We investigate how investors assess transition risks arising from the discretionary regulatory mandates for nature conservation. We focus on the UN Biodiversity Conference in Kunming, China, a policy shock signaling heightened political commitment to protection. During the conference, firms exhibited negative abnormal stock returns on average. Using a machine learning approach, we identify historical nature-related subsidies to capture firm-level variations in expectations of mandated conservation engagement, beyond measuring corporate environmental (ecological) impacts. This metric negatively correlates with returns during the conference, particularly for firms with high operational volatility, and those in regions with limited fiscal flexibility and stringent conservation pressures. Investor concerns primarily stem from policy uncertainty, without positive earning expectations from conservation. Our findings underscore the role of authoritative discretion in shaping nature transition risks.

This study investigates the role of contextual cues in memory-based decision-making within high-stakes trading environments. Using trade records from a large Chinese brokerage firm, I show that an everyday contextual cue—geographic location—triggers the recall of previously traded stocks: when an investor returns to a city she has visited before, her probability of retrading stocks associated with that city rises by 2.1 percentage points under the most saturated specification (up to 12.2 percentage points under less saturated ones). The effect displays the signatures of similarity-based recall: it is diluted by intervening trading experiences, decays with the age of the memory trace, survives when the city is not the investor's home, is not explained by mechanical recency, and is present for orders submitted via both smartphones and PCs. I then examine an extreme-event cue, COVID-19 quarantine, and find a smaller and less robust effect; the interference and decay signatures are absent precisely for these strongly encoded traces, as the memory account predicts. Memory-cued transactions underperform: stocks bought upon the cue earn about 50 basis points less per week than stocks bought for other reasons on the same day. The study provides causal field evidence for memory-based theories, particularly similarity-based recall, in real-world trading.

The robustness of the securities market is a necessary condition for ensuring the stable operation of the financial market, and stock price fluctuations have always been a major concern for academia and investors. One of the main influencing factors of stock price fluctuations is macroeconomic monetary policy. As one of the important control tools of macroeconomic monetary policy, the impact of benchmark interest rates on stock price fluctuations cannot be ignored. This paper takes Chinese A-shares as the research object, analyzes the impact of benchmark interest rate changes on stock price fluctuations, and further introduces investor sentiment as a mediating variable to analyze its role in the transmission process of monetary policy. This paper selects monthly data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2018 to 2024 and conducts empirical tests by constructing direct effect models and mediating effect models. The research results show that: First, benchmark interest rates have a significant negative impact on stock price fluctuations; second, benchmark interest rates can indirectly affect stock price fluctuations by influencing investor sentiment, with investor sentiment playing a partial mediating role. The research conclusions of this paper help to deepen the understanding of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy's impact on securities prices, and provide micro-evidence for monetary policymakers to assess the impact of policy adjustments on capital market stability, while also providing a reference for investors to understand the risk characteristics of the securities market under changes in the interest rate environment.

This paper develops a delegation-based framework to explain how institutional design shapes pricing incentives under risk. Using China’s 2016 IPO reform—which abolished prefunding requirements and transferred payment obligations from investors to underwriters—as a natural experiment, we show that introducing subscription-payment risk (SPR) renders underwriter’s partial residual claimants with respect to unpaid allocations. Building on Baron’s (1982) delegation model, we argue that the reform amplifies information asymmetry and induces underwriters to adopt more conservative pricing strategies to manage perceived payment risk. Empirically, IPOs exposed to SPR exhibit greater underpricing and lower offer prices, particularly when investor bids reflect stronger valuation pessimism. The effect tends to be less pronounced for reputable underwriters and when foreign institutional investors participate. Overall, the evidence demonstrates how risk redistribution and institutional frictions jointly shape underwriter behavior and pricing efficiency in primary equity markets.

A central premise of mandatory disclosure regulation is that greater transparency reduces information asymmetry and lowers borrowing costs. We challenge this premise by examining industry-level operational disclosure - a regulatory form that reveals horizontally comparable information across peer firms rather than refining individual firm fundamentals. Exploiting the staggered introduction of mandatory industry-specific disclosure guidelines by Chinese stock exchanges between 2013 and 2019, we find that enhanced industry disclosure significantly widens bond credit spreads by approximately 54 basis points - the opposite of what standard disclosure theory predicts. This counterintuitive effect is more pronounced in non-homogeneous industries, among smaller firms, and for bonds restricted to institutional investors. Mechanism tests confirm two opposing channels: disclosure reduces information asymmetry while simultaneously intensifying product market competition by exposing strategically sensitive operational metrics. Our evidence challenges the one-size-fits-all approach to disclosure regulation and highlights that the competitive implications of disclosed information - not merely its quantity - shape credit risk pricing.

The China Securities Regulatory Commission is allowing firms to use externally financed funds for share repurchases, a recent measure to enable listed companies address valuation pressures and protect investors; however, its implications for corporate marketing decisions remain unclear. Using an event sample of Chinese listed firms that conducted open-market repurchases between 2009 and 2024, this study empirically examines how this market activity financed by different sources influence marketing decisions and explores the underlying mechanisms. The findings show that compared with firms using internal cash for repurchases, those relying on debt financing are inclined to resist myopic marketing decisions, and this negative relationship is pronounced under high analyst coverage and when privately owned listed firms are controlled by family entrepreneurs. These results remain robust after replacing the dependent variables and applying propensity score matching. Overall, this study shows that debt financing to support share repurchases has a long-term beneficial governance impact as it improves earnings quality and protects investor interests, and offers a new perspective on the relationship between financing-based repurchases and marketing myopia, and provides useful policy insights for evaluating the effectiveness of China’s refinancing regulations related to share repurchases, while guiding further refinement.

Technology firms are often financed on narratives about products, contracts, customers, and technological progress well before these developments appear in accounting statements. We ask when such narratives become economically informative. Our central idea is that narratives should matter more once they can be linked to later verifiable outcomes rather than treated as stand-alone text.Using listed Chinese technology firms, we develop a validated corporate narrative framework for bank-affiliated investment, a setting in which investors must screen with soft information ex ante and then monitor hard realization and downside risk ex post. We use GPT-5.1 to extract business claims from management discussion, investor-relations records, exchange Q&A, and earnings-roadshow materials, and to label later claim–evidence pairs as support, partial support, conflict, duplicate, or irrelevant. We then connect these labels to official announcements, procurement awards, permits, project updates, and negative-event disclosures to construct a validated firm-month signal. The broad merged panel contains 592 firms and 30,169 firm-month observations; the main return tests use 576 firms and 18,230 firm-month observations over 2022–2024. A simple production rule that combines a low-narrative-premium component with hard-narrative and hard-event anchors, together with a separate downside-risk gate, delivers an implementable annualized long-short return of 8.93% in bank-invested firms after trading costs. The signal is much weaker in non-bank firms, predicts future gross-margin improvement more strongly than future ROE, and improves downside screening.

This paper identifies the marginal investors in China’s stock market and examines their impact on stock pricing. To clearly distinguish between the equity constraint channel and the debt constraint channel, we construct the capital ratio factor and the debt constraint factor for banks and securities companies, the two most critical financial intermediaries in China’s stock market. Our results demonstrate that banks indeed serve as marginal investors and influence stock market efficiency primarily through the equity capital constraint channel. Furthermore, we find that the bank capital ratio factor significantly explains stock mispricing in China, with the single-factor model based on bank equity capital producing substantially smaller pricing errors compared to traditional multi-factor models.

This article examines the link between foreign institutional holdings and firms’ efficiency in labor investment in the setting of Chinese markets. We find that foreign institutional investors enhance firms’ labor investment outcomes primarily through mitigating asymmetric information and by strengthening internal governance. Specifically, the influence of foreign institutional investors on a firm’s labor investment efficiency is stronger when the firm faces greater labor adjustment frictions. This effect is more evident when foreign institutional investors are originated from countries or areas with stronger cultural connections to China, stronger governance quality, common law traditions, or stronger bargaining power in the firms’ governance. Our paper contributes to the literature in that it documents the monitoring role of foreign institutional investors from the perspective of firms’ labor investment decisions, and adds to the literature on the drivers of firms’ labor investment choices.

Research Question/Issue: This study investigates whether and how political connections affect customer complaints in the Chinese market, using a comprehensive dataset from the country’s largest online complaint platform. Research Findings/Insights: Analyzing 22,644 firm-year observations from 2018 to 2023, we find that politically connected firms experience significantly fewer customer complaints. A one-unit increase in political connection strength is associated with a 9% reduction in complaints relative to the sample mean. This effect operates through two primary mechanisms: a reputation-motivation channel and a financial resource channel. The mitigating effect is more pronounced for firms in highly marketized regions, those with higher advertising expenditures, companies facing greater earnings pressure, and those with lower tangible asset ratios. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our study contributes to the literature on political connections and corporate governance by demonstrating how political capital translates into tangible consumer experience advantages. It also advances research on the determinants of customer complaints by highlighting the role of internal governance mechanisms, particularly managerial political ties. Our findings support the Corporate Reputation and Financial Resource Hypotheses while challenging alternative explanations based on regulatory shielding or managerial complacency. Practitioner/Policy Implications: For corporate leaders, our results underscore the importance of reputation management and quality investment, particularly when political connections are absent. Policymakers should consider strengthening public monitoring institutions to reinforce reputational incentives across markets. Investors may use customer complaints as an indicator of product quality and operational stability in their investment decisions.