The crypto and noncrypto markets used to be separated from each other. We argue that with the rapid development of stablecoins since 2018, risks are now transmitted between the crypto and noncrypto markets through stablecoins, which are both pegged to noncrypto assets and play a central role in crypto trading. Applying copula-based CoVaR approaches, we find significant risk spillovers between stablecoins and cryptocurrencies as well as between stablecoins and noncrypto markets, which could help explain the tail dependency between the crypto and noncrypto markets from 2019 to 2021. We also document that the risk spillovers through stablecoins are asymmetric—stronger in the direction from the US dollar to the crypto market than vice versa—which suggests the crypto market is re-dollarizing. Further analyses consider alternative explanations, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and institutional crypto holdings, and determine that the primary channels of risk transmission are stablecoins’ US dollar peg to the noncrypto market and their transaction-medium function in the crypto ecosystem. Our results have important implications for financial stability and shed light on the future of stablecoin regulation.

Bank bailouts are systemic in China, having been extended to nearly all distressed banks, including those with no systemic importance. This paper investigates the consequences of regulators seizing control of Baoshang Bank, the country’s first bank failure in two decades. Despite the numerous liquidity and credit provision measures immediately implemented by bank regulators, we find that the collapse of this city-level commercial bank significantly exacerbated funding conditions in the market for negotiable certificates of deposit (NCD), resulting in liquidity distress for other banks. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that the spillover of Baoshang’s collapse is disproportionately concentrated in systemically unimportant (SU) banks, owing to diminished market confidence in government bailouts of SU banks, or implicit nonguarantee. We employ a difference-in-differences approach to show that the Baoshang event had a persistent and significant effect on SU banks’ NCD issuance, increasing credit spreads by 21.9 bps and the likelihood of issuance failure by 6.3%. Our empirical framework further enables us to examine the impact of China’s long-standing guarantee of SU banks, which we find impairs price efficiency, undermines market discipline, encourages excessive risk taking, and raises equity prices.

This paper examines the health consequence of rising housing prices by exploiting spatial and temporal variation in housing price appreciation linked to individual-level health data in China from 2000 to 2011. Using an instrumental variable approach, we find robust evidence that increases in housing prices significantly raise the probability of residents having chronic diseases. This negative health impact is more pronounced among individuals from lowincome families and rural to urban migrants. Exploring various possible channels, we find that marriage culture and marriage market competition exacerbates the negative health effects, particularly for males and parents with young adult sons. Our results also reveal that housing price appreciation induces negative health consequences through increased work intensity, higher mental stress, and changes in lifestyle. This paper underlines the unintended health consequences of the real estate market prosperity.

We document that monetary policy has asymmetric effects on investments by large and small firms in China. Large firms’ investment are highly responsive to monetary expansions, but less affected by monetary contractions. In contrast, small firms’ investments are less responsive to monetary expansions, but significantly affected by monetary contractions. We argue that this asymmetric responses of large and small firms stem from their differential access to credits in a two-tiered banking system. Large firms borrow from the big state-owned banks, which have a strong depositor base, whereas small firms borrow mainly from small banks which does not have a large depositor base and therefore rely heavily on the inter-bank market for financing their loans to small firms. We build a DSGE model with heterogeneous banks, heterogeneous firms, and an inter-bank market that is calibrated to the Chinese data. We show that the model’s quantitative predictions about the effects of monetary policy on large and small firms are consistent with the facts we documented.

长期以来，货币政策与通货膨胀的相互关系一直是主流经济学关注的核心问题。但因不同收入群体的消费结构迥异，不同商品的价格粘性也存在显著差异，传统单一的居民消费价格指数（Consumer Price Index）无法客观反映各收入群体所感知的真实物价水平。本文结合中国家庭微观调查数据与宏观加总数据，创新性地构建了分布式居民消费价格指数（Distributional CPI）。基于该指数，本文提出了货币政策通过消费价格端影响不平等的新机制，并对其进行了量化研究。同时，本文还采用了新近发展的我国货币政策工具变量序列来解决可能存在的内生性问题。实证结果表明，不同收入群体的消费者价格指数存在显著差异，且低收入群体的价格指数具有更大的波动性。进一步分析表明，与传统研究所揭示出的加总效应不同，由于消费结构的差异，货币政策对不同收入群体的生活成本造成了异质性影响。特别地，宽松的货币政策会显著增加低收入群体的生活成本，而高收入群体受到的影响较弱。本文的政策启示是货币政策在稳增长、保就业之外，还在消费价格端表现出明显的社会福利分配效应。此外，本文构建的分布式消费者价格指数也是Piketty et al.（2018）强调的政府构建并发布分布式国家账户（Distributional National Account）在消费价格端的一个重要延伸。

Fintech firms mobilize information technology to provide intermediation services using a broker methodology, whereas dealer banks intermediate using leveraged balance sheets. The integration of Fintech into banking may reduce the unit cost of intermediation by shifting the production function from dealer to broker. A “Fintech score” is derived using nonlinear and machine learning algorithms that show on-balance sheet lending for low Fintech score dealer banks versus securitization, brokered deposits, and non-interest income for high score, broker banks. Using Data Envelopment and Stochastic Cost Frontier Analyses, we find that banks with higher Fintech scores are more operationally efficient and resilient in crises.

In recent years, numerous Chinese peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms have collapsed, prompting us to investigate the regulation and monitoring of the fintech industry. Using a unique dataset of P2P lending platforms in China, we investigate the effect of the information environment on regulatory monitoring and platform collapse. Using the platforms’ proximity to regulatory offices as a proxy for information asymmetry, we show that an increase in distance reduces regulatory monitoring and increases the likelihood of platform collapse. Specifically, for every 1% increase in the driving distance between the local regulatory office and a P2P lending platform’s office, the platform’s likelihood of collapse increases by 1.011%. To establish causality, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis that exploits two exogenous shocks: government office relocation and subway station openings. We provide evidence that proximity enhances monitoring quality by facilitating soft information collection, reducing platform failures. We further find two channels of this effect: (1) the information channel through which greater regulatory distance reduces the likelihood and frequency of regulators’ on-site visits and (2) the resource-constraint channel, through which greater regulatory distance significantly increases the local regulatory office’s monitoring costs. Overall, this study highlights the importance of the acquisition of soft information for regulatory monitoring to ensure the viability of fintech firms.

We estimate real losses arising from the cross-sectional misallocation of financial liabilities. Extending a production-based framework of misallocation measurement to the liabilities side of the balance sheet and using manufacturing firm data from the United States and China, we find significant misallocation of debt and equity in China but not the United States. Reallocating liabilities of firms in China to mimic U.S. efficiency would produce gains of 51% to 69% in real value-added, with only 17% to 21% stemming from inefficient debt-equity combinations. For Chinese firms that are large or in developed cities, we estimate lower distortionary financing costs.

We use administrative registration records with information on the owners of all Chinese firms to document the importance of “connected” investors, defined as state-owned firms or private owners with equity ties with state-owned firms, in the businesses of private owners. We document a hierarchy of private owners: the largest private owners have direct investments from state-owned firms, the next largest private owners have equity investments from private owners that themselves have equity ties with state owners, and the smallest private owners do not have any ties with state owners. The network of connected private owners has expanded over the last two decades. The share of registered capital of connected private owners increased by almost 20 percentage points between 2000 and 2019, driven by two trends. First, state owned firms have increased their investments in joint ventures with private owners. Second, private owners with equity ties to state owners also increasingly invest in joint ventures with other (smaller) private owners. The expansion in the “span” of connected owners from these investments with private owners may have increased aggregate output of the private sector by 4.2% a year between 2000 and 2019.

This study investigates the nexus between investor protection and dividend policy for 517 listed non-financial firms operating in Asian countries between the 2008- 2017 period. The dynamic panel data model (System-GMM) reveals that stronger investor protection is associated with higher dividend payouts, and firms increase dividends, specifically in response to the rise of the extent of disclosure and director liability and also ease of shareholder suits. Besides, the results highlight that firms pay out fewer dividends in cases of growth opportunity particularly in environments with stronger investor protection, more developed financial market, and common-law system. Results are robust when alternative specifications are implemented.