We examine whether the gains from incentive realignment have driven corporations out of the public security market. It is shown that going private transactions are due to the reduction in the diversification gains from the public market. The anticipated gains from incentive realignment are likely to be lowest among firms whose managers own most equity and the leverages are high. Avoiding the high cost of being public is the primary consideration for managers to take a firm private. Such firms go private because of financial distress and dwindling profitability. These kinds of going-private activities are counter-cyclical. On the other hand, a less distressed firm with diffused ownership has high anticipated incentive gains. The gain from incentive realignment is the dominant factor for these going-private transactions. Such firms go private because of an increase in profitability or an improvement in financial distress. We show that these going-private activities are pro-cyclical.

Standard principal-agent theory predicts that the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) decreases in the risk of the firm. An alternative literature argues that entrenched executives as in weakly governed firms use compensation contract to extract the rent, which renders risk irrelevant in determining PPS. This paper uses event study approach to test both principal-agent model and CEO power theory by studying changes in executives’ compensation contract around litigation events. Consistent with principalagent model prediction, we find that, after the initiation of litigation, PPS drops, compensation shifts from performance-sensitive component (equity) to performanceinvariant component (cash). In addition, all the changes reverse themselves after litigation settlements. To test CEO power theory, we further partition the event firms into firms with good and bad corporate governance. We find that the PPS in firms with bad corporate governance increases after lawsuit and decreases after the settlement. This suggests that litigation brings the bad compensation practice of poorly governed firms to the limelight and forces firms to discipline their CEOs temporarily during the litigation period (so called “limelight effect”), which lends indirect support to CEO power theory. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests including two endogeneity tests.

The debate among various market partic-ipants on the short-selling of securities continues today. Opponents of short-selling argue that it disrupts orderly mar-kets by causing panic selling, high vola-tility, and market crashes. So this paper investigates what the impact of short sell-ing on the volatility and liquidity of Hong Kong stock market is, and the results in-dicate that short selling volumes do not Granger-cause market volatility, but volatility Granger-cause short selling volumes. Moreover Granger causality tests show that there is a double direc-tional causality relationship between short selling volumes and market liquidity.

In this paper, we pay attention to the relationship between stock index and increments of trading accounts in A, B share market and funds. We show that there exists bilateral relationship between A, B index and their trading accounts increments. However, Granger causality only exists from stock index to increments of funds accounts. Regressions show that the investors’ sentiment will be easily driven by the index in the same direction, which imply momentum strategy in a very short period. In comparison, when using weekly data, only increments of funds accounts Granger cause the stock index. These uncover the differences between fund managers and small investors while investing on stock market. We also analyse the relationship between index volatility and trading accounts volatility.

This paper examines a wide variety of popular volatility models for stock index return, including Random Walk model, Autoregressive model, Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model, and extensive GARCH model, GARCH-jump model with Normal, and Student-t distribution assumption as well as nonparametric specification test of these models. We fit these models to Dhaka stock return index from November 20, 1999 to October 9, 2004. There has been empirical evidence of volatility clustering, alike to findings in previous studies. Each market contains different GARCH models, which fit well. From the estimation, we find that the volatility of the return and the jump probability were significantly higher after November 27, 2001. The model introducing GARCH jump effect with normal and Student-t distribution assumption can better fit the volatility characteristics. We find that that RW-GARCH-t, RW-AGARCH-t RW-IGARCH-t and RW-GARCH-M-t can pass the nonparametric specification test at 5% significance level. It is suggested that these four models can capture the main characteristics of Dhaka stock return index.

This study analyzes the effect of social pressures on CEO compensation focusing on social interactions within 60 miles of the firm. Social premiums in CEO pay are in excess of what can be explained by firm performance and characteristics, corporate governance, and local economic variables. Using the S&P 500 companies during 1994-2005, we show that the average social premium in a social circle with 31 CEOs (the 75th percentile of social circles) is $1.29 million higher than that in a circle with six CEOs (the 25th percentile). Golfing, sharing directors, and comparing mansions are likely avenues of social interactions.

We investigate the information cost of stock trading during the 2000 presidential election. We find that the uncertainty of the election induces information asymmetry of politically sensitive firms under the Bush/Gore platforms. The unusual delay in election results in a significant increase in the adverse selection component of trading cost of politically sensitive stocks. Cross-sectional variations in bid-ask spreads are significantly and positively related to changes in information cost, controlling for the effects of liquidity cost and stock characteristics. This empirical evidence is robust to different estimation methods.

We evaluate the efficacy of price discovery in the round-the-clock U.S. Treasury market. Using a comprehensive intraday database, we explore informational role of trades over the 24-hour day. We find that information asymmetry is generally highest in the preopen period and lowest in the postclose period. Information asymmetry in the overnight period is comparable to that in the regular trading period. However, on days with macroeconomic announcements, information asymmetry peaks shortly after the news release at 8:30. Moreover, information asymmetry is higher on Monday morning and higher immediately before than after the open of U.S. Treasury futures trading. Although volume is low after hours and trading cost is relatively high, overnight trading generates significant price discovery. Results suggest that overnight trading activity is an important part of the Treasury price discovery process.

This paper tests the smart money effects about equity mutual fund flow, and provides some good sights for the international investments. First, it provides some evidence of the outperformance of equity mutual funds using Chinese equity mutual fund data. Then it studies the determinants of mutual fund total net flows, individual net flows, and institutional net flows, and finds that the proportion fee plays an important role. Most importantly, I test the “smart money” effects, confirm its existence, and conclude that institutional net flows are smarter than individual net flows. Finally, I find that the proportion fee has a significant signal effect to direct the net flow of the new money.

Trading constraints with unspecified constraint horizon are imposed on the shares held by the state in the IPO of each listed firm in China Stock Market. In 2005, a so-called Split Share Structure Reform (also known as Division Reform) was launched in which the holders of restricted shares give up a proportion of their shares to purchase the right to terminate the trading constraint. From the size of the compensation, we infer the value of restricted shares and find that their price discounts are negatively affected by the restriction looseness captured by our proposed new multi-dimensional measure and positively affected by the bargaining power of the holders of freely-traded shares.