所属栏目:银行与金融机构/商业银行

摘要

Using the Automatic Earthquake Information Release System (AEIRS) that China launched in 2013 as a quasi-natural experiment, which disseminates real-time seismic information to the public, we explore the impact of frequent information release on the pricing in the credit markets and whether such pricing is efficient. The results show a significant increase in loan pricing for firms with higher peak ground acceleration (PGA) scores following the AEIRS. Such effect is more pronounced in firms in regions where seismic risk was previously unrecognized. The baseline results still stand with several robustness checks including parallel trend analysis, spatial regression discontinuity design, placebo tests, and controlling for loan demand effect, etc. Moreover, the release of earthquake information does not alter the actual frequency of seismic events, ex-post loan defaults, or corporate fundamentals. The increase in loan pricing is primarily driven by banks’ overreaction induced by the availability heuristic, which in turn hinders corporate capital investment and asset growth. Collectively our empirical evidence reveals the dark side of frequent information release.
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Saiying Deng; Xinming Li; Yuchao Peng; Nanxuan Wang; Cong Xia The More the Merrier? The Dark Side of Frequent Release of Information (2026年11月06日) https://www.cfrn.com.cn/lw/16974

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