According to prospect theory [Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk, Eco- nometrica, 47, 263–292], gains and losses are measured from a reference point. We attempted to ascertain to what extent the refer- ence point shifts following gains or losses. In questionnaire studies, we asked subjects what stock price today will generate the same utility as a previous change in a stock price. From participants’ responses, we calculated the magnitude of reference point adapta- tion, which was significantly greater following a gain than following a loss of equivalent size. We also found the asymmetric adap- tation of gains and losses persisted when a stock was included within a portfolio rather than being considered individually. In studies using financial incentives within the BDM procedure [Becker, G. M., DeGroot, M. H., & Marschak, J. (1964). Measuring utility by a single-response sequential method. Behavioral Science, 9(3), 226–232], we again noted faster adaptation of the reference point to gains than losses. We related our findings to several aspects of asset pricing and investor behavior.

We show that the personal traits of analysts, as revealed by their political donations, influence their forecasting behavior and stock prices. Analysts who contribute primarily to the Republican Party adopt a more conservative fore- casting style. Their earnings forecast revisions are less likely to deviate from the forecasts of other analysts and are less likely to be bold. Their stock recommen- dations also contain more modest upgrades and downgrades. Overall, these analysts produce better quality research, which is recognized and rewarded by their employers, institutional investors, and the media. Stock market participants, how- ever, do not fully recognize their superior ability as the market reaction following revisions by these analysts is weaker.

Prior literature shows that implied volatility spreads between call and put options are positively related to future underlying stock returns. In this paper, however, we demon- strate that the volatility spreads are negatively related to future out-of-the-money call option returns. Using unique data on option volumes, we reconcile the two pieces of evidence by showing that option demand by sophisticated, firm investors drives the posi- tive stock return predictability based on volatility spreads, while demand by less sophis- ticated, customer investors drives the negative call option return predictability. Overall, our evidence suggests that volatility spreads contain information about both firm funda- mentals and option mispricing.

Using one of the largest samples of litigation data available to date, we examine whether the political culture of a firm determines its propensity for corporate misconduct. We measure political culture using the politi- cal contributions of top managers, firm political action committees, and local residents. We show that firms with a Republican culture are more likely to be the subject of civil rights, labor, and environmental litigation than are Democratic firms, consistent with the Democratic ideology that emphasizes equal rights, labor rights, and envi- ronmental protection. However, firms with a Democratic culture are more likely to be the subject of litigation related to securities fraud and intellectual property rights violations than are Republican firms, whose party ideology stresses self-reliance, property rights, market discipline, and limited government regulation. Upon lit- igation filing, both types of firms experience similar announcement reaction, which suggests that the observed relationship between political culture and corporate misconduct is unlikely to reflect differences in expected litigation costs.

This article proposes a semi-martingale approximation to a fractional Lévy process that is capable of capturing long and short memory in the stochastic process together with fat tails. The authors use the semi-martingale process in option pricing and empirically compare its performance to other option pricing models, including a stochastic volatility Lévy process. They contribute to the empirical literature by being the first to report the implied Hurst index computed from observed option prices using the Lévy process model. Calibrating the implied Hurst index of S&P 500 option prices in a period that covers the 2008 financial crisis, they find that the risk-neutral measure is characterized by a short memory in turbulent markets and a long memory in calm markets.

We study when CEOs with legal expertise are valuable for firms. In general, lawyer CEOs are negatively associated with frequency and severity in employment civil rights, contract, labor, personal injury, and securities litigation. This effect is partly induced by the CEO’s man- agement of litigation risk and reduction in other risky policies. Lawyer CEOs are further associated with an increase in gatekeepers providing additional legal oversight and a decrease in innovative activities with high litigation risk. Lawyer CEOs are more valuable during periods of enhanced compliance requirements and regulatory pressure and in indus- tries with high litigation risk or better growth opportunities.

We demonstrate that personal political preferences of corporate managers influence cor- porate policies. Specifically, Republican managers who are likely to have conservative personal ideologies adopt and maintain more conservative corporate policies. Those firms have lower levels of corporate debt, lower capital and research and development (R&D) expenditures, less risky investments, but higher profitability. Using the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Sept. 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as natural experiments, we demonstrate that investment policies of Republican managers became more conservative following these ex- ogenous uncertainty-increasing events. Furthermore, around chief executive officer (CEO) turnovers, including CEO deaths, firm leverage policy becomes more conservative when managerial conservatism increases.

We find that investors react more favorably to corporate announcements of share repurchases, SEOs, earnings, dividend changes, and acquisitions if the announcement is made immediately prior to or on holidays. These announcements are associated with more positive reactions for favorable events and less negative reactions for unfavorable events. This effect is robust to controls for market conditions and a selection bias, is accompanied by subsequent reversals, and is present in several international markets. Our findings suggest that predictable individual mood changes can cause biases in market reactions to firm-specific news.

Existing research has found cross-sectional seasonality of stock returns—the periodic out- performance of certain stocks during the same calendar months or weekdays. We hypoth- esize that assets’ different sensitivities to investor mood explain these effects and imply other seasonalities. Consistent with our hypotheses, relative performance across individ- ual stocks or portfolios during past high or low mood months and weekdays tends to recur in periods with congruent mood and reverse in periods with noncongruent mood. Furthermore, assets with higher sensitivities to aggregate mood—higher mood betas— subsequently earn higher returns during ascending mood periods and earn lower returns during descending mood periods.

Using three natural experiments, we test the hypothesis that investor overconfidence produces overpricing of high idiosyncratic volatility stocks in the presence of binding short-sale constraints. We study three events: IPO lockup expirations, option introductions, and the 2008 short-sale ban on financial firms. Consistent with our prediction, we show that when short-sale constraints are relaxed, event stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility tend to experience greater price reductions, as well as larger increases in trading volume and short interest, than those with low idiosyncratic volatility. These results hold when we benchmark event stocks with non-event stocks with comparable idiosyncratic volatility. Overall, our findings suggest that biased investor beliefs and binding short-sale constraints contribute to idiosyncratic volatility overpricing.