This paper researches into development of China’s shadow banking during 2020-2022, a special period marked by COVID-19 and strengthened global regulation on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation (NBFI). Research focus includes balance sheet evolvement, growth dynamics, and relation with macro-finance. Its business model surprisingly resembles western peers. They both fund underserved sectors and have similar exposure to balance sheet mismatch. Massive holding of bond investment (36.6% of total asset) is funded by uninsured interbank fund and wealth management product, which makes it more closely related with banks’ balance sheet and risk contagion from NBFI to traditional commercial banks more easily. This paper then re-summarizes growth dynamics of China’s shadow banking in a “Pull-Push” framework, and proposes concept of reintermediation in respective to disintermediation. Consecutive regulation on NBFI and real estate sector kept dragging on growth of shadow banking, and rendered it in liquidity surplus, which is invested into interbank market. This paper also provides empirical evidence on relation of China’s shadow banking with macro-finance, and notes several empirical breakdowns of pre- COVID relations among economic and financial indicators. Most important breakdown is the non-functionality of monetary policy transmission channel. Besides, it continued to twist de facto financial regulatory indicators, however with fading impact.