金融约束是金融发展理论中较前沿的问题，其理论对发展中国家金融发展有重要的借鉴价值。本文简要介绍了金融约束中租金的作用，然后运用金融约束这一框架分别分析了租金在全球化和不同所有制结构条件下的流动，得出了金融约束将受到甚至变形的结论，并结合我国金融发展的实际情况，提出了一些建议。 Abstract: Financial restraint is a frontier issue in the theory of finance development; it has important use for reference during the process of financial development in the developing countries. Firstly, this paper present the function of rent in the financial restraint, then we use this framework to analyze the rent flow under the globalization and different ownership structure respectively, find that financial restraint will be weakened, even distorted. In the end, we provide some suggestions combined with the situation of China.

摘要 随着我国进入WTO，我国将逐步取消在各方面对外资银行的限制，并在2006年12月11日前对其实现全面的国民待遇,外资银行将成为我国金融市场上重要的一部分.作为我国银行业监管当局,银监会将接受更加严峻的考验.简单的区域监管将无法防御国际间快速传播的风险，这就需要对外资银行总行进行监管。通过对外资银行总行的监管,可以避免部分银行不良资产比率较高、外资银行存款准备金的计提方式的漏洞、外资银行的操作风险、外资法人机构风险突出、业务创新加快的风险等诸多风险。当前，我国还没有对这种监管方式进行完整的规定。本文于法规和具体操作两方面进行全面的阐述，对于该监管方式的具体运做进行了明确的表达。本文还论述了该监管方式的优劣点，通过分析说明运用这种监管为我国带来得好处要远远大于其所带来得坏处。总之，对外资银行总行的监管是我国应对新的银行监管形势的一个重要方法。 Abstract Being a member of WTO, our country will progressively cancel the various restrictions of foreign banks. And before 11st December 2006, the comprehensive national treatment will become true. The foreign banks are going to be one of the most essential parts in our bank industry, the China Banking Regulatory Commission has to accept more severer test. The simple area supervision cannot defend the risks which have been spread fast in the world. In that case, the head offices of foreign bank should be supervised. It can avoid the high rates of harmful property, the loopholes of deposit planning money in foreign banks, the operation risk, foreign capital corporation having more risk and the risk of prompting business creation. In nowadays, we have not perfect rules in such area. This article discussed both statutes and specific operations, especially emphasized the specific operations of supervision. In the article, the author also discussed the advantages and disadvantages of supervision, and explained the advantages of supervision were far more than the disadvantages. To sum up, supervising the head offices of foreign bank is an important way for us to deal with the new situation of bank supervision.

资本资产定价模型（CAPM）被认为是金融市场现代价格理论的支柱之一，自从创立以来，其在各个领域得到了广泛的应用。然而，长期以来对CAPM的实证检验也争议不断，检验结果毁誉参半。本文评述了以往对CAPM的实证研究，并采用上海股票市场90家上市公司的数据作为样本对CAPM中的贝塔系数的波动状况进行了实证检验，结果发现所有股票贝塔系数的波动率都是显著异于零的，即贝塔系数在不同的时期会发生变化。实证分析中如果忽略了这一点，必将导致对CAPM检验失效。 Capital Asset Pricing Model is the backbone of the modern asset pricing theory of the financial market. Since it appeared, it is widely used in many fields. However, there are many disputations about the empirical tests of CAPM. Someone support it, but someone not. The authors review the past empirical tests of CAPM, and analyze 90 public companies in Shanghai security market. The conclusion helps to explain why some empirical tests of CAPM in the past fail.

The paper take notes for “Equilibrium Points in N-person Games” and draw the conclusion that the Asset-pricing-model should reflect the investors’ strategies and payoff functions, and then we give the rudiment of the model.

We present a model in which informational economies of scope that provide a cost advantage to universal banks oering “one-stop” shopping for lending and underwriting services also enable these intermediaries to “lock in” their clients’ subsequent business. This (limited) market power of universal banks reduces their incentive, relative to that of investment banks, to undertake costly eort in underwriting their clients’ securities. The consequent reduction in firms’ likelihood of successful security issues with universal bank underwriters prevents these intermediaries from using their scope economies to completely dominate their markets. Our analysis identifies economy, intermediary, and firm characteristics that motivate either the integration or segmentation of underwriting and bank lending. Our results also have implications for financial innovation and capital market development in markets characterized by the integration of financial services. Some of our empirical implications have not been tested; others can be compared with findings in Kroszner and Rajan (1994).

A substantial literature in institutional herding examines reasons for and evidence of correlated trading across institutional investors, but little has been written about the extent to which individual investor trading is correlated or why. We document that the trading of individuals is highly correlated and surprisingly persistent. Furthermore, we find that the systematic trading of individual investors is driven by their own decisions―trades they initiated―rather than by passive reactions to institutional herding. We discuss why this correlation is unlikely to stem from the same motivations as institutional herding. Correlated trading by individual is a necessary condition for the trading biases of individual investors to affect asset prices, since the trades of any particular individual are likely to be small. The preferences for buying some stocks while selling others must be shared by many individual investors if these preferences are to affect prices. We analyze trading records for 66,465 households at a large national discount broker between January 1991 and November 1996 and 665,533 investors at a large retail broker between January 1997 and June 1999. Using a variety of empirical approaches, we document that the trading of individuals is more coordinated than one would expect by mere chance. For example, if individual investors are net buyers of a stock this month, they are likely to be net buyers of the stock next month. In additional analyses, we present four stylized facts about the trading of individual investors: (1) they buy stocks with strong past returns; (2) they also sell stocks with strong past returns, though this relation is stronger than that for buys at short horizons (one to two quarters), but weaker at long horizons (up to 12 quarters); (3) their buying is more concentrated in fewer stocks than selling; and (4)they are net buyers of stocks with unusually high trading volume.

摘要：一国经常项目赤字只有获得足够资金支持才能维持，基于此本文将美国经常项目赤字可持续性问题转化为能否稳定地获得外源性融资的问题。文章从供给和需求角度探讨了美国与东亚之间特殊融资安排的形成与稳定性问题，并用两种方法估计了美国经常项目赤字可持续的必要条件及调整的时间。本文认为国际金融体系下美元霸权和东亚国家内需不足导致了东亚国家的资金供给，美国消费主导型经济导致经常项目赤字进而引致资金的需求，供求之间能达到短期均衡。但是由于制度安排的缺陷，这种特殊的融资安排长期必然走向崩溃。届时美国赤字调整不可避免，中国应采取措施方法赤字调整带来的风险。 Abstract: The current account deficits are sustainable only if it was adequately financed. On this basis, this paper has translated the problem concerning the sustainability of current account deficits into the question of stability of outside financing. Then, our paper discuss the special financing arrangement between East Asia and US, hence after, we further discuss the necessary conditions for the “sustainability” and time to adjust deficits. This paper justified that: East Asia becomes the supplier of financing because of the dollar hegemony under the absent of international financing system and lack of inner demand, US become the demander of financing for sake of the demand-led growth. The demand and supply will reach an equilibrium in short run, but the special financing arrangement dooms to be collapsed for short institutional arrangements, the US has to adjust its currents account deficits passively.

中央银行独立性问题在现代宏观经济研究特别是货币政策研究中备受关注，其与宏观经济指标的相互作用很大程度上决定着货币政策的运行效果。就此问题，本文首先介绍了西方学者对央行独立性的不同定义及研究的理论基础，随后从理论和实证两个角度分析中央银行独立性同宏观经济运行之间的关系，最后本文得出如下结论：中央银行独立性与通货膨胀之间的关系比较明确，与其他变量之间的关系仍不能明确界定；中央银行独立性的提升确实能有效降低通货膨胀率，但是抑制通货膨胀不能单独地成为支持中央银行独立性的理论基础；是否提高中央银行独立性应该结合其与物价、就业、经济增长的关系； The Central Bank Independent (CBI) issue has drawn more attention in macroeconomic research, especially is in the monetary policy research .To a large extent, it’s interaction with macroeconomic goals (price, economic growth, employment) mutually plays a remarkable role on the effect of monetary policy. On this question, this article first introduced the western scholar’s different definition on central bank independent and the theoretical basis of it. Then, we analyses the relationship between Central Bank independence and macroscopic economic performance theoretical and empirical angle. Finally we drawn draws the following conclusions: The relations Between the Central Bank independence and the inflation is quite explicit, but we are not clear about it’s relation with other variables such as growth、employment、deficits; Increasing Central Bank independent can effectively reduce the inflation rate, but “cut down” inflation cannot alone become the support for Central Bank independence; Whether or not to enhances the Central Bank independence should take in account it’s relations with the price, the employment, the economy grows; we should care about the “stationary” of variable when dealing with time-series data, otherwise the conclusion maybe less in accuracy and credibility;

Traditional hedge of bond duration and convexity are incorrect. We derive correct hedge ratios by capturing the neglected volatility linkage between Treasury futures and cheapest-to-deliver Treasuries. Our hedge-ratio equations specify each hedge instrument’s contribution against short-term spot and forward rate exposures. Our numerical analysis indicates that traditional hedge substantially overhedges. The relative overhedge is especially large in hedging high coupon bond when the hedge horizon is long, the term structure is steep, or the cheapest-to-deliver is a high coupon Treasury. The results are robust to various maturity of bond and the cheapest-to-deliver Treasuries.

内容提要：本文在介绍泰勒规则产生、内涵、发展的基础上，利用Lawrence模型将汇率因素引入，构建了开放经济条件下的前瞻性泰勒规则。实证结果表明：泰勒规则能够为中国货币政策提供一个很好的参照系；相对于物价稳定目标，央行更关注经济增长；将微观主体的预期和汇率因素引入到货币政策时，央行对利率的敏感性增强；继续推动利率和汇率体制改革能更有效地提高泰勒规则的解释力；“前瞻性泰勒规则”能提高中国货币政策透明度； Abstract: This paper introduce the origination、connotation and development of Taylor’s rule. On this basis, we then contrast the forward looking Taylor’s rule in an open economy by employing a model from Lawrence (1999).The empirical analysis indicates that: Taylor’s rule provides us a frame of reference in policy making; Central bank prefer “economic growth” to “price stability”; when considering the effect of public expectation and exchange rate, central bank pay more attention to price stability; exchange rate and interest rate regime reformation would increase the explanation of Taylor’s rule; the forward looking Taylor’s rule could enhance the transparency of monetary policy.