We examine the effect of a regulation in China that restricts perquisite consumption by managers of state-owned companies. We find that the regulation causes state-owned companies to issue more entrusted loans to other firms. Furthermore, entrusted loans issued by state-owned companies have lower interest rates and larger loan amounts. These results suggest that managers of state-owned companies use entrusted loans to extract personal benefits to compensate for the lost perquisite consumption due to the regulation.

Using multiple short sale measures, we examine the predictive power of short sales for future stock returns in 38 countries from July 2006 to December 2014. We find that the days-to-cover ratio and the utilization ratio measures have the most robust predictive power for future stock returns in the global capital market. Our results display significant cross-country and cross-firm differences in the predictive power of alternative short sale measures. The predictive power of shorts is stronger in countries with non-prohibitive short sale regulations and for stocks with relatively low liquidity, high shorting fees, and low price efficiency.

China has now entered the pilot phase of the digital currency electronic payment, and the impact of the digital currency electronic payment on China's bank credit system is unknown. This paper analyzes the long-run equilibrium and short-run variation relationship between digital currency electronic payment and narrow money multiplier based on the long-run cointegration equation and short-run VECM using data from the first quarter of 2014 to the second quarter of 2022 for the scale of digital currency electronic payment usage and narrow money multiplier variables. It is found that the introduction of digital currency electronic payment will expand the narrow money multiplier by reducing the cash leakage rate and the excess reserve ratio, thus enhancing the credit creation capacity of China's banks; among the determinants of the narrow money multiplier, the proportion of factors that the central bank can control increases, and the central bank's monetary regulation capacity is enhanced. Finally, this paper proposes that the central bank should improve the technical construction of the central bank's digital currency, strengthen the cooperation with various participants, and enhance the supervision of merchant banks.

In this paper, we leverage the bank governance reform in China as a laboratory to explore the impact of the banking governance system on lending activities. Specifically, a well-functioning governance system does not improve the bank’s selection abilities due to the regulation constraints. However, a good governance system enhances the bank’s monitoring abilities. Finally, a well-governance bank needs more independent directors on the board, lower shareholdings of the top 1 shareholder, the government as the top 1 shareholder, and fewer risk management committee meetings. Therefore, this paper sheds light on banking governance and has important policy implications for bank sectors in the transition economy.

How does labor risk affect corporate’s bond financing? Using the unique institutional feature of government regulations in China, we provide robust evidence that firms with a larger employment size have significantly better access to bond credit. This effect is more pronounced in times of local labor market deterioration or economic slowdown, for low-skill intensive industries, or in places with career-driven government officials. Our results are not driven by differential financial constraints or information frictions. We further show that the employment bias allocates bond credit towards under-performing large employers and the performance-enhancing benefits from bond issuance diminishes with employment size.

This article aims to provide an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of PRC Securities Law 2020 which overhauls China’s securities regulatory framework to construct more efficient and transparent capital markets with enhanced investor protection and market integrity. The law constrains regulators’ administrative powers in deciding the outcome of IPOs as well as streamline the securities offering procedure. This article pays attention to key reform initiatives proposed by PRC Securities Law 2020, such as the registration-based IPO system, the enhanced investor protection and compensation regime, the cross-border supervision, and the harsher punishments for securities frauds. It also discusses the latest enforcement cases relating to high-profile financial frauds like the Luckin Coffee scandal which resulted in Luckin Coffee being delisted from NASDAQ in 2020. The analysis in the article is accompanied by relevant US securities law in the same area to offer a comparative angle, which is of interest to practitioners, academics and policymakers in major financial centres.

Referring to the newspaper textual analysis method by Baker et al. (2016), this study constructs a monthly Chinese Real Estate Policy Uncertainty (REPU) index from 2001 to 2018. The index increases significantly near the promulgation of major policies. We also conduct evaluation of the index with the vector autoregression (VAR) model, which reveals that the rise of REPU indicates the decline in the growth rate of commodity housing development investment, sales area, and real estate industry added value. The REPU index is helpful to expand the understanding of policy uncertainty, and the accurate measurement of REPU is the basis for further research of its impact on China's real estate market.

This paper uses a loan transactions dataset from China to identify whether shadow loans cost more than formal bank loans even with collateral. This motivates us to explore the reasons as to why a listed firm would opt for such loans. Using propensity-score matched data, we find that privately-owned firms with shadow loans are forced to obtain these loans since they are politically discriminated following a regulation change in 2009 that favoured state-owned firms. However, state-owned firms obtain shadow loans due to their inferior firm characteristics. Further, we employ a Difference-in-Differences methodology to uncover that privately-owned firms experience a decline in their performance, investment growth and an increase in default probability following their high dependence on shadow loans when they are excluded from the formal loan market. The above results survive various robustness checks, including doubly-robust inverse-probability weighted Difference-in-Differences regressions.

The crypto and noncrypto markets used to be separated from each other. We argue that with the rapid development of stablecoins since 2018, risks are now transmitted between the crypto and noncrypto markets through stablecoins, which are both pegged to noncrypto assets and play a central role in crypto trading. Applying copula-based CoVaR approaches, we find significant risk spillovers between stablecoins and cryptocurrencies as well as between stablecoins and noncrypto markets, which could help explain the tail dependency between the crypto and noncrypto markets from 2019 to 2021. We also document that the risk spillovers through stablecoins are asymmetric—stronger in the direction from the US dollar to the crypto market than vice versa—which suggests the crypto market is re-dollarizing. Further analyses consider alternative explanations, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and institutional crypto holdings, and determine that the primary channels of risk transmission are stablecoins’ US dollar peg to the noncrypto market and their transaction-medium function in the crypto ecosystem. Our results have important implications for financial stability and shed light on the future of stablecoin regulation.

In recent years, numerous Chinese peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms have collapsed, prompting us to investigate the regulation and monitoring of the fintech industry. Using a unique dataset of P2P lending platforms in China, we investigate the effect of the information environment on regulatory monitoring and platform collapse. Using the platforms’ proximity to regulatory offices as a proxy for information asymmetry, we show that an increase in distance reduces regulatory monitoring and increases the likelihood of platform collapse. Specifically, for every 1% increase in the driving distance between the local regulatory office and a P2P lending platform’s office, the platform’s likelihood of collapse increases by 1.011%. To establish causality, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis that exploits two exogenous shocks: government office relocation and subway station openings. We provide evidence that proximity enhances monitoring quality by facilitating soft information collection, reducing platform failures. We further find two channels of this effect: (1) the information channel through which greater regulatory distance reduces the likelihood and frequency of regulators’ on-site visits and (2) the resource-constraint channel, through which greater regulatory distance significantly increases the local regulatory office’s monitoring costs. Overall, this study highlights the importance of the acquisition of soft information for regulatory monitoring to ensure the viability of fintech firms.