We empirically examine how institutional investors react to adjustments in environmental policies in China. We observe a seemingly counterintuitive phenomenon: when environmental policies intensify, fund managers do not increase their holdings in high ESG-rated firms as might typically be expected; instead, they significantly divest from these firms. This behavior stems from the fact that, under stringent environmental policies, maintaining a high level of ESG investing leads to financial losses and fund outflows, especially in the short term, which impair fund managers’ compensation and raise career concerns. Further, within the context of environmental policy adjustments, our heterogeneity analysis tries to disentangle the true motivations behind institutional investors' ESG adoptions. We demonstrate that both pro-social preferences and financial incentives play pivotal roles, and that fund managers do not tolerate unlimited financial losses when ESG investing underperform. Our findings reveal the economic impact of environmental policies on institutional investors and shed light on the contentious and complex nature of the ESG concepts.