Using an extended overlapping generations (OLG) model, we theoretically prove that functional inequality resulting from weak labor bargaining power can be a key driver of high saving rates, as observed in China and other labor- abundant Asian emerging markets. Income distribution that favors capital over labor may attract excess capital investments and hence lead to high saving rates. The link between inequality and saving is especially prominent for the household sector because excess return on capital motivates the working-age population to increase their retirement savings. We also find empirical support for our theoretical predictions using China’s sectoral-level data.

In recent years, the phenomenon of ‘greenwashing’ of corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) reports has been on the rise, seriously interfering with normal capital investment behaviour. This paper explores the relationship between investor concerns and the ‘greenwashing’ of corporate ESG reports, using Chinese A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2021 as a sample. The results show that green finance policies significantly contribute to the ‘greenwashing’ of ESG reports of heavily polluting companies. Under the pressure of green finance policies, heavily polluting companies have more incentives to ‘greenwash’ their ESG reports to relieve financing pressure. This paper’s findings suggest that green finance policies that promote enterprises’ green transformation may negatively induce enterprises to make false ESG disclosures.

This paper documents that ffrms are increasingly financing innovation using their stock of innovation, measured as patents. We refer to this behavior as financing innovation with innovation. Drawing on patent collateral data from both the US and China, we first show that (1) in both countries, the total number and share of patents pledged as collateral have been rising steadily, (2) Chinese firms employ patents as collateral on a smaller scale and with a lower intensity than US firms, (3) firms increase their borrowing and innovation after they start to use patent collateral. We then construct a heterogeneous firm general equilibrium model featuring idiosyncratic productivity risk, innovation capital investment, and borrowing constrained by patent collateral. The model emphasizes two barriers that hinder the use of patent collateral: high inspection costs and low liquidation values of patent assets. We parameterize the model to firm-level panel data in the US and China and find that both barriers are significantly more severe in China than in the US. Finally, counterfactual analyses show that the gains in innovation, output, and welfare from reducing the inspection costs in China to the US level are substantial, moreso than enhancing the liquidation value of patent assets.

Using a large sample of over 5,000 start-ups across various industries and 524 media outlets in China between 2000 and 2016, we examine the effects of media coverage of start-ups on VC investment decisions and performance. To the best of our knowledge, for the first time in the finance literature, we have discovered that media coverage of start-ups significantly affects VC investment decisions and exit performance. Specifically, such coverage, especially positive coverage, significantly increases the probability and amount of VC investments in start-ups. It also significantly improves the exit performance of VC investments. The significant effects of media coverage of start-ups on VC investments are driven by market-oriented instead of state-controlled media. We further find that VC investments in a focal start-up are significantly influenced by the average media coverage of other start-ups in the same industry or the same city. Our results are robust to a battery of robustness tests. Our research contributes to the behavioral finance literature by showing that an increasingly prominent type of institutional investors, venture capitalists, just like individual investors, are also subject to limited attention. Our research also extends the research by You, Zhang and Zhang (2018) by revealing the heterogeneous effects of market-oriented and state-controlled media on VC investments. Last but not the least, we are the first to discover that peer start-ups’ media coverage matters for VC investments in the focal firms, thereby pushing the frontier of research on the roles of media in finance.

Exploiting staggered COVID-19 lockdowns and reopening across different regions in China, we study how lockdowns affect the investment decisions of venture capital (VC) investors and whether such changes are temporary or enduring in the post-pandemic era. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that lockdowns exacerbate the “tyranny of distance” (i.e., VCs avoid investing in remote ventures), our findings suggest the “death of distance”: VCs invest in remoter ventures during a lockdown and such effects persist even after the economy reopens. Such lockdown effects are more pronounced when there is better internet infrastructure, when the level of information asymmetry between VCs and entrepreneurs is lower, and when VCs are more experienced. The lockdown effects can be explained by the advancement and adoption of remote communication technology as a response to the social distancing requirements. As geographic boundaries of VC investment are shattered by remote communication technology, local competition among VCs has been intensified, the monopoly power of VCs has been curtailed, and the regional inequality of entrepreneurial access to VC financing has been mitigated.

We investigate the impact of state ownership structure on asset prices and corporate policies. By primarily focusing on China’s corporations, we show that the relationship between expected returns and capital investment varies significantly across state owned enterprises (SOE) and private owned enterprises (POE). A portfolio that longs low investment and shorts high investment firms earns an average annual excess stock return of 5% in the SOE sector. In contrast, there is no relationship between investment and expected returns in the POE sector. We show that the difference in the link between expected returns and investment across SOE and POE firms is driven by their differential exposures to the debt issuance shocks, which captures the monetary supply shocks in China. As SOE firms have easier access to bank loans, the high investment firms in the SOE sector are more able to raise debt despite that debt supply is shrinking, and hence they are less risky. We develop a dynamic model with SOE and POE firms facing different frictions in debt markets. The economic mechanism emphasizes that heterogeneous access to the debt market is an important determinant of equilibrium risk premiums across sectors with different state ownership.

Using a panel of listed Chinese firms over the period 2001-2008, we investigate the interactions among corporate investment, financing, and payout decisions within a simultaneous equations system, where each decision is treated as endogenous and is subject to the constraint that sources much equal uses of cash, as implied by the flow-of-funds framework. We find that capital investment and dividend payout, being the competing uses of limited funds, are negatively interrelated, whilst both of them are positively connected to net amount of new debt issued, suggesting the existence of a joint determination of corporate decisions under financial constraints. In addition, we find that the simultaneity among the corporate decisions becomes more intensified for firms that are more financially constrained, which may reduce managerial flexibility of Chinese firms. Therefore, our result reveals new insight into the complex interdependence of corporate behaviour under financial constraints.

This paper studies idiosyncratic risk of new ventures. An option-based model of a new venture with multistage investments and jumps is developed. Our model ex- plains (1) why new ventures?idiosyncratic volatility eventually decreases as they clear R&D investment stages and become mature ?rms ?the stage-clearing e¤ect; (2) the negative relation between jumps in value and subsequent idiosyncratic volatility ?the jump e¤ect; (3) the dynamics of idiosyncratic volatility under di¤erent schedules of staged venture capital investments; and (4) the e¤ect of di¤erent schedules of staged investments on ?rm valuation with the presence of jumps. Empirically, we develop a generalized Markov-Switching EARCH model to simultaneously capture structural changes in ?rms?idiosyncratic volatility and the relation between jumps and idiosyn- cratic volatility. Using a hand-collected dataset of early-stage biotech ?rms, we ?nd empirical evidence supporting the jump e¤ect and the stage-clearing e¤ect described by our model.

This paper investigates the value effect of large investors through their impact on corporate investment policy using a sample of listed firms in the Chinese stock market where large shareholdings and concentrated ownership are a norm. We find that the impact of capital expenditures on firm value is closely related to the level of large shareholdings (non-tradable or state shareholdings). Capital expenditures are negatively associated with firm value if firms are controlled by entrenched large shareholders. Although there is a general tendency of over-investment, the negative impact of over-investment is cancelled out if firms are controlled by incentive-aligned large shareholders. We also find that, the incentive-alignment effect of large investors is stronger in scenarios where agency conflicts are more intensified. Our findings suggest that capital investment is an important channel through which the value effect of large investors is achieved.

Business groups organized by pyramids enable the ultimate shareholders to control a portfolio of firms with less cash requirement. Further, corporate pyramid induces an internal capital market and makes capital transfer more convenient within the pyramid. In China, the state and business groups control a large number of listed firms through pyramidal ownership structure. What role does the corporate pyramid play in firms’ investment decisions? What is its influence on firm performance? This paper investigates the capital investment and firm performance from the perspective of pyramidal ownership structure. We find that as the layers of corporate pyramid increases, the capital overinvestment declines. The negative relations between pyramid and overinvestment exist for both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs), which indicate that increasing the layers within corporate pyramid reduces the likelihood of overinvestment of the listing firm and improving investment efficiency. Moreover, we show that the effects of increasing the layers of corporate pyramid on accounting performance are different for SOEs and NSOES. For SOEs, increasing the layers of pyramid results in less government interference on the listed firm and more flexibility in operate. Therefore, increasing pyramidal layers is positively related to accounting performance. While for NSOEs, pyramiding is to build an internal capital market for the ultimate shareholder’s capital investment. Although pyramid may reduce overinvestment of the listing firm, agency costs may offset the positive effect and induce a lower accounting performance.