Like other major countries in the world, Chinese listed firms have recently experienced a dramatic rise in executive compensation. However, the arguments that could explain the same phenomena in developed countries can not be extended to the case in China. First, most Chinese listed firms are controlled by the state, thus management cannot set their own compensations through captured boards as suggested by Bebchuk and Fried (2004). Second, very few listed firms in China granted stock options and/or common stocks as part of executive compensations prior to 2005. There is little possibility that executives increased their own compensations by offering stock-option plans implied by Bolton et al. (2006). Based on the facts that the legal investor protection has been improved in China, we argue theoretically and empirically in this paper that the rise in executive compensation of Chinese listed firms can be attributed to the enhancement of legal investor protection. Since the management has to give up part of their private benefit with the improvement of legal investor protection, some private benefits extracted by management before have to be paid in an explicit way in order to make management incentive compatible. This finding partially leads to the increasing trend in executive compensations. It therefore provides a new perspective to explain why executive compensations keep rising in this emerging market where legal investor protection has been improving.

Feedback is the trading strategy of irrational investors. Positive feedback traders' buying or selling behavior is decided by the stock price of the preceding period. On the presence of positive feedback trading, stock market returns show characteristics which are different from these assumed in the classical financial theory, and thus make the stock market fluctuate extraordinarily. This essay establishes a model with the participation of positive feedback trader and rational trader,. The irrational traders adopt feedback trading strategy. Based on the model, we used Monte Carlo simulation method to produce a time series. We computed the kurtosis, tail-index and the autocorrelation coefficient of the time series and compared with the relevant quantity of Shanghai stock market index time series. It turned out that our model can provide a powerful expression to the fat-tail and autocorrelation characteristics of stock market return.

The ignorance of market friction causes the invalid portfolio investment, and whether the arrangement of capital structure is reasonable will influence the income of funding cost, effective utilization of non-selfowned and funding risk level. Therefore, portfolio model under the assumption of complete market lacks of practically instructiveness. Capital structure factor and transaction cost do influence the portfolio decision in the capital market. On the basis of capital structure factor and transaction cost during the process of investment, this article improve the portfolio model that CVaR control proposed by Rockafeller and Uryasev, built a CVaR portfolio model with capital structure factor and transaction cost. Empirical studies indicates that the changes of capital structure factor and transaction cost lead to the movement of efficient frontier on CVaR portfolio model and the changes of upper and lower limit.

We examine empirically whether internal corporate governance mechanisms play a role in reducing the probability of being sued by lending banks due to bank loan default and the market reaction to the announcement of bank loan litigation. Using bank loan litigation events in Chinese financial markets, our results show that companies with better internal corporate governance mechanisms are associated with a lower probability of being sued. We also find a significant negative market reaction to the announcement of a bank loan filing while insignificant market reaction to the announcement of bank loan litigation verdict. Moreover, we test whether internal corporate governance mechanisms can play a role in mitigating the effect of market reactions. Our findings indicate that there is no evidence of internal corporate governance in mitigating this effect. Our paper suggests that internal corporate governance mechanisms are important in preventing the trigger of external governance mechanisms (litigation) but do not play any role once external governance (litigation) takes over.

According to the standard neoclassical model of trade theory, technology and factor endowments are both important determinants of specialization. This paper attempts to investigate the industrial specialization in China determined by both of the sources of comparative advantage. Using a 30 provinces, 9 years panel of China’s manufacturing industrial data and seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique, we find that the effect of relative technology differences is quite large and significant during the recent years. Factor endowments differences also have effects on the output share, but the results are inexplicit and elusive in some industries.

A political-macroeconomic model is developed to explain why small differences in fiscal decentralization may ultimately lead to dramatically di¤erent economic policies toward FDI hence starkly different amount of FDI flows into two otherwise identical developing countries. Too much fiscal decentralization hurts incentives of the central government while too little fiscal decentralization renders the local governments captured by the protectionist special interest group. Moreover, the local government's preference for FDI can be endogenously polarized and sensitive to fiscal decentralization. Calibration and counterfactual experiments results support fiscal decentralization as the major reason for China and India's nine-fold difference in FDI per capita.

In this paper, we study the pricing and hedging of catastrophe European option when catastrophe loss is described by a regime-switching jump di?usion process. We derive the close-form pricing formula of catastrophe European options and brie°y discuss the pricing issue of catastrophe bonds. We extend the formulas of static hedging strategies to the regime-switching setting and provide some discussions on the static hedging of catastrophe options. Numerical examples show that static hedging strategy of catastrophe options is effective.

This paper empirically investigates the determinants of financing decisions in Chinese listed firms, using 3,196 firm-year observations from the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 2001–2005. Thereby, we investigate the effects of differences in institutions across Chinese provinces and municipalities, and compare the financing choices of state-controlled and private-controlled enterprises. We find that a better legal environment negatively affects the debt ratio and the proportion of debt that consists of bank loans in SOEs as well as private enterprises. Conversely, regional banking development positively influences these two variables. If anything, these effects of the rule of law and regional banking development on leverage are stronger for private-controlled firms. SOEs have lower debt ratios in regions with better stock market access, while private firms rely less on bank loans in regions with more government intervention in business. Finally, we document that SOE bank loans have a longer maturity, while their overall debt ratio and debt mix are comparable to those of private firms.

We investigate the endogenous choice problem of Chinese state-owned enterprises in their decision on whether to corporatize or privatize. Corporatization differs from privatization in the Chinese context, as in the former case, the state remains as a large shareholder, and in the latter case, the state has little or no ownership. Using a panel of provincial statistics, we show that the larger the local employment pressure, the less likely we see privatization; the smaller the local fiscal pressure, the less likely we see privatization; the more corrupted the local business environment, the less likely we see privatization. Privatization is found to yield consistent efficiency gains over corporatization measured in terms of both employment and firm profitability. Our evidences are supportive of the theoretical framework of Boycko and Shleifer and Vishny (1996) where they model privatization as politicians’ endogenous decision trading off employment pressure against public fiscal interest.

Dynamic allocation of control rights between managers and investors affects policy of the dividend and value of enterprise. The paper studied the relevant factors that affect optimal debt ratio and allocation of control right. We suggest that the enterprise decrease the debt ratio with the increase of moral hazard, liquidity risk and investors’ absolute risk aversion. With the increase of shareholder’s control right, the relationship between shareholder’s control right and managers’ moral hazard is reversed from positive to negative. The implication of the paper is moderate debt ratio may achieve the tough constraint on the managers’ decision.