截至2012年底，中国企业年金的基本养老保险职工参保率仅为8.04%，很难起到真正有效的补充作用。基于中国家庭金融调查（2011）数据，从人力资源效应、节税效应和所有制效应等企业提供企业年金的激励因素着手，考察中国企业年金参保影响因素。首先进行单变量列联表分析，然后进行多变量Logit回归，结果显示：①人力资源效应得到验证，文化程度、工作年限、职称和职务与职工企业年金参保概率正相关；②节税效应没有得到验证，地方政府如果出台过比中央更优惠的企业年金税收政策，该地职工参保概率反而更低。产业与参保概率无关，上市企业职工参保概率更高；③所有制效应得到验证，国有企业的参保概率更高；④控制变量中，地域与参保概率相关，西部最高，东部次之，中部最低。年龄与参保概率负相关。性别、婚姻、政治面貌、户口、民族等与参保概率无关。这表明：①激励中国企业建立企业年金的主要市场因素是企业年金的人力资源效应，企业借企业年金吸引、激励、保留员工；②主要非市场因素是所有制效应，国有企业借企业年金打破薪酬管制；③税收优惠政策的作用不显著。政府应考虑对企业年金覆盖率、缴费水平等进行更详尽的数量规制，并审慎考察税收优惠政策。

投资-现金流敏感性能否用来检验融资约束假说存在颇多争议，投资机会的 衡量偏误和融资约束分组的样本选择偏误对研究的可信性困扰已久。鉴于中国银行为主导的 融资渠道，本文利用银行授信进行分组，通过模型设定检验，发现投资机会的衡量偏误和授 信分组的样本选择同时影响了基于投资-现金流敏感性的统计推断。然而，在控制了二者的 影响后，没有授信的公司表现出显著的投资-现金流敏感性，但获得授信的公司则没有表现 出这种特征。因此，本文认为，在合理控制衡量偏误和样本选择偏误后，投资-现金流敏感 性可以作为检验融资约束假说的依据。

本文通过控制项目自然状态来模拟私有信息环境，通过控制投融资双方的角色比例来体现谈判力，以此来研究两者对直接融资市场上中小企业融资契约选择偏好的影响。实验结果表明：（1）私有信息对融资方的契约选择有显著影响，当双方谈判力均等且融资方具有项目好（坏）状态的私有信息时，融资方最倾向于选择标准债务（股权）契约。（2）在控制私有信息的前提下，投资方拥有谈判力将会导致选择可转债的融资方比例增大。（3）在融资方具有私有信息且投资方拥有谈判力的前提下，投资方谈判力越大，则融资方私有信息对自身契约选择的影响越小。以上研究为消除我国中小企业直接融资市场的信息不对称所带来的负面影响提供了理论支持。

基于上市公司实际控制人的政治关联本文实证检验中国银行业改革是否成功。选择2003-2012年中国上市公司年度数据，分别采用OLS回归模型、固定效应面板回归模型和随机效应面板回归模型从银行贷款可获得性、银行贷款数量和银行贷款结构三个维度进行实证分析，实证结果表明中国上市公司实际控制人的政治关联并不显著地正向影响银行贷款，甚至为显著负向影响。最后通过上市公司财务信息、银行贷款余额、上市公司融资偏好和商业信用四个方面进行稳健性检验。因此，从政治关联的角度来看，中国银行业改革是成功的。

本文研究中国家族上市公司中独立董事的声誉对企业盈余质量的影响。本文以2007—2011年我国家族上市企业为样本，研究了家族企业董事会中独立董事声誉对企业盈余质量的影响，我们没有发现董事会中独立董事的声誉对企业的盈余质量产生影响，但是我们发现审计委员会独立董事的声誉、尤其审计委员会主席的声誉对企业盈余质量有着显著的影响。并且，本文在控制了独立董事的自选择效应后，结论依然成立。本文为研究独立董事的声誉提供了一个新的视角，本文的结论说明，家族企业的独立董事通过审计委员会发挥其治理作用，本文同时对家族企业选聘独董的目的和独董在家族企业发挥的作用有一定的借鉴意义。

　　近年来，我国国有商业银行的治理水平不断提高，治理结构不断优化，形成了具有中国特色的治理框架，具体体现在治理中的政府过度干预、党组织的监督职能、传统文化对治理的深刻影响、独特的内部监督机制等方面。然而，其还存在包括国有股份“一股独大”、内部监督机制存在缺陷、激励约束机制不完善、治理模式有待改进、缺乏法治环境和治理文化、外部治理环境与内部治理难以匹配等问题；今后，国有商业银行公司治理的改进还有赖于逐步改革股权结构、完善内部监控制度、转变治理模式、发展外部市场要素、加强法治建设和培育治理文化等重要途径。

基于2000-2010年我国31个省域的面板数据，采用非参数Malmquist指数法，测算了我国金融发展的经济增长效率（简称金融效率）及其分布特征。研究结论表明：我国的金融效率偏低且没有明显改变。其中，金融创新效率更是低于金融配置效率；金融效率分布具有较为典型的经济区域特征和金融控制程度特征。金融控制程度影响金融效率的提升，特别是抑制金融创新效率。研究表明，我国金融发展对经济增长的作用仍停留在数量扩张和要素堆积阶段，金融创新效率不足是金融效率提升的钳制因素。

本文针对商业银行流动性风险国际监管框架的演变，探讨监管重点与流动性风险变化的互动关系，从而梳理出国际流动性风险监管的目的、手段和发展趋势，进而研究其对我国流动性风险监管实践的影响。 本文从分析商业银行流动性风险的成因入手，指出其根源是银行存款和贷款业务所形成的期限错配，因此这种风险是银行在经营活动中难以避免的。流动性风险区别于银行面临的其他风险的主要表现是其低频率、高损失的特点，这使得银行一旦面临流动性危机的打击就很难在短时间内恢复过来，所以必须引起银行管理层和监管机构的重视。从20世纪90年代起单一的流动性指标监管方法已经逐渐被综合的流动性风险管理体系所取代，但各国之间尚存在较大差异。 本文对次贷危机前美国、英国和东亚各国的流动性风险监管框架作了横向比较。经过比较后发现，在流动性风险监管体系中，存在两种不同的方法，即定性方法和定量方法。前者偏重在制度层面对银行进行指导以提高其流动性风险管理能力，而后者则偏重以硬性指标客观计量和评估流动性风险，两者互有优劣，不可偏废。相对来说，英美国家因为金融制度比较完善、人才水平较高，其监管机构以使用定性方法为主；而东亚各国由于金融发展水平较低，产品结构简单，从业人员水平参差不齐，所以更偏好使用定量方法。 当各国金融监管机构还在为如何在定性方法和定量方法之间进行取舍的时候，美国次贷危机和之后席卷全球的金融危机不期而至，这大大加快了流动性风险管理理念和监管实践的发展速度。作为次贷危机的受害者，本文深入分析了英国北岩银行（Northern Rock plc）的挤兑危机案例，对危机背景、银行的经营特点、事件经过和后续影响都作了较为细致的论述，并指出银行自身流动性风险管理不善是形成危机的主要原因，这表现在不合理的资产负债结构、期限错配、利率缺口以及内部控制的缺失。尽管北岩银行管理层对于流动性危机的发生负有不可推卸的责任，但是监管失败的教训同样发人深省，这间接促成了巴塞尔银行监管委员会（Basel Committee on Banking Supervision，以下简称巴塞尔委员会）制定后危机时代的流动性风险监督管理新框架。 本文回顾了历年巴塞尔委员会制定的流动性风险监管文件，将其大致分为次贷危机前和次贷危机后两大类。本文指出，巴塞尔委员会早期制定的流动性监管框架已经很难适应飞速发展的国际金融形势，面临诸多迫切需要解决的问题，包括融资渠道的变化、资产证券化、复杂金融工具的泛滥、抵押品的广泛应用、支付结算系统和日内流动性需求以及跨境资金流。在这些问题中，很大部分也同样存在于危机前的北岩银行，因此危机的爆发带有某种必然性。巴塞尔委员会在次贷危机后发布的《流动性风险管理和监督稳健原则》和《第三版巴塞尔协议：流动性风险计量、标准和监测的国际框架》奠定了第三版巴塞尔协议下国际流动性风险监管新框架的基石。前者制定的17项流动性风险监管新原则和后者引入的流动性覆盖率（Liquidity Coverage Ratio，简称LCR）和净稳定资金比例（Net Stable Funding Ratio，简称NSFR）两大指标分别从定性方法和定量方法两方面完善了现有的流动性风险监管框架，这也反映了未来国际流动性风险监管的趋势。 正如在本文开篇提到的，流动性风险是银行不可避免的风险，对于中国银行业来说，也不能置身事外。经过分析我国银行业的流动性风险现状，笔者认为我国银行的资产负债结构仍属传统，偏重以存款作为融资来源、以贷款作为盈利来源，因此长期流动性风险不容忽视而短期流动性风险尚属可控。同时，不同类型商业银行的流动性风险来源也有所不同。此外，国内银行的流动性风险管理水平也有待提高。与巴塞尔协议类似，在次贷危机前后，我国的流动性风险监管框架也有了质的飞跃，这主要归功于中国银监会颁布的《中国银行业实施新监管标准的指导意见》、《商业银行流动性风险管理指引》和《商业银行流动性风险管理办法（试行）》（征求意见稿）。这些法规系统性地借鉴巴塞尔委员会的先进经验，辅以本地化的监测工具，从而形成了兼顾定性方法和定量方法的有中国特色的流动性风险监督管理新框架。 本文最后指出，无论是定性方法还是定量方法，在流动性风险监管中都起着举足轻重的作用，两者不可偏废。监管机构在设计流动性风险监管框架并实施现场或非现场监管时，应灵活运用定性方法和定量方法并结合压力情景评估银行的流动性风险，这样才能全面有效地实施流动性风险监管，避免系统性的流动性危机。另外，本文还建议我国监管机构在本地化国际流动性风险监管框架方面做更多尝试。 With respect to the evolution of the international supervision framework for commercial bank’s liquidity risk, this article aims to discuss the interaction between the regulatory focuses and the diversification of liquidity risk, in order to sort out the purposes, approaches and development trends of the international supervision on liquidity risk and their impacts on China’s supervision practice of liquidity risk. In regard to the causes of commercial bank’s liquidity risk, this article points out that the mismatch of maturity between the bank’s deposits and loans is the fundamental reason. Such risk is inevitable when conducting banking business. The features of liquidity risk (i.e. low frequency but extremely severe) distinguish itself from other risks that the bank faces, which hinders the bank from a quick recovery after being stricken by a liquidity crisis. Therefore, both the bank management and the regulators must draw their attentions to it. From 1990s, the monitoring method of single indicator has been gradually replaced with the comprehensive liquidity risk management system. However, there are still big variances between different countries. This article compares the framework for liquidity risk supervision between the United States, the United Kingdom and the East Asian countries prior to the subprime mortgage crisis. It is noted after comparison that there are two different approaches in the liquidity risk supervision system, namely the qualitative approach and the quantitative approach. The former emphasizes improving the bank’s liquidity risk management skill by guiding the bank from governance perspective, while the latter prefers measuring and evaluating the liquidity risk by means of objective indicators. Each of these two approaches has its pros and cons that neither should be overemphasized at the expense of the other. Relatively speaking, the Anglo-American countries prefer qualitative approaches due to their mature financial system as well as professional practitioners. By contrast, East Asian countries rely on quantitative approach because of their under-developing financial system, simple product structure and less experienced practitioners. When the financial regulators in various countries were still wondering whether to adopt the qualitative approach or the quantitative approach, the subprime mortgage crisis occurred in the United States and thereafter became a global financial crisis. This crisis accelerated the development of the management theory and the supervision practice of liquidity risk. This article analyzes the bank run on Northern Rock plc (the Bank) in the United Kingdom, a victim of the subprime mortgage crisis, by elaborating the crisis background, the business features of the Bank, the incident course as well as the subsequent impacts. The major cause of the bank run was the Bank’s own mismanagement of its liquidity risk, which included unbalanced structure of assets and liabilities, maturity mismatch, interest rate gap and ineffective internal control as well. Although the management of the Bank bore the ultimate responsibility for this liquidity crisis, the lesson of the supervision failure was thought-provoking. It also indirectly led to the renewed framework for the post-crisis liquidity risk management and supervision by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel Committee). This article reviews the historical documents of liquidity risk supervision that were formulated by the Basel Committee and divides them into two categories, i.e. before and after the subprime mortgage crisis. This article points out that the framework for liquidity risk supervision which was established by the Basel Committee at the early stage could no longer meet the rapid development of the international financial environment and faced many problems which need be solved urgently. These problems included the change of financing channels, asset securitization, misapplication of complex financial instruments, extensive use of collaterals, payment-settlement system, demand for intraday liquidity and cross-border cash flow. Northern Rock plc had most of these problems prior to its bank run crisis. Therefore, the crisis was with certain inevitability. After the subprime mortgage crisis, the Basel Committee issued “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision” and “Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” which laid the foundation of the renewed international framework for the liquidity risk supervision under Basel III. The former defines 17 new principles of liquidity risk supervision whilst the latter introduces two key indicators, i.e. the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). Both of the two foundational documents improve the existing framework for liquidity risk supervision from qualitative and quantitative aspects respectively. They also reflect the trends of international liquidity risk supervision. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the liquidity risk is inevitable to all banks including the China’s banks. Based on the analysis of the status quo of the Chinese banks’ liquidity risk, the author draws the conclusion that the structures of assets and liabilities of the China’s banks are traditional, i.e. the deposits are the source of financing while the loans are the source of profit. Hence, their long-term liquidity risk cannot be ignored whilst their short-term liquidity risk is still under control. In addition, the liquidity risk management skills of the China’s banks need further improvement. Similar to the Basel Accord, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (the CBRC) promulgated “Guidance Opinions on the Implementation of the New Supervisory Standards of Basel III in China Banking Sector”, “Guidelines on Liquidity Risk Management for Commercial Banks” and “Administrative Measures on Liquidity Risk Management for Commercial Banks (Trial) (Draft for Consultation)” right after the subprime mortgage crisis, which made great improvement in the framework for liquidity risk supervision in China. By referring to the advanced experiences of the Basel Committee, together with the help of the localized monitoring tools, these regulations forms a new framework for liquidity risk management and supervision with Chinese characteristics which takes into account both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. Finally, this article reminds that both the qualitative and quantitative approaches play equally important roles in the field of liquidity risk supervision that neither of them is dispensable. When designing the framework for liquidity risk supervision and conducting the on-site or off-site inspections, the regulators should apply flexibility in the use of qualitative and quantitative approaches and attach importance to the stress scenarios to assess the bank’s liquidity risk. By this means, comprehensive and effective supervision on liquidity risk can be achieved to prevent systemic liquidity crisis. Furthermore, it is suggested that the domestic regulators should make more efforts to localize the international framework for liquidity risk supervision.

企业集团内部成员企业之间的关联关系是影响其信用风险变化的重要因素之一。在评估企业集团信用风险的过程中，如何消除这些复杂关联因素的影响，目前尚无有效的应对方法。基于此，本文尝试基于控制理论，构建了金字塔股权结构下企业集团的现金流线性系统，运用解耦方法消除成员企业之间的相互耦合影响，示例分析表明运用解耦控制消除成员企业之间的耦合影响是具备可行性的，为评估企业集团信用风险提供有效途径。

本文在最一般的多维跳跃扩散过程假设下，推导出Delta对冲组合盈亏（即期权复制误差）所遵循的随机过程，它由四个部分组成，其中包含了跳跃风险以及跳跃风险的风险溢酬。在此理论基础上，我们通过美国SPX期权数据对理论推导的结论进行分样本实证，实证结果证明了我们理论推导的合理性。并且，在考虑了模型风险、市场信息传递效率等以往学者未曾考虑到的控制变量后，结果仍然稳健。