Based on the background of the banking industry in China, this paper establishes Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg mixed oligopoly competition models with deposit and interest rates as strategic variables between a representative state-owned bank and a representative foreign bank. We discuss and compare the equilibrium deposits, interest rates and profits in different market structures. More importantly, considering the endogenous timing setup and taking the extended game with observable delay as the basic model, we analyze the competition results of the mixed duopoly at different market structures and make numerical simulations in order to get the outcomes of the extended game. It is found that, in the deposit competition with endogenous timing, if two banks have the same deposit return rate, the simultaneous move could become the final result; If the deposit return of the foreign bank is more than twice that of the state-owned bank, all SPNEs of the extended game are sequential, i.e one bank will lead, the other will follow. If the state-owned bank’s profit in Cournot is larger than that of the state-owned bank as the Stackelberg follower, the only SPNE will be (E, L), i.e. the state-owned bank will lead and the foreign bank will follow. Additionally, in the interest rate competition with endogenous timing, if the degree of nationalization is no larger than 75% as well as two banks have the same deposit return rate, the final SPNEs of the extended game are sequential and the simultaneous move can not become the SPNE.

We examine whether the Chinese exchange rate is misaligned and how Chinese trade flows respond to the exchange rate and to economic activity. We find, first, that the Chinese currency, the renminbi (RMB), is substantially below the value predicted by estimates based upon a cross-country sample, when using the 2006 vintage of the World Development Indicators. The economic magnitude of the mis-alignment is substantial -- on the order of 50 percent in log terms. However, the misalignment is typically not statistically significant, in the sense of being more than two standard errors away from the conditional mean. Moreover, this finding disappears completely when using the most recent 2008 vintage of data; then the estimated undervaluation is on the order of 10 percent. Second, we find that Chinese multilateral trade flows respond to relative prices -- as represented by a trade weighted exchange rate -- but the relationship is not always precisely estimated. In addition, the direction of the effects is sometimes different from what is expected a priori. For instance, Chinese ordinary imports actually rise in response to a RMB depreciation; however, Chinese exports appear to respond to RMB depreciation in the expected manner, as long as a supply variable is included. In that sense, Chinese trade is not exceptional. Furthermore, Chinese trade with the United States appears to behave in a standard manner -- especially after the expansion in the Chinese manufacturing capital stock is accounted for. Thus, the China-US trade balance should respond to real exchange rate and relative income movements in the anticipated manner. However, in neither the case of multilateral nor bilateral trade flows should one expect quantitatively large effects arising from exchange rate changes. And, of course, these results are not informative with regard to the question of how a change in the RMB/USD exchange rate would affect the overall US trade deficit.

Chinese outbound investment can overall be explained by traditional theories on FDI and MNEs. However, in some aspects Chinese outward FDI is unique and differs from known investment in the “Western” context. Most importantly, it is largely executed by Chinese SOEs. This paper aspires to deepen understanding on the phenomemon by focusing on the policy dimension of Chinese outbound investment. It provides an understanding of the potential and actual government influence, comparing motivations for internationalization by Chinese enterprises and the Chinese government, and pointing out where Chinese companies own a comparative advantage in their internationalisaton activities compared to its mostly Western competitors due to the particular Chinese policy support. Apart from typical motivations for internationalization that apply for Chinese MNEs (market-seeking, resource-seeking, strategic asset seeking and efficiency-seeking motivations), a number of additional motivations exist, which are directly linked to the particular institutional and societal context of China.

Chinese commercial banks have experienced tremendous growth over the past decade but have received limited academic attention due to data collection difficulty. We’ve successfully compiled a hand-collected panel dataset of Chinese commercial banks governance characteristics from 1998 to 2007. We empirically examine the relation between board governance and the profitability of Chinese commercial banks. We find that board governance has significant impact on Chinese banks’ performance. Specifically, higher board ownership, lower percentage of insiders on board, and lower block ownership are associated with better bank performance. In addition, to improve bank performance, Chinese bank managers should also focus on effectively control of bank’s operating cost, increasing net interest margin, and closely monitoring loan productivity. This is the first study conducted on the efficacy of Chinese banks’ governance system and its relation with banks’ profitability. Empirical evidence from this study has important policy implications in reforming China’s banking system into a more transparent and more efficient market driven system.

We investigate the performance and characteristics of acquiring firms on 1148 M&A on the two Chinese stock markets from 1998 to 2003. Using the market model, the CAPM model and the buy-and-hold methods, we find significantly positive abnormal returns before (6 months) and upon M&A announcements, while the long-run abnormal returns (6 months) after M&A are insignificant. Within our sample, cash is the dominant payment method and the competition during M&A is low. The cross-sectional analysis on acquirers' market performance upon announcements shows that the political advantages of acquiring firms have a significantly positive impact on the acquirers' performance, while the economic advantages do not. Cross-provincial M&A and better corporate governance create value to acquiring firms. Finally, cash payment impacts positively and regulation development impacts negatively the performance of acquiring firms during M&A.

Many prior studies have been devoted to financial distress of Chinese listed companies over the last two decades. However, these distressed companies are still failed to find out the exact determinants of financial distress. Therefore, the purposes of this paper are to provide an investigation of financial distressed companies trading on Chinese Stock Exchanges, and to elaborate the determinants of falling into financial distress by using a panel data set containing information on the stock market under Binary Logit Model during the period 1998-2005. The empirical findings present the relationship between 13 independent variables and the probability of financial distress, and particularly analyze the impact of corporate governance on Chinese financial distressed companies. Of these corporate governance variables, agency costs and ownership structure appear to be important factors to affect the probability of financial distress.

We document the under-pricing of state asset sales in China. Because these stakes were in partially privatized firms, there is a credible benchmark - the price of publicly traded shares - to measure the extent of under-pricing. On average, we find that blocks of government shares sell at a discount of more than 70 percent relative to tradable shares. Further, sellers that conceal their state ownership status (likely in order to elude regulatory scrutiny) sell at a further 5 percentage point discount. The impact on subsequent performance is negative - both profitability and investment fall after transfers. We also document patterns in the data consistent with increased tunneling after asset sales.

In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that has taken on renewed importance in recent times.

Following the economic theory of venture capital financing, a corporate governance framework would be economically efficient for VC investments if it can help to reduce the agency costs resulted from information and incentive problems. As a highly successful model in global VC industry, the standard VC investment contracts in the Silicon Valley practice largely embody such framework. By analyzing the currently effective laws and regulations of China that are relevant to the investments by foreign venture capitalists, this paper paints a practical picture of how can foreign VC investors do business in China. It is shown that, the recent (starting from 2005) outflow of a set of new legal norms can be seen as a dividing point for the VC investing practice in China – the previously prevalent mode “offshore structuring, offshore listing” is challenged, and both the investment and exit are gradually pulled onshore. This being said, the current Chinese laws and institutions still cannot fully entertain the contracting and governance model prevalent in the Silicon Valley VC investment practices, and in this light, this paper goes on to discuss, in particular, various strategies that may be availed by foreign VC firms to tap and/or subvert the Chinese laws and regulations when financing Chinese new ventures. Finally, under the theme of globalization and crossborder corporate governance convergence, this paper provides a general comment on the currently applicable Chinese legal framework, and stresses the importance of converging towards efficient legal rules through contracts in the global competitive village.

从融资约束的角度来研究公司的现金持有行为是当前公司财务学的的重要课题之一。本文根据Almeida et al(2004)提出的现金-现金流敏感性模型，从资产规模、股利支付和控制权性质三个融资约束分组标准角度研究了我国上市公司的现金持有行为。结论表明，融资受约束和不受约束的公司的现金-现金流敏感性都显著为正，没有表现出明显的差异。特别的，国有企业与民营企业的现金-现金流敏感性都非常的正显著，都面临严重的融资约束问题。一方面由于目前我国资本市场的发展仍不够完善，大多数公司仍面临严重的融资约束；另一方面可能说明我国上市公司普遍存在滥用“自由现金流”的现象。因此本文的结论不能有效的支持融资约束影响了我国上市公司现金持有这一假说，现金-现金流敏感性模型并不能有效区分融资约束与非融资约束公司，其作为检验我国上市公司融资约束假说并不合适。