经济下行期，风险传染效应对经济冲击的催化作用对我国金融体系带来挑战，现有研究忽略了从银行、担保等金融、准金融机构向实体企业的流动性风险传染效应，少有对此防范机制与政策建议。运用多案例研究法，本文基于 10 家我国中小企业融资担保机构或组织的不同风险管理模式与实际稳定性，从风险传染理论探究流动性风险传染机制及其管理策略。研究发现：流动性风险会通过银行抽断贷或拒绝放款、担保机构拒偿或追诉从银行、担保机构向中小企业传染，途径银行、担保的流动性风险传染效应可能被加剧、加速，有效应对手段包括寻找内生风险分担方和及时处置不良的行为风险抑制策略，和平衡谈判地位和收益风险配置、构建经营大数据预警机制的经营风险管理策略。本研究丰富了风险传染理论和风险管理理论，引出了金融、准金融机构向实体企业风险传染研究话题，对融资担保业金融创新的实践和监管亦有贡献。

过桥贷款作为一种短期、临时性的非正规金融工具，对我国经济发展与金融稳定有着多重影响。本文利用特有的银行贷款数据，识别样本区间内超过20%的上市公司有使用过桥贷款。证据表明，市场过桥贷款供给越多，实际不良贷款率与披露不良贷款率的相关性越弱，存在更大的隐性金融风险。为此，本文构建了一个包含银行与企业的两部门三期博弈模型，系统地分析过桥贷款的宏观经济效应。模型发现，银行因过桥贷款会逆向选择提高短期贷款利率、降低长期贷款利率，进而加剧了企业的流动性风险。过桥贷款对投资具有双向效应，一方面增加银行续贷可能、缓解部分企业的流动性短缺而促进它们的投资，另一方面增加短期融资成本、引发更多企业的流动性问题而抑制了投资。进一步的分析表明，过桥贷款增加会加剧信贷资源错配，因而产出最大化目标下的最优监管力度相比投资最大化下的最优监管力度更大。

流动性影响股票收益的渠道在传统文献中仍需进一步厘清，本文采用随机折现因子的 方法构建了SDF‐LCAPM 模型，将流动性影响股票收益的渠道分为两个：第一个渠道是股票 自身的流动性特征直接影响股票收益；第二个渠道为流动性是系统风险的组成部分，影响股 票的收益。SDF‐LCAPM 模型提出了将流动性影响资产收益的两个渠道联接的框架，并解开了 流动性的波动性与资产收益负向关系之谜，解释了系统流动性与股票收益率对市场流动性的 敏感度不被定价可能的原因，还发现了流动性与资产收益的协方差在资产定价中有重要的作 用。根据SDF‐LCAPM 模型我们实证发现，不同类型的股票流动性特征和流动性风险对收益 率影响的程度是不同的，这一发现可为投资者流动性风险管理提供参考依据。除此而外， SDF‐LCAPM 模型应用在中国股票市场上，可以提高投资组合的Sharpe 比率，具有一定的应 用价值。

本文针对商业银行流动性风险国际监管框架的演变，探讨监管重点与流动性风险变化的互动关系，从而梳理出国际流动性风险监管的目的、手段和发展趋势，进而研究其对我国流动性风险监管实践的影响。 本文从分析商业银行流动性风险的成因入手，指出其根源是银行存款和贷款业务所形成的期限错配，因此这种风险是银行在经营活动中难以避免的。流动性风险区别于银行面临的其他风险的主要表现是其低频率、高损失的特点，这使得银行一旦面临流动性危机的打击就很难在短时间内恢复过来，所以必须引起银行管理层和监管机构的重视。从20世纪90年代起单一的流动性指标监管方法已经逐渐被综合的流动性风险管理体系所取代，但各国之间尚存在较大差异。 本文对次贷危机前美国、英国和东亚各国的流动性风险监管框架作了横向比较。经过比较后发现，在流动性风险监管体系中，存在两种不同的方法，即定性方法和定量方法。前者偏重在制度层面对银行进行指导以提高其流动性风险管理能力，而后者则偏重以硬性指标客观计量和评估流动性风险，两者互有优劣，不可偏废。相对来说，英美国家因为金融制度比较完善、人才水平较高，其监管机构以使用定性方法为主；而东亚各国由于金融发展水平较低，产品结构简单，从业人员水平参差不齐，所以更偏好使用定量方法。 当各国金融监管机构还在为如何在定性方法和定量方法之间进行取舍的时候，美国次贷危机和之后席卷全球的金融危机不期而至，这大大加快了流动性风险管理理念和监管实践的发展速度。作为次贷危机的受害者，本文深入分析了英国北岩银行（Northern Rock plc）的挤兑危机案例，对危机背景、银行的经营特点、事件经过和后续影响都作了较为细致的论述，并指出银行自身流动性风险管理不善是形成危机的主要原因，这表现在不合理的资产负债结构、期限错配、利率缺口以及内部控制的缺失。尽管北岩银行管理层对于流动性危机的发生负有不可推卸的责任，但是监管失败的教训同样发人深省，这间接促成了巴塞尔银行监管委员会（Basel Committee on Banking Supervision，以下简称巴塞尔委员会）制定后危机时代的流动性风险监督管理新框架。 本文回顾了历年巴塞尔委员会制定的流动性风险监管文件，将其大致分为次贷危机前和次贷危机后两大类。本文指出，巴塞尔委员会早期制定的流动性监管框架已经很难适应飞速发展的国际金融形势，面临诸多迫切需要解决的问题，包括融资渠道的变化、资产证券化、复杂金融工具的泛滥、抵押品的广泛应用、支付结算系统和日内流动性需求以及跨境资金流。在这些问题中，很大部分也同样存在于危机前的北岩银行，因此危机的爆发带有某种必然性。巴塞尔委员会在次贷危机后发布的《流动性风险管理和监督稳健原则》和《第三版巴塞尔协议：流动性风险计量、标准和监测的国际框架》奠定了第三版巴塞尔协议下国际流动性风险监管新框架的基石。前者制定的17项流动性风险监管新原则和后者引入的流动性覆盖率（Liquidity Coverage Ratio，简称LCR）和净稳定资金比例（Net Stable Funding Ratio，简称NSFR）两大指标分别从定性方法和定量方法两方面完善了现有的流动性风险监管框架，这也反映了未来国际流动性风险监管的趋势。 正如在本文开篇提到的，流动性风险是银行不可避免的风险，对于中国银行业来说，也不能置身事外。经过分析我国银行业的流动性风险现状，笔者认为我国银行的资产负债结构仍属传统，偏重以存款作为融资来源、以贷款作为盈利来源，因此长期流动性风险不容忽视而短期流动性风险尚属可控。同时，不同类型商业银行的流动性风险来源也有所不同。此外，国内银行的流动性风险管理水平也有待提高。与巴塞尔协议类似，在次贷危机前后，我国的流动性风险监管框架也有了质的飞跃，这主要归功于中国银监会颁布的《中国银行业实施新监管标准的指导意见》、《商业银行流动性风险管理指引》和《商业银行流动性风险管理办法（试行）》（征求意见稿）。这些法规系统性地借鉴巴塞尔委员会的先进经验，辅以本地化的监测工具，从而形成了兼顾定性方法和定量方法的有中国特色的流动性风险监督管理新框架。 本文最后指出，无论是定性方法还是定量方法，在流动性风险监管中都起着举足轻重的作用，两者不可偏废。监管机构在设计流动性风险监管框架并实施现场或非现场监管时，应灵活运用定性方法和定量方法并结合压力情景评估银行的流动性风险，这样才能全面有效地实施流动性风险监管，避免系统性的流动性危机。另外，本文还建议我国监管机构在本地化国际流动性风险监管框架方面做更多尝试。 With respect to the evolution of the international supervision framework for commercial bank’s liquidity risk, this article aims to discuss the interaction between the regulatory focuses and the diversification of liquidity risk, in order to sort out the purposes, approaches and development trends of the international supervision on liquidity risk and their impacts on China’s supervision practice of liquidity risk. In regard to the causes of commercial bank’s liquidity risk, this article points out that the mismatch of maturity between the bank’s deposits and loans is the fundamental reason. Such risk is inevitable when conducting banking business. The features of liquidity risk (i.e. low frequency but extremely severe) distinguish itself from other risks that the bank faces, which hinders the bank from a quick recovery after being stricken by a liquidity crisis. Therefore, both the bank management and the regulators must draw their attentions to it. From 1990s, the monitoring method of single indicator has been gradually replaced with the comprehensive liquidity risk management system. However, there are still big variances between different countries. This article compares the framework for liquidity risk supervision between the United States, the United Kingdom and the East Asian countries prior to the subprime mortgage crisis. It is noted after comparison that there are two different approaches in the liquidity risk supervision system, namely the qualitative approach and the quantitative approach. The former emphasizes improving the bank’s liquidity risk management skill by guiding the bank from governance perspective, while the latter prefers measuring and evaluating the liquidity risk by means of objective indicators. Each of these two approaches has its pros and cons that neither should be overemphasized at the expense of the other. Relatively speaking, the Anglo-American countries prefer qualitative approaches due to their mature financial system as well as professional practitioners. By contrast, East Asian countries rely on quantitative approach because of their under-developing financial system, simple product structure and less experienced practitioners. When the financial regulators in various countries were still wondering whether to adopt the qualitative approach or the quantitative approach, the subprime mortgage crisis occurred in the United States and thereafter became a global financial crisis. This crisis accelerated the development of the management theory and the supervision practice of liquidity risk. This article analyzes the bank run on Northern Rock plc (the Bank) in the United Kingdom, a victim of the subprime mortgage crisis, by elaborating the crisis background, the business features of the Bank, the incident course as well as the subsequent impacts. The major cause of the bank run was the Bank’s own mismanagement of its liquidity risk, which included unbalanced structure of assets and liabilities, maturity mismatch, interest rate gap and ineffective internal control as well. Although the management of the Bank bore the ultimate responsibility for this liquidity crisis, the lesson of the supervision failure was thought-provoking. It also indirectly led to the renewed framework for the post-crisis liquidity risk management and supervision by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel Committee). This article reviews the historical documents of liquidity risk supervision that were formulated by the Basel Committee and divides them into two categories, i.e. before and after the subprime mortgage crisis. This article points out that the framework for liquidity risk supervision which was established by the Basel Committee at the early stage could no longer meet the rapid development of the international financial environment and faced many problems which need be solved urgently. These problems included the change of financing channels, asset securitization, misapplication of complex financial instruments, extensive use of collaterals, payment-settlement system, demand for intraday liquidity and cross-border cash flow. Northern Rock plc had most of these problems prior to its bank run crisis. Therefore, the crisis was with certain inevitability. After the subprime mortgage crisis, the Basel Committee issued “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision” and “Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” which laid the foundation of the renewed international framework for the liquidity risk supervision under Basel III. The former defines 17 new principles of liquidity risk supervision whilst the latter introduces two key indicators, i.e. the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). Both of the two foundational documents improve the existing framework for liquidity risk supervision from qualitative and quantitative aspects respectively. They also reflect the trends of international liquidity risk supervision. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the liquidity risk is inevitable to all banks including the China’s banks. Based on the analysis of the status quo of the Chinese banks’ liquidity risk, the author draws the conclusion that the structures of assets and liabilities of the China’s banks are traditional, i.e. the deposits are the source of financing while the loans are the source of profit. Hence, their long-term liquidity risk cannot be ignored whilst their short-term liquidity risk is still under control. In addition, the liquidity risk management skills of the China’s banks need further improvement. Similar to the Basel Accord, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (the CBRC) promulgated “Guidance Opinions on the Implementation of the New Supervisory Standards of Basel III in China Banking Sector”, “Guidelines on Liquidity Risk Management for Commercial Banks” and “Administrative Measures on Liquidity Risk Management for Commercial Banks (Trial) (Draft for Consultation)” right after the subprime mortgage crisis, which made great improvement in the framework for liquidity risk supervision in China. By referring to the advanced experiences of the Basel Committee, together with the help of the localized monitoring tools, these regulations forms a new framework for liquidity risk management and supervision with Chinese characteristics which takes into account both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. Finally, this article reminds that both the qualitative and quantitative approaches play equally important roles in the field of liquidity risk supervision that neither of them is dispensable. When designing the framework for liquidity risk supervision and conducting the on-site or off-site inspections, the regulators should apply flexibility in the use of qualitative and quantitative approaches and attach importance to the stress scenarios to assess the bank’s liquidity risk. By this means, comprehensive and effective supervision on liquidity risk can be achieved to prevent systemic liquidity crisis. Furthermore, it is suggested that the domestic regulators should make more efforts to localize the international framework for liquidity risk supervision.

：在现有的资产定价理论基础上，研究了非完全市场下的风险资产定价问题。首先在无套利下对流动性风险进行定价，得到流动性风险的市场价格，进而给出了无风险资产和风险资产的有效前沿。再从风险构成的角度给出了流动性风险的测度和市场价格，推导出两种形式的基于流动性风险的资本资产定价模型（以相对量表示风险的LBCAPM和以绝对量表示风险的LBCAPM）并揭示了资产期望回报的形成过程。最后，介绍了定价模型的应用前景。

随着国内债券市场规模迅速增长，对于债券定价的各类研究变得日益重要。关于定价和利差的解释，国内外研究集中在违约风险（反映为信用利差）和流动性风险（反映为流动性利差）方面。国内银行间企业类债券市场为商业银行主导的市场结构，存在交易商协会注册制和发改委审批制两大体系，发行人主要为国有企业和投融资平台。限于发展时间较短，历史市场价格和违约数据积累不足，给研究分析带来了诸多困难。 本文以实践角度出发，提出了“企业类债券收益率=同期限无风险利率+信用利差+流动性利差+其他因素（例如税收利差）”的分析范式。在一级市场，本文发现：1、交易商协会发布的“指导定价”是发行利率的决定性因素；2、债券种类和结构会影响债券发行利率，企业债券和中小企业集合票据的发行利率明显高于其他同评级债券，但债券回售和赎回条款未被有效定价。在二级市场，本文选取国债和政策性金融债作为无风险利率，对3-5年中期票据的收益率进行回归分析。结论为：1、国内中期票据收益率大部分可以由无风险利率和信用评级所解释，税收因素也在债券交易定价中得到了反映；2、3年期中期票据信用等级每降低1级，收益率大约上升42.5bps；5年期中期票据信用等级每降低1级，收益率大约上升45bps；3、高评级债券的收益率变动能被无风险利率收益率变动解释的程度要高于低评级债券的收益率变动；4、宏观资金面紧张时，企业类债券的信用利差和流动性利差倾向于上升。本文还选取了铁道部发行债券作为实际案例，就信用风险和流动性风险对铁道债的收益率变化的影响，以及财税支持行动的效果进行了简要分析。 基于上述分析，本文最后针对投资银行的业务发展提出了两点意见：1、抓住金融脱媒机遇，大力布局债券承销、资产证券化和资产管理业务；2.发展银行间做市业务和定价模型，提升交易和销售能力。

流动性是金融市场的核心要素，系统流动性驱动着个股流动性的形成。本文拓展了 FDR 法，并研究了中国市场股票系统流动性的存在性和影响因素，结果发现：中国市场显著存在 的只有与市场有正向变动的系统流动性，并且系统流动性具有一定的持续性，这意味着系统 流动性风险不能被充分分散。本文还发现股票的波动率越高、公司规模越小或市场收益率越 低，系统流动性越大。中国市场的系统流动性风险是系统风险的组成部分，投资者需要谨慎 关注。

在现有的资产定价理论基础上，研究了非完全市场下的风险资产定价问题。首先在无套利下对流动性风险进行定价，得到流动性风险的市场价格，进而给出了无风险资产和风险资产的有效前沿。再从风险构成的角度给出了流动性风险的测度和市场价格，推导出两种形式的基于流动性风险的资本资产定价模型（以相对量表示风险的LBCAPM和以绝对量表示风险的LBCAPM）并揭示了资产期望回报的形成过程。最后，介绍了定价模型的应用前景。

中小企业的融资需求往往不同于大企业。针对中小企业对融资产品的差异化需求，如何加强金融产品和服务创新，提高风险定价能力，并在此过程中挖掘自身的发展潜力，是商业银行在当前形式下求发展的契机。基于该背景，文章引入模糊决策理论，在采用相关参变量表征展期贷款特有风险因子基础上，对中小企业作为需求主体的、在信贷市场上已几趋萎缩的展期贷款产品进行风险定价研究，提出了一类包含信用风险、市场风险、流动性风险等的整合风险框架下的定价模型。文中的应用分析表明：基于无套利均衡的中小企业展期贷款风险定价，对扩展中小企业融资渠道以及缓解中小企业融资难问题大有裨益。其次，基于文章所提模型的定价能克服现实中的把“浮动比例”作为唯一风险溢价衡量指标、贷款定价随意性较大的弊端。最后，贷款风险定价是科学也是艺术。模糊决策方法的引入，使银行信贷专家的看法直接融入到模型设计中，它对提高模型定价结果的市场竞争力具有重要意义。

本文基于我国沪深两市1997年1月至2010年12月的数据，分别在二元马尔可夫区制转换模型和Carhart(1997)四因子模型框架下检验了我国股市收益与市场流动性的动态关系。实证结果表明，我国股市单位流动性风险溢价存在显著的时变性，可区分为“低流动性β”和“高流动性β”区制；但是，当控制了Carhart四因子后，时变性仍然显著，低流动性β区制下的流动性溢价则不再显著。此外，我国股市存在流动性转移（flight to liquidity）现象。股市的高换手率、高波动和经济增长的放缓可对此时变性进行预测，利率和货币供应量等货币政策变量则不具前瞻性。