The China-U.S. trade frictions and COVID-19 pandemic have caused unprecedentedly high economic policy uncertainty since 2017. To resist this high uncertainty, investors may prefer large stocks over small stocks, thereby damaging the size effect. To test this inference, we apply data from China to show that the size effect becomes insignificant after 2017. However, a significant size effect re-emerges among stocks with low valuations or low volatility, and this is positively associated with the increment of the economic policy uncertainty index. We also find that when uncertainty increases, institutional investors increase their holdings in small stocks before 2017, but hold more large stocks after 2017. Our findings consistently suggest that high policy uncertainty may change investors' preferences for firm size and cause the disappearance of the size effect, and only among stocks with low risk, size effects may show up due to low-risk small firms' similar function in resisting market uncertainty as large firms. Other mechanisms, such as the quality premium, unexpected profitability shock, shell value, or M&A option value, are not applicable in explaining the findings in China. Our study contributes to proposing a new mechanism for the time-variability of the size effect.

The past decade has witnessed a phenomenal rise of digital wallets, and the COVID-19 pandemic further accelerated their adoption globally. Such e-wallets provide not only a conduit to external bank accounts but also internal payment options, including the ever-popular Buy-Now-Pay-Later (BNPL). We examine, for the first time, e-wallet transactions matched with merchant and consumer information from a world-leading provider based in China, with around one billion users globally and a business model that other e-wallet providers quickly converge to. We document that internal payment options, especially BNPL, dominate both online and on-site transactions. BNPL has greatly expanded credit access at the extensive margin through its adoption in two-sided payment markets. While BNPL crowds out other e-wallet payment options, it expands FinTech credit to underserved consumers. Exploiting a randomized experiment, we also find that e-wallet credit through BNPL substantially boosts consumer spending. Nevertheless, users, especially those relying on e-wallets as their sole credit source, carefully moderate borrowing when incurring interest charges. The insights likely prove informative for economies transitioning from cash-heavy to cashless societies where digital payments and FinTech credit see the largest growth and market potential.

Whether responsible investing reduces portfolio risk remains open to discussion. We study the relationship between ESG performance and downside risk at fund level in the Chinese equity mutual fund market. We find that fund ESG performance is positively associated with fund downside risk during the period between July 2018 and March 2021, and that the positive relationship weakens during the COVID-19 pandemic. We propose three channels through which fund ESG performance could affect fund downside risk: (i) the firm channel in which the risk-mitigation effect of portfolio firms’ good ESG practices could be manifested at fund level, (ii) the diversification channel in which the portfolio concentration of high ESG-rated funds could amplify fund downside risk, and (iii) the flow channel in which fund ESG performance may attract greater investor flows that could reduce fund downside risk. We show evidence that the observed time-varying relationship between fund ESG performance and downside risk is driven by the relative force of the three channels.

How to shape a firm’s stock price resilience in the increasingly uncertain environment has become an important topic. This paper investigates the effect of important market participantsfinancial analysts-on stock price resilience. Based on data from 3,444 listed firms from China, we find that firms with higher analyst coverage are more resilient during the Covid-19 induced crisis, which is manifested by a lower pandemic-induced decline in stock price, shorter duration of decline period, higher recovery probability, and shorter duration of the recovery period after the shock. This positive relationship is more prominent for small firms but does not depend on ownership type, and the ratio of star analyst coverage. Further channel tests show that analysts could help in attracting attention from media and institutional investors, improving corporate governance, and reducing financial constraints, which in turn enhance the ability of stock prices to absorb pandemic shocks.

This paper provides new estimates of the housing stock, construction rates and price developments by city tier in China in order to understand where excess supply might be concentrated, and the implications of any significant contraction. We also update estimates of the size of China’s rapidly evolving real estate sector through 2021, allowing one to look at the initial impact of COVID-19, as well as extending the analysis to incorporate urban-expansion related infrastructure construction. We argue that China overall faces imbalances between supply and demand for housing stock, but the problem is significantly deeper in the generally smaller and lower income tier 3 cities, which nevertheless account for more than 60% of both China’s GDP and its housing stock.

The foreign capital flight amid pandemic outbreaks can result in propagation effects in the equity market. With a daily shareholding dataset, this paper investigates the trading behavior of foreign mutual funds in China when it was the epicenter of COVID-19 outbreaks and the subsequent period with global spreads. Using fixed effects and panel structural VAR models, we confirm propagation effects caused by the capital flight of foreign mutual funds. Substantial heterogeneities across foreign funds affiliated and unaffiliated with commercial banks have been uncovered, though they are both found to withdraw from risky stocks as an indication of a "flight to quality." Without implicit guarantees, unaffiliated foreign mutual funds liquidated immediately and more when the pandemic hit China. The resulting price shocks led to further deleverage by bank-affiliated foreign funds on their pre-pandemic risk exposure stocks. Our results shed new light on the behavioral theory of stock market trading featuring fund and stock exposure channels.

This paper investigates the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the volatility spillover and dependence structure among the major developed and emerging stock markets. The TVP-VAR connectedness decomposition approach and R-vine copula are implemented in this research. The results of the TVP-VAR connectedness decomposition approach reveal that the volatility spillover among the major developed and emerging stock markets has been significantly strengthened by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, although it has gradually faded over time. In addition, during the pandemic, the UK, German, French and Canadian stock markets are the spillover transmitters, while the Japanese, Chinese Hong Kong, Chinese and Indian stock markets are the receivers. It is also found that the US and Brazilian stock markets have undergone role shifts after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The results of the R-vine copula model indicate that during the pandemic, the Canadian, French, and Chinese Hong Kong stock markets are the most important financial centre in the American, European, and Asian stock markets, respectively. Furthermore, the effect of the extreme risk contagion has been strengthened by the pandemic, particularly the downside risk contagion.

The crypto and noncrypto markets used to be separated from each other. We argue that with the rapid development of stablecoins since 2018, risks are now transmitted between the crypto and noncrypto markets through stablecoins, which are both pegged to noncrypto assets and play a central role in crypto trading. Applying copula-based CoVaR approaches, we find significant risk spillovers between stablecoins and cryptocurrencies as well as between stablecoins and noncrypto markets, which could help explain the tail dependency between the crypto and noncrypto markets from 2019 to 2021. We also document that the risk spillovers through stablecoins are asymmetric—stronger in the direction from the US dollar to the crypto market than vice versa—which suggests the crypto market is re-dollarizing. Further analyses consider alternative explanations, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and institutional crypto holdings, and determine that the primary channels of risk transmission are stablecoins’ US dollar peg to the noncrypto market and their transaction-medium function in the crypto ecosystem. Our results have important implications for financial stability and shed light on the future of stablecoin regulation.

In the dollar-denominated corporate bond market, 42% of bonds with an amount outstanding of USD 5.9 Trillion are issued by non-US firms. Despite the increasing importance of cross-border financing, foreign issuers are paying an extra premium of 23 bps, compared with their US counterparts. A similar foreign discount exists in the euro-denominated corporate bond and dollar-denominated sovereign bond market. Contrary to the common view, the standard risk and risk aversion cannot explain the discount. I propose a theoretical explanation based on uncertainty aversion. The model can generate the uncertainty effect in the cross-section and the volatility effect in the time series, both are supported by the data. Taking Covid-19 as an event study, I further document a foreign squeeze effect by showing that foreign dollar bonds suffer higher selling pressure relative to US dollar bonds during market turmoil. Such foreign discount (USA effect) dominates the dollar safety premium (USD effect). My results highlight the foreign discount and foreign squeeze effects in the international cross-border investment and financing.

Utilizing a national online survey we conducted in China, we examine the impact of COVID-19 on individuals’ willingness to take risks, willingness to trust other people, and mental health measured by the Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression (CES-D) scale. Our findings suggest that people who live in the neighborhood with a higher number of confirmed cases became more risk-averse, less likely to trust others, and more depressed. Interestingly, the effects on risk preferences and trust attitudes are statistically significant only for men, and the effects on depression are statistically significant only for women. Furthermore, the impact of COVID-19 on financial decisions, such as buying new commercial insurance and making a risky investment, is also statistically significant only for men, which is consistent with our findings on risk preferences. Attitudes towards cadres and doctors mainly drive the results on trust attitudes. The change in employment status does not drive these effects.