This paper examines the interactional phenomenon where an institutional complainee initiates a complaint and becomes a co-complainant with their original complainant against a third party that is proposed to have caused grievances to both participants. Institutional complainees initiate their third-party complaints when their complainants repeatedly refuse to affiliate with their attempts to shift responsibility or their proposed solutions. This shift from being the complainee to being a co-complainant is regularly accomplished through practices in which the institutional complainee: 1) produces implicit counter-complaints; 2) partitions complainants and themselves as sharing similar identities; and 3) highlights and upgrades their own grievances. Once complainants affiliate with their complaints, institutional complainees attempt to end the complaint sequences. The interactions end with a sense of solidarity sustained between the participants, even though no satisfying solutions are offered to the original complainants. The findings suggest that institutional actors can make relevant their noninstitutional identities and go against what is expected of them as institutional actors to achieve the institutional task of directing blame away from their institutions. Recorded phone conversations between local residents and various institutional actors during COVID-19 lockdowns in China serve as data for this study.

While observational studies have long suggested a positive correlation between social relationships and online transactions, surprisingly little research demonstrates a causal link. Effects identified in observational data generally conflate the Information effect, which bears the counterfactual causal interpretation, with the Homophily/environment effect. Against this background, this study conducted a pioneering a randomized field experiment design to isolate the Information effect of friendship disclosure from confounding homophily factors. We exploit a rare opportunity to conduct a field experiment on a large Chinese online second-hand platform, in which we manipulate buyer and seller’s awareness of their preexisting friendship ties. We provide the first empirical evidence that the effect of revealing friendship information between transaction parties turns out to be insignificant. We demonstrate that reliance on observational estimates of the “total effect” of friendship significantly overstates the benefits of providing friendship information in online marketplaces. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of social commerce and highlight the potential fallacy of relying on observational data in business studies.

This study examines how firm-specific characteristics and monetary tightening influence the composition and dynamics of trade credit received by Chinese listed firms. Using panel data, the analysis distinguishes among three sources of trade credit: related parties, non-related parties, and controlling shareholders. The findings reveal a clear asymmetry in firms’ financing responses to monetary tightening: while trade credit from non-related parties declines, credit from related parties—especially controlling shareholders—increases. This underscores the strategic role of intra-group financing in buffering firms against external financial shocks during periods of constrained liquidity. Moreover, firm-specific factors such as size, profitability, market power, and ownership have differing effects depending on the source of trade credit. These effects are most pronounced when the credit is extended from controlling shareholders, reflecting the influence of intra-group trust and reduced information asymmetries. The results also highlight a substitute relationship between bank credit and trade credit, which weakens when trade credit is sourced from related parties and disappears entirely in the case of controlling shareholders. By shedding light on the distinct mechanisms of intra-group trade credit in China’s underdeveloped financial system, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of corporate financing strategies of Chinese firms.

This study applies large language models (LLMs) to measure technological links and examines its predictive power in the Chinese stock market. Using the BAAI General Embedding (BGE) model, we extract semantic information from patent textual data to construct the technological momentum measure. As a comparison, the measure based on traditional International Patent Classification (IPC) is also considered. Empirical analysis shows that both measures significantly predict stock returns and they capture complementary dimensions of technological links. Further investigation through stratified analysis reveals the critical role of investor inattention in explaining their differential performance: in stocks with low investor inattention, IPC-based measure loses its predictive power while BGE-based measure remains significant, indicating that straightforward information is fully priced in while complex semantic relationships require greater cognitive processing; in stocks with high investor inattention, both measures exhibit predictability, with BGE-based measure showing stronger effects. These findings support behavioral finance theories suggesting that complex information diffuses more slowly in markets, especially under significant cognitive constraints, and demonstrate LLMs’ advantage in uncovering subtle technological connections that traditional methods overlook.

This paper investigates the causal impact of pre-trade transparency on the market liquidity of an over-the-counter-style market by leveraging a natural experiment in China’s interbank corporate bond market. We find that turnover, market liquidity, and aggregate bond returns significantly declined when the regulators unexpectedly suspended real-time quote dissemination in March 2023. Consistent with our expectation, these effects were mainly focused on interbank bonds, not exchange bonds, and bonds with lower credit ratings and longer maturities. This study contributes novel evidence to the transparency literature and provides insights for policymakers in emerging markets weighing the trade-offs between data governance and market efficiency.

This paper investigates the gambling preference of Chinese investors in the convertible bond (CB) market through a natural experiment—the 2018 amendment of Article 142 of the Company Law. Utilizing CB issuance data from 2016 to 2023, we employ a cohort difference-in-difference approach and find a 4% to 7% increase in IPO premiums for high-repurchase-expectation CBs across various measures. This significant increase indicates that the legal revision reshapes investors’ expectation and adjusts their valuation of CBs. Furthermore, the event-study analysis reveals the escalating impact of legal revision, driven by the herding behavior of gambling investors.

With the digital transformation of the capitalist economy, some contemporary scholars have put forward the Techno-Feudalism narrative of the digital economy. This narrative emphasizes that digital platform enterprises, as emerging market entities in the digital economy, have many practices that are highly similar to those of feudal lords. For example, digital platform enterprises plundering user data is similar to feudal lords plundering land; digital platform enterprises collecting digital rent is similar to feudal lords collecting land rent; digital platform enterprises controlling users and workers is similar to feudal lords controlling slaves. However, this narrative has many theoretical fallacies. Marx's theory of surplus value shows that the above phenomena are essentially still the contemporary form of capital seizing surplus value through technological innovation. The techno-feudalism narrative ignores the internal logic of capital using technological iteration to reconstruct the exploitation mechanism and falls into a superficial misjudgment. In contrast, the Chinese governance practice of digital economy breaks the monopoly of platforms on data elements through the innovation of the separation of three rights of data property rights; promotes fair competition and optimal allocation of resources in the digital economy by strengthening anti-monopoly supervision and promoting the construction of digital infrastructure; proves that the socialist system can break the capital proliferation cycle and achieve "people-centered" development by building a labor rights protection system to promote the creation and sharing of value and transcending the techno-feudalism phenomenon of the digital economy.

This paper examines the impact of Chinese local government hidden debt on corporate ESG greenwashing. Extending fraud theory, we reveal that hidden debt shifts the boundary between government and market that drives the factors behind ESG greenwashing. Using the ESG greenwashing indicator of listed firms in the A-share market and the hidden debt-to-GDP ratio of 31 provinces from 2012 to 2023, we find that local government hidden debt is positively correlated with corporate ESG greenwashing. The impact is more significant for firms that are state-owned, without active primary-level Party organizations, or not on China’s key pollution supervisory list. Mechanism analysis indicates that expansion of local government hidden debt brings firms with higher LGFVs’ share-holding for the SOEs, heavier environmental tax burden, and less social responsibility preference, all of which are related with ESG greenwashing. Reducing local government special debt and improving tax compliance can help alleviate this impact. These findings highlight the necessity of fiscal risk management in achieving genuinely sustainable corporate development.

Following the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the central government elevated the construction of ecological civilization to a central position within national strategy and introduced environmental governance indicators as mandatory criteria for evaluating officials, alongside GDP. These indicators served as an additional "threshold" for performance assessments. In the context of changes in the central government's development ideology and policies, this study utilizes matched data on the turnover of municipal party secretaries and local enterprise carbon emissions from 293 prefecture-level cities in China between 1990 and 2021. The research finds that turnovers of municipal party secretaries after the 18th National Congress have led to a significant reduction in carbon emissions from local enterprises, a trend that was not evident prior to the congress. This effect is more pronounced in situations where official turnover is primarily driven by promotion incentives, and less influenced by collusive behavior between the government and enterprises. Further analysis reveals that the decline in carbon emissions is more significant for private enterprises, non-heavy polluting enterprises, those located in the eastern region, and those in general prefecture-level cities, before and after municipal party secretary turnovers. This study enhances understanding of the relationship between the promotion incentives of Chinese officials and the carbon emissions of local enterprises, offering valuable insights for improving the official promotion assessment system and advancing local carbon reduction efforts.

We examine how organizational learning and organizational disruption jointly arise when Chinese audit firms have U.S. cross-listed clients and which effect dominates. Among public companies listed only in China, we define the treatment group as companies audited by Chinese audit firms serving at least one U.S. client, similar companies audited by firms without U.S. clients as the control group. Survey evidence indicates strong incentives and opportunities to learn from U.S. engagements and frequent learning activities in treatment audit firms. The archival evidence however shows that their domestic audit quality declines relative to the control group. The effect is more pronounced when U.S. clients demand more audit resources, when domestic clients are more sensitive to limited audit attention, and when U.S. and domestic clients are more similar. Overall, our findings indicate a negative externality of U.S. cross-listing audit when resource constraints hinder an effective firm-wide learning.