Using cross-border holding data from all custodians in China’s Stock Connect, we provide evidence that Chinese mainland insiders tend to evade the see-through surveillance by round-tripping via the Stock Connect program. After the regulatory reform of Northbound Investor Identification in 2018, the correlation between insider trading and northbound flows decays, and so does the return predictability of northbound flows. The reduction of return predictability is especially pronounced among less prestigious foreign custodians and cross-operating mainland custodians, behind which mainland insiders are more likely to hide. Our analysis sheds light on the role of regulatory cooperation over capital market integration.

Using a proprietary dataset from 2016 to 2019, we find that order flows from foreign investors, facilitated by regulatory liberalization through several channels, present strong predictive power for future stock returns in the Chinese market. Most surprisingly, foreign investors possess the ability to process local firm-level public news, whereas their informational advantages regarding global market-level information are relatively muted. Further, the predictive power of foreign investors is particularly strong on large price movement days when the implications of firm-level information is likely most pronounced. Finally, regulatory reforms that generally relax investment access requirements further improve foreign investors’ predictive power

Convertible bonds were first introduced in China in 1998. Their popularity has risen in the past decades through various domestic regulatory reforms, as more and more companies came to recognize their advantages over conventional bond or equity issuances as ways to raise capital. In this paper, we study the role of convertible bonds in Chinese A-share listed companies’ decision to refinance, using data from 1999 to 2018. First, we find that firms with high information asymmetry tend to issue more convertible bonds than equities to mitigate financing cost, especially under the “Regulation of Restraining Non-public Issuance of Shares (NPIS)” launched in 2017, a regulation that retrains listed companies to issue shares non-publicly. Second, the introduction of “Breaking Rigid Redemption” policy, which breaks the custom of using rigid redemption clauses when financial institutes issue corporate bonds and asset management products, effectively promoted interest rate marketization in China and as a result, companies with a strong tendency to shift risks began to issue convertible bonds to reduce issuing cost after 2017. Third, regulatory requirements on the qualifications for companies played important roles in their refinancing choices. Lastly, we also find that SOEs in China are overall less sensitive to risk-shifting and information asymmetry, given their ample loan resources compared with non-SOEs. Our findings delineate the behaviors of Chinese A-share listed companies in their refinancing and explain the sudden surge in convertible bonds issuance since 2017.

We develop a portfolio-choice model to investigate how regulatory reforms influence the risk-taking behavior of financial institutions with different capital adequacy levels. The model predicts that either all firms reduce their risk-taking, or there exists a capital-adequacy threshold below which risk-taking increases as regulation becomes more stringent. The Chinese insurance solvency regulatory reform provides a unique natural experiment to test our theory. In 2015, each insurer reported two solvency ratios under the original and the new regulatory systems. The difference between them produces an exogenous and insurer-specific measure of the regulatory pressure shock. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find that increasing regulatory pressure induces greater risk-taking for less capital-adequate insurers, of which the regulator should want to reduce risk-taking mostly. We show that increasing the penalties of insolvency, increasing the risk sensitivity of capital requirements, and reinforcing the qualitative risk assessment are effective policy remedies for this backfiring problem.

Recent events in China provide a historical opportunity to study the expropriation of minority shareholders. In this paper, we document the use of inter-corporate loans by controlling shareholders to extract funds from Chinese listed firms. Using accounting information from public sources, we show how tens of billions of RMB were siphoned from hundreds of companies during the 1996 to 2006 period. Specifically, we show the nature and extent of these abuses, evaluate their economic consequences, explore their cross-sectional determinants, and report on the extensive efforts by auditors and regulators that eventually contained this practice. Collectively, our findings shed light on the nature and severity of the tunneling problem in China, and the on-going challenges associated with regulatory reform in the country.