We examine the impact of firm-investor communication on ESG issues through investor interactive platforms in Chinese stock exchanges from 2010 to 2022. Our regression analysis finds that increased ESG-based questions from investors and firms’ responses lead to increased stock liquidity, suggesting that investor-firm dialogues beyond financial aspects to include ESG-related themes contribute to greater information transparency. We posit that investors use such communication as a “voice” strategy, advocating firms for enhanced ESG disclosures and performance. This strategy yields a two-fold benefit: it aligns with investors’ ESG objectives and, alternatively, facilitates their exit through improved stock liquidity. Our robustness tests suggest a probable causal relationship between investor engagement on ESG issues and stock liquidity. Moreover, we find that a positive tone in ESG-based communications strengthens this relationship, prompting managers to enhance ESG disclosure transparency in response to investor pressure.

This study investigates the impact of investor attention on stock market reactions to ChatGPT using dialogues on the Chinese interactive investor platforms (IIPs). We measure investor attention by the number of investors’ questions toward ChatGPT on the IIPs and categorize the firms’ answers as Investing, Speculative, and Absent. The research reveals positive and statistically significant market reactions surrounding the initial questions that occur before firm responses. Positive abnormal returns are also observed around the initial answer dates, with Investing firms evoking the highest market response, followed by Speculative firms, and Absent firms exhibiting the lowest reactions. Furthermore, positive market reactions persist even as firms modify their ChatGPT involvement statements or face stock exchanges inquiries, suggesting that the stock price upswing may primarily be fueled by ChatGPT-related mania. Our findings imply the potential of ChatGPT fervor: collusion caused by investor attention to ChatGPT and firm’s responses catering to investors.

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to examine the effect of information disclosure by unlisted bond issuers on the stock price informativeness of listed firms in the same industry. Design/methodology/approach – This paper takes advantage of information disclosure during the bond issuance and examines the spillover effect of unlisted bond issuers’ information disclosure on listed firms in the stock market. The sample is composed of A-share firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2018. All the data are obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research and WIND databases. The impact of bond market information disclosure on price informativeness of listed firms in the same industry is identified through multivariate regression analyses. Findings – Empirical results show that price informativeness of listed firms has a significantly positive association with the information disclosure of same-industry unlisted bond issuers. Further analyses show that the above finding is more significant when information disclosure of bond issuers is a more important channel for acquiring industry information (i.e. when industry is more concentrated, when economic uncertainty is high, and when industry information is less transparent) and understanding the industry competitive landscape (i.e. when bond issuers are relatively large, when bond issuers and listed firms have more direct product competition, when bond issuance firms are large-scale state-owned business groups), and when there are more cross-market information intermediaries (i.e. more cross-market institutional investors and more sellside analysts).This paperindicates that information disclosure of bond issuers has a positive spillover effect on the stock market. Originality/value – The novelty of the research is that the authors examine industry information spillover from unlisted firms to listed firms leveraging on unlisted firms’ information disclosure in bond markets.

This study examines the impact of Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s (SZSE) information disclosure ratings on investment efficiency in China. Based on a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies on the SZSE from 2001 to 2018, we discover that superior information disclosure ratings improve investment efficiency after controlling for various firm- and industry-level variables. Our findings remain valid after various robustness tests and using instrumental variables to address the endogeneity problem. Specifically, we find that improving information disclosure ratings help firms attract more investor attention, which leads to higher investment efficiency. In addition, this information disclosure effect is more pronounced for underinvestment firms and firms on the main board than for smaller firms on SEM (small- and medium-sized enterprise) and GEM (growth enterprise market) boards. Our evidence supports the idea that regulatory activities for information disclosure ratings of companies listed on China’s stock exchanges improve investment efficiency.

We examine an important yet understudied form of reputational sanction in China, namely public criticisms imposed on culpable firms by the Chinese stock exchanges from 2013 to 2018. We find significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date, and they were affected by several factors, including financing propensity, governance mechanism, and equity nature. However, the market reaction is significantly negative only for firms relying on external financing and non-state enterprises, and importantly, becomes insignificant in cases where the firm had self-exposed misconduct before the official announcement of public criticism. Further, we examine other effects of public criticism, finding that public criticism does not improve firms’ long-term values, nor produce strong deterrence to change their behaviour. Overall, the evidence of the effects of public criticism on culpable firms is mixed, suggesting that reputational sanction is a weak, if not ineffective, instrument of market regulation in China.

We document that firms' strategic reactions could hamper the effectiveness of RegTech. Our paper focuses on one RegTech innovation in China—online platforms launched by stock exchanges for investors to communicate with listed companies. We find that firms provide a number of no-answer replies—answers without clear, specific, or useful information—to investors' questions. Consistent with strategic information hoarding, no-answers are shown to be associated with subsequent unfavorable news. Moreover, firms with higher no-answer rates tend to have lower price efficiency, higher return volatility, and higher stock price crash risk. The evidence suggests regulators' objective of enhancing investor protection is not fully fulfilled.

Using a sample of 1250 companies listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock exchanges for the time period from 1999 to 2010, we find that for firms with a higher level of uncertainty, the benefits of the connections and advice provided by directors outweigh the costs of the impairment in decision making related to having a large board size. In particular, the positive incremental effect of board size on Q, for firms with a higher proportion of State shares, suggests that connections provided by directors is crucial for firms to get access to greater resources and it is even more important to Stateowned than to Non-State-owned firms during the economic reform in China. Our results indicate that that both agency theory and resource dependence theory play an important role on board efficient research.

This paper documents different timeliness in disseminating sanction and enforcement information (SEI) by two types of regulatory agencies in China and the different consequences that flow from them. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) does not make timely public disclosures of SEI and, instead, leave it up to the firms to make a public announcement under their general obligation to disclose price-sensitive information. The firms therefore have considerable discretion in deciding whether and when to disclose SEI. In contrast, the stock exchanges in Shenzhen and Shanghai make SEI public promptly through the media and the exchanges’ official websites. Using Chinese SEI data during the period 1999 to 2005, we find that the CSRC approach is associated with significantly lagged corporate disclosure (compared with the timely stock exchange approach) and a significantly negative (but delayed) stock price reaction. We also show that the sanctioned firm may take advantage of the less timely CSRC approach to delay its disclosure of SEI for opportunistic reasons such as completing material transactions. We conclude that the CSRC should make immediate public announcements of SEI as these contain price-sensitive information. Furthermore, the immediate dissemination of SEI will bring the CSRC into line with the disclosure practices of China’s stock exchanges and international market regulators.

If liquidity or illiquidity shocks reduce returns, then such risks need to be priced. The goal of this paper is to examine whether liquidity or illiquidity shocks increase or decrease returns on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Our measure of illiquidity is the widely used Amihud’s (2002) ILLQ measure, and we proxy liquidity with the trading volume (TV), the turnover rate (TR), and the trading probability (TP). Using daily data for the period 1993 to 2003, we find weak evidence of the illiquidity shock having a negative effect on returns on both exchanges, and while greater cases of a positive effect of liquidity factors on returns is documented, very few of these are statistically significant. Hence, contrary to the extant literature, we find weak evidence in favour of pricing liquidity on the Chinese stock market.

Applying the principle of the bonding theory, this study examined the relationship between corporate governance practice and performance of Chinese firms that are listed in the major international stock exchanges, including NASDAQ, New York, Hong Kong, Singapore and London AIM markets, and further investigated whether the Chinese firms that adopted the corporate governance mechanisms of the stock exchanges where they are listed would outperform those of firms listed locally in the Chinese stock exchanges that operates in a weak enforcement mechanism environment. Hypotheses are tested using panel data analysis. The results suggest that the Chinese cross-listings exhibit bonding premium only in U.S. markets, while those non-cross-listed Chinese firms demonstrate better firm performance than those listed in London, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Further, the results reveal that for all the cross-listed Chinese firms, profitability rate and the leverage ratio play a positive role in improving the firms’ performance. The adoptions of Big Four auditing firms and international accounting standard as a must-to-do corporate governance mechanism regulated by the host stock exchange has less effects on firm’s performance. The study suggests that merely borrowing a corporate governance mechanism does not guarantee the improvement of corporate governance of a firm, and therefore to its firm performance; rather, a firm’s own background and country effects also matter.