所属栏目:资本市场/固定收益证券

SOVEREIGN SPREADS AND THE POLITICAL LEANING OF NATIONS
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发布日期:2021年12月28日 上次修订日期:2021年12月28日

摘要

Using data from 56 nations over 45 years, we find that nations that are more likely to elect left wing governments face higher (and more volatile) sovereign spreads. To explain these facts, we build a sovereign default model in which two policymakers (left and right) alternate in power. The probability of an incumbent staying in power is increasing in the share of government spending. We parametrize the left policymaker as having a higher marginal political gain from increasing government spending than the right does, a feature found in our data. Model economies in which the left is more frequently in power face worse borrowing terms due to higher default risk, a greater reluctance for fiscal austerity in bad times, and a higher share of government spending on average. These features imply large welfare losses for households.
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Ionut Cotoc; Alok Johri; César Sosa-Padilla SOVEREIGN SPREADS AND THE POLITICAL LEANING OF NATIONS (2021年12月28日) https://www.cfrn.com.cn/lw/13110.html

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