China's stock market (the "A share market'') has a lower correlation with the global market and is less affected by international financial contagions than any other major economy. The inclusion of mainland China stocks into an international portfolio increases its Sharpe ratio. However, we find that Chinese stocks providing the most diversification benefits also carry the most policy risk for international investors. Holding Chinese stocks listed in Hong Kong does not reap the same diversification benefits. While global market integration and the increase in foreign ownership can diminish diversification benefits, mainland China stocks still provide valuable diversification opportunities for international investors up till the most recent time in late 2010s.

We provide direct evidence of leverage-induced fire sales contributing to a market crash using account-level trading data for brokerage- and shadow-financed margin accounts during the Chinese stock market crash of 2015. Margin investors heavily sell their holdings when their account-level leverage edges toward their maximum leverage limits, controlling for stock-date and account fixed effects. Stocks that are disproportionately held by accounts close to leverage limits experience high selling pressure and abnormal price declines which subsequently reverse. Unregulated shadow-financed margin accounts, facilitated by FinTech lending platforms, contributed more to the crash despite their smaller asset holdings relative to regulated brokerage accounts.

We analyze the effects on Chinese firms of the "China Connect" equity market liberalization. Because China is a capital abundant country, unlike typical emerging markets in the literature, the benefits and costs of liberalization are logically different. Nonetheless, the liberalization brought benefits: lower funding costs, higher stock prices, and more investment for connected firms compared to unconnected firms, despite a common negative effect on all firms from capital outflows. These benefits come from a new channel: reducing domestic credit misallocation between private- and state-owned enterprises. We also document costs: connected firms became more sensitive to external shocks than unconnected firms.

Fluctuations in investor demand dramatically affect firms' valuation and access to capital. To quantify its real impact, we develop a dynamic investment model that endogenizes both the demand- and supply-side of capital. Strong investor demand elevates equity prices and dampens price impacts of issuance, facilitating investment and financing, while weak investor demand instead incentivizes firms to optimally repurchase shares at favorable prices, which can crowd out investment, especially among firms with liquidity constraints. We estimate the model using indirect inference by matching the endogenous relationship between investors' portfolio holdings and firm characteristics. Our estimation suggests that investor demand substantially distorts firms' real investment decisions and impedes the efficient capital allocation across firms. Eliminating excess demand reduces dispersion in the marginal product of capital by 10.74% and TFP losses by 16.20%. Investor demand also influence firm size distributions and generates a heavy right tail---large excess demand provides firms with market power and opportunities to profit from their financial market activities, contributing to the emergence of superstar firms.

Using a difference-in-differences approach, we examine the effect of industry-specific knowledge transfer on audit performance after a merger of two Chinese audit firms with different levels of expertise in an industry. For clients in an industry audited by both merging audit firms, those audited by the audit firm less specialized in that industry belong to the treatment group, while all other clients belong to the control group. We find an economically-significant improvement in audit quality (as reflected in a reduction in financial misstatements) for the treatment group relative to the control group in the same merged audit firm. We show that the treatment effect is not driven by changes in auditor incentives or personnel movement and is more pronounced when we expect stronger communication between the less and more specialized auditors after the merger. We caution that our findings are specific to China and may not generalize to other countries.

Over the past twenty years, especially the past decade, China has taken enormous strides to develop its bond market as an integral step of financial reform. This paper aims to provide the most up-to-date overview of Chinese bond markets, by highlighting two distinct and largely segmented markets: Over-the-Counter based interbank market, and centralized exchange market. We explain various bond instruments traded in these two markets, highlighting their inherent connection with the banking system, and many multi-layer regulatory bodies who are interacting with each other in an intricate way. We also covers the credit ratings and rating agencies in Chinese market, and offer an account of ever-rising default incidents in China starting 2014. Finally, we discuss the recent regulatory tightening of shadow banking since late 2017 and its impact on bond investors, and the forces behind the internalization of Chinese bond markets in the near future.

Using data from 56 nations over 45 years, we find that nations that are more likely to elect left wing governments face higher (and more volatile) sovereign spreads. To explain these facts, we build a sovereign default model in which two policymakers (left and right) alternate in power. The probability of an incumbent staying in power is increasing in the share of government spending. We parametrize the left policymaker as having a higher marginal political gain from increasing government spending than the right does, a feature found in our data. Model economies in which the left is more frequently in power face worse borrowing terms due to higher default risk, a greater reluctance for fiscal austerity in bad times, and a higher share of government spending on average. These features imply large welfare losses for households.

We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on executive incentives at publicly listed firms. VC directors serving on the compensation committee are associated with greater CEO risk-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and greater pay-for-performance sensitivity (i.e., delta). These effects are more substantial if VC directors are from highly reputable VC firms. Using Regulation S-K requirements to disclose attributes of nominated directors as an instrument, we show that these results are causal. We also document that prior finding of greater research intensity and innovation when VC directors serve on boards of public firms are in part explained by the presence of increased risk-taking incentives of the CEO instilled by such directors. Lastly, we find that having VC directors on nominating and/or governance committees is associated with a higher likelihood of forced CEO turnover.

Using a proprietary loan data set, we study how a large state-owned bank uses its internal ratings in loan granting decisions around China’s 2008 economic stimulus programme that relies on bank credit for financing. We find that there is little change in the rating process of the bank, and internal ratings remain a valid, albeit weaker, predictor of loan interest rates in the stimulus period. Weakened rating-interest rate relation is concentrated for borrowers from the industries that the stimulus programme focuses on, for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for bank branches operating in provinces with a low level of credit market marketization, or when the credit rater and loan officer have no collaboration before. We also find that interest rates remain a valid predictor of ex-post loan outcomes in the stimulus period. Overall, there is no evidence that loan decisions of the state-owned bank are severely compromised in the economic stimulus period as speculated by some media. By showing how a state-owned bank maneuvers between supporting government stimulus initiative and maintaining market-based lending, we contribute to the limited literature on the roles of internal ratings in loan contracting decisions, and add to the debate over the roles of state-owned banks.

In a frictionless market where  rms can always raise capital, debtors default only if their total assets cannot cover their total liabilities. However, in the presence of market imperfection, debtors may default even while solvent if the cost of new capital outweighs the legal penalty on contract violation. Using a unique sample of Chinese bank loans over the period 2007-2012, we analyze the repayment decisions of borrowing rms whose cash holdings are high enough to cover the bank debt coming due. We  nd that poor legal enforcement signi cantly increases the likelihood of default. This positive association becomes stronger if  rms face tighter  nancing constraints, or when credit supply becomes more scarce. Our results illustrate the role of legal enforcement in determining  nancial risks and show that market imperfection strengthening the impact of legal enforcement on  nancial risks.