Research into asset pricing anomalies in the China A-share market is hampered given the short time series of available returns. Even when average excess returns on candidate factor portfolios are economically sizeable, conventional portfolio sorting methods lack statistical power. We apply an efficient sorting procedure that combines firm characteristics with the covariance matrix. For the China A-share market, we find that the efficient sorting procedure doubles the t-statistics compared to conventional portfolio sorts, leading to nine instead of three significant anomalies over the postreform period from 2008 to 2020. We find significant size, value, low-risk, and returns-based anomalies. While portfolio characteristics differ between sorting methods, we find that efficient sorting portfolios highly correlate with equally weighted portfolios and capture the same underlying anomaly.

We evaluate how prior mutual fund working experience affects private fund managers' performance. Using a novel Chinese private fund database from 2012 to 2016, we document significantly lower excess returns and higher left-tail risks for private fund managers with prior mutual fund working experience. Such effect is concentrated in switched managers with lower performance ranks in mutual funds. Additionally, the underperformance is attributable to reduced research support, change in investment styles, and deteriorated market timing skills, while incentive schemes help alleviate such underperformance. Our findings demonstrate the key role of industry-specific human capital in the asset management industry.

Convertible bonds were first introduced in China in 1998. Their popularity has risen in the past decades through various domestic regulatory reforms, as more and more companies came to recognize their advantages over conventional bond or equity issuances as ways to raise capital. In this paper, we study the role of convertible bonds in Chinese A-share listed companies’ decision to refinance, using data from 1999 to 2018. First, we find that firms with high information asymmetry tend to issue more convertible bonds than equities to mitigate financing cost, especially under the “Regulation of Restraining Non-public Issuance of Shares (NPIS)” launched in 2017, a regulation that retrains listed companies to issue shares non-publicly. Second, the introduction of “Breaking Rigid Redemption” policy, which breaks the custom of using rigid redemption clauses when financial institutes issue corporate bonds and asset management products, effectively promoted interest rate marketization in China and as a result, companies with a strong tendency to shift risks began to issue convertible bonds to reduce issuing cost after 2017. Third, regulatory requirements on the qualifications for companies played important roles in their refinancing choices. Lastly, we also find that SOEs in China are overall less sensitive to risk-shifting and information asymmetry, given their ample loan resources compared with non-SOEs. Our findings delineate the behaviors of Chinese A-share listed companies in their refinancing and explain the sudden surge in convertible bonds issuance since 2017.

We examine global integration in the market for asset management, as indicated by the correlation of mutual fund flows across domiciles. We observe no leading role for the US relative to flows in other domiciles. We do observe a strong global factor in MF flows, and global integration is linked to a market’s business environment, safety from conflict, and political stability. In regional analysis, Europe represents an integrated market for asset management, led by Luxembourg, where asset managers face common flow risks across domiciles. The Asia-Pacific region displays no coherent patterns of correlations across domiciles.

This paper investigates CEO pay and pay-performance relationship in China’s listed firms. We distinguish four firm types based on their controlling owners: state owned enterprises affiliated with state asset management bureaus (SAMBs), state owned enterprises affiliated with the central government (SOECGs), state owned enterprises affiliated with a local government (SOELGs), and private firms controlled by private investors. We also distinguish between firms with foreign investors and those without. Because the different types of controlling owners have different objectives, motivations, and political interests, they affect managers’ compensation in the firms in which they invest. Our results indicate that CEO pay is lowest in SAMB controlled firms and highest in SOECG controlled firms. Not only is CEO pay positively associated with firm performance, the positive pay-performance relationship is stronger in both types of SOE firms but weaker in privately controlled firms. In addition, firms with foreign investors compensate their CEOs more highly than those without foreign investors, an effect that is significant in both SOEs and privately controlled firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that CEO compensation in China is jointly determined by firm performance, market-oriented reform and the unique ownership structure, meaning that standard theories of efficient compensation contracts may not apply in such emerging markets.

An asset manager trades o? the bene?ts of higher leverage against the costs of adjusting leverage in order to mitigate expected insolvency losses. We explicitly calculate optimal dynamic incentive-compatible leverage policies in simple versions of this problem.

China’s non-performing loans were as high as 35 percent of state banks’ total loans, or about RMB 3,549 billion (about 40 percent of its GDP) in 2000. The adequacy ratios of the four state banks were only between 1.4 percent to 4.6 percent in September 2000. Moreover, non-bank financial institutions as a group as early as 1996 had non-performing assets equal to 50 percent of their total assets. By Western accounting standards, China’s most financial institutions are insolvent. Be conventional standards for measuring financial sector robustness, China is past the point at which a systemic banking crisis might be expected. China faces enormous risks delaying the state bank reforms due to increasing capital account leaks, increasing large proportion of household deposits in banks’ total liabilities, and gradual structural shift of Chinese saving behavior. China needs to resolutely address the financial reforms soon to avoid a financial crisis, which will lead to a broad anti-regime coalition against the Chinese government. Nevertheless, China faces enormous difficulties. First, the 2000 Chinese official estimate puts the financial cost of restructuring the state banks at RMB 2,260 billion ($273 billion), or close to 30 percent of GDP. Second, the current AMC scheme is fraught with difficulties. Finally, the required financial sector reforms are closely interlinked with many other reforms such that a sequential or partial approach will not be effective.