We investigate, for China’s investable companies, the relation between stock returns and firm characteristics, and the impacts on the relation of the 2001-2003 financial reforms to further liberalize stock markets. For the first time in the literature, we document coexistence of a positive size effect and a growth effect, and the importance of liquidity and positive earnings for returns; and we also show that they underwent a structural break upon the reforms. These results are robust across 12 alternative panel model specifications with different ways of estimating and controlling for the market beta, different proxies for market portfolios, the problem of outliers considered, and the January effect allowed for.

Applying the principle of the bonding theory, this study examined the relationship between corporate governance practice and performance of Chinese firms that are listed in the major international stock exchanges, including NASDAQ, New York, Hong Kong, Singapore and London AIM markets, and further investigated whether the Chinese firms that adopted the corporate governance mechanisms of the stock exchanges where they are listed would outperform those of firms listed locally in the Chinese stock exchanges that operates in a weak enforcement mechanism environment. Hypotheses are tested using panel data analysis. The results suggest that the Chinese cross-listings exhibit bonding premium only in U.S. markets, while those non-cross-listed Chinese firms demonstrate better firm performance than those listed in London, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Further, the results reveal that for all the cross-listed Chinese firms, profitability rate and the leverage ratio play a positive role in improving the firms’ performance. The adoptions of Big Four auditing firms and international accounting standard as a must-to-do corporate governance mechanism regulated by the host stock exchange has less effects on firm’s performance. The study suggests that merely borrowing a corporate governance mechanism does not guarantee the improvement of corporate governance of a firm, and therefore to its firm performance; rather, a firm’s own background and country effects also matter.

The presence of price disparity between A- and H- shares suggests that the two markets are segmented and thus allocation of capital is inefficient. In this paper, we attempt to identify the factors contributing to the price disparity, with a view to helping policymakers find solutions to the problem. Our results suggest that the disparity is caused by a combination of micro and macro factors. The fact that some of these factors are found to have played a crucial role in determining the disparity implies that reforms that can remove or reduce the segmentation can potentially bring considerable benefits by improving price discovery and market efficiency.