This paper develops a delegation-based framework to explain how institutional design shapes pricing incentives under risk. Using China’s 2016 IPO reform—which abolished prefunding requirements and transferred payment obligations from investors to underwriters—as a natural experiment, we show that introducing subscription-payment risk (SPR) renders underwriter’s partial residual claimants with respect to unpaid allocations. Building on Baron’s (1982) delegation model, we argue that the reform amplifies information asymmetry and induces underwriters to adopt more conservative pricing strategies to manage perceived payment risk. Empirically, IPOs exposed to SPR exhibit greater underpricing and lower offer prices, particularly when investor bids reflect stronger valuation pessimism. The effect tends to be less pronounced for reputable underwriters and when foreign institutional investors participate. Overall, the evidence demonstrates how risk redistribution and institutional frictions jointly shape underwriter behavior and pricing efficiency in primary equity markets.

A central premise of mandatory disclosure regulation is that greater transparency reduces information asymmetry and lowers borrowing costs. We challenge this premise by examining industry-level operational disclosure - a regulatory form that reveals horizontally comparable information across peer firms rather than refining individual firm fundamentals. Exploiting the staggered introduction of mandatory industry-specific disclosure guidelines by Chinese stock exchanges between 2013 and 2019, we find that enhanced industry disclosure significantly widens bond credit spreads by approximately 54 basis points - the opposite of what standard disclosure theory predicts. This counterintuitive effect is more pronounced in non-homogeneous industries, among smaller firms, and for bonds restricted to institutional investors. Mechanism tests confirm two opposing channels: disclosure reduces information asymmetry while simultaneously intensifying product market competition by exposing strategically sensitive operational metrics. Our evidence challenges the one-size-fits-all approach to disclosure regulation and highlights that the competitive implications of disclosed information - not merely its quantity - shape credit risk pricing.

The China Securities Regulatory Commission is allowing firms to use externally financed funds for share repurchases, a recent measure to enable listed companies address valuation pressures and protect investors; however, its implications for corporate marketing decisions remain unclear. Using an event sample of Chinese listed firms that conducted open-market repurchases between 2009 and 2024, this study empirically examines how this market activity financed by different sources influence marketing decisions and explores the underlying mechanisms. The findings show that compared with firms using internal cash for repurchases, those relying on debt financing are inclined to resist myopic marketing decisions, and this negative relationship is pronounced under high analyst coverage and when privately owned listed firms are controlled by family entrepreneurs. These results remain robust after replacing the dependent variables and applying propensity score matching. Overall, this study shows that debt financing to support share repurchases has a long-term beneficial governance impact as it improves earnings quality and protects investor interests, and offers a new perspective on the relationship between financing-based repurchases and marketing myopia, and provides useful policy insights for evaluating the effectiveness of China’s refinancing regulations related to share repurchases, while guiding further refinement.

Technology firms are often financed on narratives about products, contracts, customers, and technological progress well before these developments appear in accounting statements. We ask when such narratives become economically informative. Our central idea is that narratives should matter more once they can be linked to later verifiable outcomes rather than treated as stand-alone text.Using listed Chinese technology firms, we develop a validated corporate narrative framework for bank-affiliated investment, a setting in which investors must screen with soft information ex ante and then monitor hard realization and downside risk ex post. We use GPT-5.1 to extract business claims from management discussion, investor-relations records, exchange Q&A, and earnings-roadshow materials, and to label later claim–evidence pairs as support, partial support, conflict, duplicate, or irrelevant. We then connect these labels to official announcements, procurement awards, permits, project updates, and negative-event disclosures to construct a validated firm-month signal. The broad merged panel contains 592 firms and 30,169 firm-month observations; the main return tests use 576 firms and 18,230 firm-month observations over 2022–2024. A simple production rule that combines a low-narrative-premium component with hard-narrative and hard-event anchors, together with a separate downside-risk gate, delivers an implementable annualized long-short return of 8.93% in bank-invested firms after trading costs. The signal is much weaker in non-bank firms, predicts future gross-margin improvement more strongly than future ROE, and improves downside screening.

This paper identifies the marginal investors in China’s stock market and examines their impact on stock pricing. To clearly distinguish between the equity constraint channel and the debt constraint channel, we construct the capital ratio factor and the debt constraint factor for banks and securities companies, the two most critical financial intermediaries in China’s stock market. Our results demonstrate that banks indeed serve as marginal investors and influence stock market efficiency primarily through the equity capital constraint channel. Furthermore, we find that the bank capital ratio factor significantly explains stock mispricing in China, with the single-factor model based on bank equity capital producing substantially smaller pricing errors compared to traditional multi-factor models.

This article examines the link between foreign institutional holdings and firms’ efficiency in labor investment in the setting of Chinese markets. We find that foreign institutional investors enhance firms’ labor investment outcomes primarily through mitigating asymmetric information and by strengthening internal governance. Specifically, the influence of foreign institutional investors on a firm’s labor investment efficiency is stronger when the firm faces greater labor adjustment frictions. This effect is more evident when foreign institutional investors are originated from countries or areas with stronger cultural connections to China, stronger governance quality, common law traditions, or stronger bargaining power in the firms’ governance. Our paper contributes to the literature in that it documents the monitoring role of foreign institutional investors from the perspective of firms’ labor investment decisions, and adds to the literature on the drivers of firms’ labor investment choices.

Research Question/Issue: This study investigates whether and how political connections affect customer complaints in the Chinese market, using a comprehensive dataset from the country’s largest online complaint platform. Research Findings/Insights: Analyzing 22,644 firm-year observations from 2018 to 2023, we find that politically connected firms experience significantly fewer customer complaints. A one-unit increase in political connection strength is associated with a 9% reduction in complaints relative to the sample mean. This effect operates through two primary mechanisms: a reputation-motivation channel and a financial resource channel. The mitigating effect is more pronounced for firms in highly marketized regions, those with higher advertising expenditures, companies facing greater earnings pressure, and those with lower tangible asset ratios. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our study contributes to the literature on political connections and corporate governance by demonstrating how political capital translates into tangible consumer experience advantages. It also advances research on the determinants of customer complaints by highlighting the role of internal governance mechanisms, particularly managerial political ties. Our findings support the Corporate Reputation and Financial Resource Hypotheses while challenging alternative explanations based on regulatory shielding or managerial complacency. Practitioner/Policy Implications: For corporate leaders, our results underscore the importance of reputation management and quality investment, particularly when political connections are absent. Policymakers should consider strengthening public monitoring institutions to reinforce reputational incentives across markets. Investors may use customer complaints as an indicator of product quality and operational stability in their investment decisions.

This paper examines the relationship between award-winning CEOs and the levels of innovation investment in Chinese-listed companies. The findings indicate that CEOs who have received awards are more likely to foster increased corporate innovation. Additionally, these award-winning CEOs are associated with enhanced long-term operating performance for their firms and reinforce the link between current R&D investments and future operational success. Ultimately, our results suggest that CEO awards can enhance corporate innovation through two primary channels: first, by attracting investors, thereby alleviating financing constraints, and second, by promoting greater engagement from academics and overseas talent in innovation initiatives.

Investors’ prior experiences with a stock substantially affect their willingness to repurchase it. This paper explores the repurchase effect, a psychological bias in which investors are reluctant to repurchase stocks that have appreciated after a prior sale. To quantify this bias, we develop a novel stock-level measure, termed Repur, and investigate its implications for cross-sectional asset pricing. Our findings show that stocks with higher Repur tend to experience reduced future buying pressure from investors, which in turn results in lower subsequent returns. Economically, long-short portfolios based on Repur yield annualized abnormal returns exceeding 23% for equal-weighted and 11% for value-weighted risk-adjusted returns. Further analyses show that the pricing effect of Repur is more pronounced following periods of high investor sentiment, for stocks with greater arbitrage constraints, and for firms with smaller investor bases. Out-of-sample evidence from China confirms the significant pricing impact of the repurchase effect.

We investigate whether overnight news sentiment adds predictive value for overnight returns. We focus on the CSI300 Index, whose ETFs are widely held by Chinese retail investors. Sentiment indi-cators are constructed from minute-level overnight news using a fine-tuned RoBERTa model. These indicators are combined with market-based variables to predict overnight returns via regression and machine learning. Results show that while the sentiment alone has predictive value, its incremental contribution disappears once the A50 overnight return is included.