government trading strategy. No evidence shows that government participation signiffcantly distorts market information efficiency.