In this paper, the author observes a stationary volume/price pattern, while studying the relationship between volume and price through the amount of transaction in stock market. The probability of accumulated trading volume (actual supply/demand volume) that distributes over its price range gradually emerges the maximum around the price mean value in a transaction body system when it takes a longer trading time regardless of its price fluctuation path or time series in the time interval. The volume/price behaves a probability wave toward an actual supply/demand equilibrium price, forced by a linear central actual supply/demand potential. In terms of physics, the author establishes a transaction (actual supply/demand) energy hypothesis, defines a measurable actual supply/demand restoring force, derives a time-independent security transaction (actual supply/demand) probability wave differential equation, and obtains an explicit volume/price distribution function, the distribution of absolute zero-order Bessel eigenfunctions, in a stable transaction body system when its supply/demand is in a dynamic state. By fitting and testing the function with intraday real transaction volume/price distributions on a considerable number of individual stocks in Shanghai 180 Index, the author demonstrates its validation at this early stage, and attempts to offer a micro and dynamic actual supply/demand volume/price wave theory. JEL classification: G12; D50; C51; C52

This paper intuitively examines the dynamic behavior of two highly relevant interest rates in China. The first one is the government rate, which is decided and published by the central bank and can be simulated by pure jump process. Estimation of the jump intension is given out. And by different robustness test, it keeps stable. The jump size has met the condition to make interest rate within reasonable bounds and shows some meaning of economic cycle behavior. The second one is the market rate, which is estimated by spline approximation based on the transaction data of government bonds. Several models, including Vasicek model, Vasicek-GARCH (1,1) model, CIR model, and CIR-GARCH(1,1), are empirically tested and the best performance is done by the Vasicek-GARCH(1,1) model. Furthermore, the estimate bias problem due to the near unit root process is tested and evidenced by both traditional methods and GPH test. Impact of government rate on market rate is finally checked and analyzed.

Abstract: This paper is mainly to achieve two aims: 1. present industry analysis on investment banking business; 2. value Goldman Sachs stock through different methods. The paper is consisted of eight parts. Part one is introduction. In part two we make a general review on I-banking industry. In part three we present the profile of Goldman Sachs Group. Then in part four we will analyse GS financial data, based on its latest annual reports. In part five, we will briefly list business risks for GS. In part six we compare fundamental valuation ratios of three biggest investment banks. In part seven we present relevant valuation theory and then value Goldman Sachs stock through three methods: Dividend Discount Model, Price multiples and a simple Residual Income Model. As a final step, in the eighth part we draw a general conclusion of the paper.

Many articles agreed that it is possible for speculators to manipulate stock prices. In this article, we give a dynamic model to show in detail how one type of the trade-based manipulation is realized in stock markets, especially in emerging stock markets, where manipulators have dominative information and fund over the uninformed investors. In our model, we assume that uniformed investors predict future price movement with their forecasting model, the number of uniformed investors who decide to buy stocks increases with fitting degree of the forecasting model for past price data and the model parameters. With these assumptions, manipulators take two-step strategy (pumping the price and selling stocks at higher prices), the pumping step aims to absorb uninformed investors' following by buying the stock by use of the forecasting model, and the selling step is to sell all the stock in higher prices by trying their best to control the supplies and continually attracting the uniformed investors’ following. We show that manipulators can realize their strategies and maximize their final wealth by controlling the strength of pumping and deciding the time length to sell out the stocks. Two numerical examples are also given.

银行并购是银行业变革在组织机构上的体现，这种变革的发生会对并购银行本身、相关国家及国际银行业产生深远影响。中国经过20多年的改革，银行业发生了巨变。随着经济增长回升和经济效益改善，银行业的竞争力明显提高，已初步具备了现代商业银行特征。然而，一些诸如竞争性不强、规模不经济；稳健性不够、盈利能力不强等深层次问题依然突出。通过分析，银行并购可以提升中国银行业的竞争力，解决规模不经济问题，培育大型企业集团等，是一种较为理想的改革中国银行业的途径。 It is bank’s M&A that embodies the change of banking on the organization.While inevitably exert a far-reaching effect on the banks themselves in the M&A, it will influence the relevant country and international banking. In China, the banking structure has been improved since 1978. But from the data in the paper, we can conclude that Chinese banking market structure is oligopoly and Chinese banking is inefficient. It is just the Bank’s M&A that can promote the competitive power of Chinese banking, improve the reasonable allocation of financial resources, and ensure the stability of financial system. Bank’s M&A is a comparatively ideal way to reform Chinese banking.

This is the first study that uses Merton’s (1974) option pricing model to compute default measures for individual firms and assess the effect of default risk on equity returns. The size effect is a default effect, and this is also largely true for the book-to-market (BM) effect. Both exist only in segments of the market with high default risk. Default risk is systematic risk. The Fama-French (FF) factors SMB and HML contain some default-related information, but this is not the main reason that the FF model can explain the cross-section of equity returns.

This paper makes indirect inference about the time-variation in expected stock returns by comparing unconditional sample variances to estimates of expected conditional variances. The evidence reveals more predictability as more information is used, and no evidence that predictability has diminished in recent years. Semi-strong form evidence suggests that timevariation in expected returns remains economically important.

We try to explain the severe under-pricing of 523 A-share IPOs in the Chinese markets from 1997 to 2001 using institutional characteristics, absolute value, and relative value of IPO. We find that relative values of IPO are critical determinants of the severe under-pricing of A-share IPOs in China. We also find that relaxing government regulation of offering price increases under-pricing, and thus conclude that the severe under-pricing of A-share IPOs in China is not caused by the government regulation of offering price. We propose a relative value theory to explain why relaxing government regulation of offering price results in higher under-pricing and find some support for the theory.

This article does not focus on any special methods or techniques for pricing a share, but concentrates on the relationship between equilibrium price(s) of a share and competitive interactions of rational investors. In this article, it attempts to establish a model combining “Bayesian Game” theory concerned on “non-cooperative games of incomplete information” and “Random Walk” theory together to illustrate process of how new equilibrium price(s) will be achieved in incomplete information when new information is released into market. Moreover, due to incomplete information structure and bargaining behaviors from rational investors for maximizing their expected utility respectively in this model, it leads to a deviation between new equilibrium price(s) and value of a share (Pareto-optimality). From this conclusion, it can be stated that rational investors’ strategies or behaviors make sense for change of share price. Furthermore, since the real market is not perfect market, so 1.when rational investors price a share, they not only need to estimate value of the share, but also should consider about beliefs and strategies from opponents; 2.if behavioral patterns among rational investors can be described by the model from process of new equilibrium price(s) achieved, change of a share price will be predicted more precisely.

Abstract：Some scholars have discussed extensively the interaction of capital structure, investment and product market behaviors. They suggest that debt leads to lower investment expenditures and weaker or stronger product market competition. They, however, look only at two of the above behaviors. This paper develops a model which examines all three behaviors and shows that debt and investment can be substitutes in a model where firms rationally take on debt. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that when firms compete with prices in the product market, an increase in debt leads to lower investment and higher prices. Key Words：Debt Investment Product Market Behavior Limited Liability Effect Credible Commitment