China’s Stock Market is the most important emerging market awaiting for investigation by both academics and industrials. We study the pro…tability of long position in winner-based threshold momentum strategies after accounting for the trans-action cost. We …nd substantial pro…ts (double to octuple the money every year) in daily threshold trading strategies when trading cost is not accounted. However, at very low level of trading cost, say 0.2%, all pro…ts disappear. We employ a model that rebalance the portfolio carefully to save the transaction cost, but the trading rules still fail to profit at a reasonable level of trading cost. Thus, the momentum pro…ts may not compete with the trading cost.

“法和金融学”（Law and Finance）是由金融学和法学交叉而形成的一门新兴学科，她是自20世纪70年代兴起的“法和经济学”（Law and Economics）的延伸。法和金融学应用经济金融理论和计量经济学方法分析和探究法律和法律制度对国家金融体系的形成、金融体系配置资源的效率、各国公司治理构架的形成及经济发展的影响。“法和金融学”有两大研究方向：一是结合法律制度来研究金融学问题，也就是以金融学为中心、同时研究涉及的法律问题，强调法律这一制度性因素对金融主体行为的影响。二是利用金融学的研究方法来研究法学问题，例如金融立法和监管的经济学分析。本文综述了“法和金融学”学派的主要观点，论文从对ＬＬＳＶ的著名论文“法律与金融”论述开始，接着论述了有关学者对金融法对公司治理、经济增长影响的相关研究；并综述了对LLSV的反对意见。最后，对“法和金融学”进行了简单的评论，并就我国开展“法和金融学”研究提出了意见。

A government policy aimed at the reduction of state shares in state-owned enterprises (SOE) triggered a crash in Chinas stock market. The sustained depression and spillover even after the policy adjustments were over constitute a puzzle the so-called state-share paradox. The empirical study finds evidence in two dimensions. First, a regime switching model with an absorbing state suggests that government policy switches the regime to liquidity black holes. Second, there is no evidence of light-to-liquidity during the crash, suggesting to model the crash as an aggregate phenomenon of the whole market. To carefully match the evidence, a theoretical model is set up within the framework of market microstructure. The state-share paradox is not a simply instance of news-driven crash. The model shows that Chinas stock market has distinctive features of liquidity production and price discovery. The irregularities of a representative liquidity supporter generate an inverted-S demand curve and give rise to potential liquidity black holes. Multiple equilibria and the resulting large drop in prices arise from supply dynamics of short-run investors, who buy the stock from the primary market liquidate their long positions in the secondary market. This study contributes a rational panics hypothesis to the literature. The rational panics hypothesis is neither an rational model with noise traders, nor a standard rational expectation model under the asymmetric information framework. It is based on homogeneous agents with incomplete information, and is consistent with the evidence of absorbing regime switching and the recent literature on state-dependent preference. Our findings have larger implications for ine¢ ciency of Chinas stock market.

Using daily data from May 2000 to January 2004, this study examines the risk, return, security selection and market timing performance of China’s security investment funds, in comparison with the performance of SIFs in the U.S. Our results indicate that China investment funds show superior marketing timing performance while U.S. fund managers display stronger security selection ability. These results imply that the potential synergy for Sino-U.S. joint venture investment funds could be tremendous. Additional analysis of the trading volume of closed-end funds in China illustrates that investors’ interests in SIFs are strongly and positively related to fund performance. Results also indicate that Chinese investors favor professionally managed funds more than direct investment in stocks during negative market conditions.

This study examines the role of information uncertainty (IU) in predicting cross-sectional stock returns. We define IU in terms of "value ambiguity", or the precision with which firm value can be estimated by knowledgeable investors at reasonable cost. Using several different proxies for IU, we show that: (1) On average, High IU firms earn lower future resturns (the "mean" effect), and (2) Price and earnings momentum effects are much stronger among high IU firms (the "interaction" effect). These findings are consistent with theoretical models that feature investor overconfidence (Daniel et al. (1998)) and information cascades (Bikhchandani et al. (1992)). Specifically, our evidence indicates that high IU exacerbates investor overconfidence and limits rational arbitrage.

This paper generalizes the Myers and Majluf (1984) model by introducing an agency cost structure based on private benefits of control. This new model predicts that many corporate finance variables each have opposing effects on under- and overinvestment. Private benefits exacerbate overinvestment but, interestingly, a small amount of private benefits can enhance firm value by alleviating underinvestment. Likewise, an increase in insider ownership alleviates overinvestment but aggravates underinvestment. When private benefits are small, the adverse effect of insider ownership on underinvestment tends to dominate. When there are considerable private benefits, the incentive-alignment effect of insider ownership is pronounced. Additionally, this model reconciles existing equity financing theories on announcement effects. It helps resolve the puzzle that small-growth firms do not seem to have an asymmetric information disadvantage when they issue new equity.

We analyze the possible effect of price limit to informed traders’ behavior and propose three hypotheses caused by price limit. Then comprehensively using the event study method and comparative grouping method, we empirically exams the performance of price limit in China’s stock market. Our finding is that price limit policy will bring significant effect to the trading behavior of insiders, which means price limit policy will impede the fulfillment of insiders’ trading activities and delay equilibrium price discovery.

Abstract: In this paper, we assume the R&D research for new products and new business models of an entrepreneur will get some cash-flow in the future. And because of the patent protection, the entrepreneur will become a monopolist in that defined market. The successful R&D research represents the growth value for the entrepreneur. We assume that the value of growth is the value of the entrepreneur. The total market value of entrepreneur can be understood as a real growth option plus a discounted real exchange option. The first time in the theory, this paper gets the formula of the real compound option under three stochastic parameters. 关键词：创业企业，增长价值，定价，复合实物期权 Keywords: entrepreneur, growth value, pricing, compound real option

本文提出了基础资产为无红利分配股票的美式看跌期权的第一个闭合计算公式。美式看跌期权赋予其持有人在期权存续期的任一时刻、以约定价格出售股票的权利但非义务。在过去的几十年中，特别是在Black-Scholes模型给出欧式期权的定价公式后，人们在美式期权的定价方面做了大量探索，提出了不少方法，但尚无闭合公式求法。本文提出了一个美式看跌期权提前行权的最优策略，即当且仅当一个美式看跌期权被提前行权时的收益大于其对应的欧式看跌期权的价值时，该美式看跌期权才会被提前行权。基于这一策略，本文提出了一系列紧密关联的定理并最终推出了一个闭合计算公式。另外，基于该闭合公式得出的结论，本文还指出了Merton（1973）有关永久美式看跌期权(perpetual American put option)的模型是不妥的，明确指出永久美式看跌期权（股票无红利）的价格等于该期权的执行价格。This paper proposes a closed form solution for pricing an American put option on a non-dividend paying stock. An American put option grants its holder rights, but not obligation to sell a stock in a fixed price at any time up until maturity. In the past decades, there is no closed form solution for pricing American options although many people made great efforts. In this paper, an optimally early exercise strategy of an American put option on a non-dividend paying stock is set up. That is, an American put option should be early-exercised when the maximum option premium of early exercise is no less than the value of its European counterpart; otherwise, it should not be early-exercised. Based on this strategy, a series of lemmas is proposed and a closed form formula is drawn. Also, this paper shows that Merton (1973)’s formula does not do a good job for pricing perpetual American put options and shows the price of a perpetual American put option on a non-dividend paying stock is equal to the strike price.

China’s non-performing loans were as high as 35 percent of state banks’ total loans, or about RMB 3,549 billion (about 40 percent of its GDP) in 2000. The adequacy ratios of the four state banks were only between 1.4 percent to 4.6 percent in September 2000. Moreover, non-bank financial institutions as a group as early as 1996 had non-performing assets equal to 50 percent of their total assets. By Western accounting standards, China’s most financial institutions are insolvent. Be conventional standards for measuring financial sector robustness, China is past the point at which a systemic banking crisis might be expected. China faces enormous risks delaying the state bank reforms due to increasing capital account leaks, increasing large proportion of household deposits in banks’ total liabilities, and gradual structural shift of Chinese saving behavior. China needs to resolutely address the financial reforms soon to avoid a financial crisis, which will lead to a broad anti-regime coalition against the Chinese government. Nevertheless, China faces enormous difficulties. First, the 2000 Chinese official estimate puts the financial cost of restructuring the state banks at RMB 2,260 billion ($273 billion), or close to 30 percent of GDP. Second, the current AMC scheme is fraught with difficulties. Finally, the required financial sector reforms are closely interlinked with many other reforms such that a sequential or partial approach will not be effective.