This study explores how the application of democratic rule in land reform decision-making determines villagers’ political trust towards different levels of the government in China. Based on analyses of a two-period household survey data we find that in China’s most recent Collective Forest Tenure Reform, the use of democratic rule improves villagers’ trust for town and county cadres, whereas the impact on trust towards village cadres is only significant for the democracy involving all the villagers or households in a village. This pattern of trust is partly explained by our findings that the democratic process helped decrease the unresolved inter-village forestland disputes whilst there seems no such impact on the within-village land disputes. Heterogeneity analyses show that democratic decision-making has a more pronounced effect in improving trust for villagers with lower income, and those without affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or to the village committee.

ESG is emerging as a new benchmark for measuring a company's sustainable development capabilities and social impact. As a measure of ESG performance, ESG ratings are increasingly receiving attention from companies, the general public, and government institutions, and are becoming an important reference factor influencing their decision-making. This paper investigates the impact of corporate ESG ratings on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and its mechanisms of action. Focusing on listed companies in China, we find that higher ESG ratings contribute to improving a company's TFP, and this conclusion remains valid after robustness tests and addressing endogeneity issues. Further exploration into the reasons behind this result reveals that ESG ratings can be seen as a signal that a company sends to the outside world, representing its overall performance. Higher ESG ratings enhance a company's TFP by reducing market financing constraints and obtaining government subsidies. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the positive impact of ESG ratings on TFP is more pronounced for companies with higher levels of attention, reputation, and audit quality. Additionally, we explore whether ESG ratings can serve as a predictive indicator for measuring a company's TFP. This hypothesis was tested using machine learning algorithms, and the results indicate that models incorporating ESG rating indicators significantly improve the accuracy of predicting a company's TFP capabilities.

Informal institutions can play a crucial role in fostering corporate and policy innovation, especially when formal institutions are weak. However, their intangible nature makes them difficult to quantify. In this paper, we proxy the strength of kinship-based informal institutions using surname homogeneity among business owners, specifically, the extent to which they share a limited number of surnames within the same county. Our analysis reveals that a one-standard-deviation increase in the strength of informal institutions leads to a 21.1% increase in patent filings and an 18.9% increase in policy innovation. We find that kinship-related informal institutions foster corporate innovation by compensating for weak formal institutions, enhancing protection for intellectual property rights, facilitating access to finance, improving public service delivery, and promoting supply chain cooperation. We also suggest that kinship-related informal institutions encourage local governments to engage in policy experimentation, which relies on the collaboration of business owners. This experimentation process is easier to coordinate and monitor in counties dominated by a few kinship networks. Both informal institutions and policy innovation contribute to economic development and foster entrepreneurial market entries. However, the positive impact of informal institutions declines over time as formal institutions strengthen in China.

Based on the sample of Chinese A-listed firms from 2003 to 2020, this paper investigates the effect of common institutional ownership on labor income share. The result shows that common institutional ownership can significantly increase firms’ labor income share. Mechanism tests indicate that common ownership can: 1) alleviate financial constraints by reducing the debt financing costs and increasing the trade credit financing, thus increasing the labor income share; 2) improve corporate innovation and therefore enhances the demand for highly-skilled labor, which eventually boost labor income share. Competitive hypothesis test represents that common institutional ownership can reduce the monopoly power of enterprises and decrease monopoly rent, so as to increase the proportion of labor in the distribution. Further analyses present that the network formed by the common ownership can effectively exert the financing support role of SOEs and the knowledge spillover effect of innovative-advantage firms, which contributes to the labor income share increasing of other related firms in the network connection. This study not only enriches the economic consequences of common institutional ownership, but also provides policy guidance for the government to further optimize the income-distribution pattern by deepening the reform of the financial market.

Amid growing global interest in state interventions, this paper examines the impact of Chinese government infrastructure investments on improving firm productivity. It centers on a policy aimed at directing regional governments to foster a more conducive market environment for private enterprises. Our analysis reveals that the positive effect of infrastructure investment on firm productivity is increased by 42.5% for private firms in industries that benefitted from improved market entry opportunities and an even more striking 97.9% in provinces where arbitrary fines were curtailed. These findings underscore the complementary roles of state interventions and the development of market mechanisms in boosting firm productivity.

This paper explores the impact of government intervention on local analysts’ earnings forecasts, based on a scenario of financial misconduct in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The results show that, under the influence of the government, local analysts’ earnings forecasts for SOEs with financial misconduct are less accurate and more optimistically biased. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that forecast bias by local analysts is greater when officials have stronger promotion incentives, when regions are less market-oriented and have a larger share of the state-owned economy, and when SOEs contribute more to taxation and employment. In further analysis, we find that local analysts have a more optimistic tone in reports targeting non-compliant SOEs. Local analysts who depend heavily on political information will also issue more biased and optimistic forecasts on SOEs with violations. Finally, as a reward for achieving government goals, the local brokerages affiliated with these analysts and providing these optimistic forecasts are more likely to become underwriters in seasoned equity offerings of SOEs. This paper reveals that government intervention significantly influences analyst forecasts, providing implications for understanding the sources of analyst forecast bias.

We develop a model economy with active financial markets in which a policymaker's adoption of a gradualistic approach constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In our model, the ex ante policy proposal influences the supply side of the economy, while the ex post policy action affects the demand side and shapes market equilibrium. When choosing policies, the policymaker internalizes the impact of her decisions on the precision of the firm-value signal. Moreover, financial markets provide a price signal that informs the government. The policymaker learns about the productivity shocks not only from firm-value performance signals but also from financial market prices. Access to information through both channels creates strong incentives for the policymaker to adopt a gradualistic approach in a time-consistent manner. Smaller policy steps yield more precise information about the productivity shock. These results hold robustly for both exogenous and endogenous information models.

This study examines the economic consequences of China’s Three-Red-Lines policy—introduced in 2021 to cap real estate developers’ leverage by imposing strict thresholds on debt ratios and liquidity. Developers breaching these thresholds experienced sharp declines in financing, land acquisitions, and financial performance, with privately-owned developers disproportionately affected relative to state-owned firms. Using granular project-level data, we document significant drops in sales and a demand shift from private to state-owned developers. The policy also reduced local governments’ land sale revenues, prompting greater reliance on hidden local government financing vehicles for land purchases. The policy induced broad structural changes in China’s housing and land markets.

This paper revisits the default-crash risk relation in the context of China. We find that firms with higher default risk have lower stock price crash risk both in monthly and yearly frequencies. To identify the causal effect, we use the first-ever default event in China’s onshore bond market in 2014 as an exogenous shock to the strength of implicit guarantees. The negative relation arises from the active involvement of the government before 2014 and creditors after 2014 in corporate governance. Consistent with the external scrutiny mechanism, the impact of default risk on stock price crashes is stronger in situations in which creditors are more likely to engage in active monitoring (i.e., firms with higher liquidation costs, lower liquidation value, and higher levels of information asymmetry), with these effects primarily observed in the post-2014 period. Overall, our study highlights the role of the “invisible hand” in the absence of the “visible hand.”

Using data from Chinese A-share listed firms from 2015 to 2022, we employ a difference-in-differences model to empirically examine the impact of bankruptcy regimes, marked by the establishment of bankruptcy courts, on firms’ total factor productivity (TFP). The results show a significant decline in TFP among firms in regions following the establishment of bankruptcy courts. This finding remains valid after a series of robustness tests. Mechanism tests reveal that establishing bankruptcy courts increases firms’ risk aversion incentives by endowing creditors with excessive rights. Consequently, firms tend to reduce liabilities, curtail R&D investment, and accumulate liquid assets as coping measures, ultimately contributing to a decline in TFP. Furthermore, this effect is more pronounced for firms with high financial risk. However, the improvement of the market mechanism can alleviate the negative impact of bankruptcy courts excessively strengthening creditor protection. Specifically, when firms are located in regions with weak government intervention and strong financial development, as well as in market environments with low uncertainty and strong competition, this negative impact can be mitigated. These findings provide fresh insights into the dual nature of creditor protection and offer valuable references for governments to improve the bankruptcy legal system.