Bank bailouts are systemic in China, having been extended to nearly all distressed banks, including those with no systemic importance. This paper investigates the consequences of regulators seizing control of Baoshang Bank, the country’s first bank failure in two decades. Despite the numerous liquidity and credit provision measures immediately implemented by bank regulators, we find that the collapse of this city-level commercial bank significantly exacerbated funding conditions in the market for negotiable certificates of deposit (NCD), resulting in liquidity distress for other banks. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that the spillover of Baoshang’s collapse is disproportionately concentrated in systemically unimportant (SU) banks, owing to diminished market confidence in government bailouts of SU banks, or implicit nonguarantee. We employ a difference-in-differences approach to show that the Baoshang event had a persistent and significant effect on SU banks’ NCD issuance, increasing credit spreads by 21.9 bps and the likelihood of issuance failure by 6.3%. Our empirical framework further enables us to examine the impact of China’s long-standing guarantee of SU banks, which we find impairs price efficiency, undermines market discipline, encourages excessive risk taking, and raises equity prices.

Shadow financing through off-balance sheet wealth management products (WMPs) has become increasingly important besides deposits in China. We quantify the economic magnitude of the effect of WMPs on banking stability in an equilibrium model calibrated to Chinese banking sector data. Alternative equilibria emerge, which deviate substantially from the observed banking system and lead to severe financial distress and large welfare losses. Rollover costs from the WMP market and negative shocks to the asset market underlying WMPs can exacerbate banking instability. Moreover, we show that smaller and medium sized banks are comparably relevant for financial stability as the systemically important big 4 banks in China.

The credit collusion is the main form of internal fraud and will lead to the wrong decision on loan-issue and further worsen the operation risk as well as the default risk. At present, the loan initiated by commercial banks in China is surging and challenges the loan management. Based on the literature and the situation of risk management in Chinese banking industry, this paper adopts the P-S-A model to study the collusion between loan officers and lending firms. Finally, it derives the collusion-free conditions and proposes some measures to reduce the collusions, which includes: (1) to impose harsher penalty on bribes to deter any collusion for increasing individual welfare; (2) to launch more sophisticated remuneration for loan officers to develop long relationship with commercial banks; (3) to spend more efforts on monitoring the larger sized loans.

The People’s Republic of China has taken substantial steps to reform its financial system, especially the banking sector, since 1995. The speed of banking reform has accelerated after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001. This study examines the impact of recent banking reforms and of WTO accession on the cost efficiency of the Chinese banking sector. We use a non-parametric approach to investigate the efficiency trend and productivity growth of banks in China between 1998 and 2006. We also compare the efficiency and productivity growth of different banking ownership groups prior to and after joining the WTO. We find that, on average, domestic banks outperform their foreign counterparts over the sample period in terms of overall and allocative efficiency, but they fall behind in terms of overall technical efficiency. The comparison of efficiency indexes pre and post WTO accession reveals that the efficiency of domestic banks has declined post accession, while foreign banks have enjoyed an improvement rise in their cost efficiency post WTO accession in 2001.The findings of this study further suggest that the total factor productivity of Chinese banks has weakened over the period under study. However, a pre and post analysis of WTO accession results shows that total factor productivity has improved for both domestic and foreign banks after China joined the WTO, equally owing to efficiency improvement and technological progress

The People’s Republic of China has taken substantial steps to reform its financial system, especially the banking sector, since 1995. The speed of banking reform has accelerated after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001. This study examines the impact of recent banking reforms and of WTO accession on the cost efficiency of the Chinese banking sector. We use a non-parametric approach to investigate the efficiency trend and productivity growth of banks in China between 1998 and 2006. We also compare the efficiency and productivity growth of different banking ownership groups prior to and after joining the WTO. We find that, on average, domestic banks outperform their foreign counterparts over the sample period in terms of overall and allocative efficiency, but they fall behind in terms of overall technical efficiency. The comparison of efficiency indexes pre and post WTO accession reveals that the efficiency of domestic banks has declined post accession, while foreign banks have enjoyed an improvement rise in their cost efficiency post WTO accession in 2001.The findings of this study further suggest that the total factor productivity of Chinese banks has weakened over the period under study. However, a pre and post analysis of WTO accession results shows that total factor productivity has improved for both domestic and foreign banks after China joined the WTO, equally owing to efficiency improvement and technological progress

Great credit risk is a big headache which blocks the development of the banking sector of China. Based on the panel data of the Chinese banking sector from 2002 to 2006, this paper empirically examines the effects of foreign strategic investors’ participation on the risk behavior of Chinese banks. The results show that foreign strategic investors (FSI) had a positive, but limited impact on the credit risk of Chinese banks. Further analysis reveals that the risk management abilities of Chinese banks have improved apparently when the proportion of shareholding of the leading foreign strategic investors exceeds 15 percent, which results in a significant drop of the credit risk. However, due to the ‘minority ownership’ restriction on foreign investors' stock shares, the positive effect of the participation of foreign strategic investors is limited. The visible decline in both non-performing loans (NPLs) and the NPL ratio of Chinese banks mainly reflects the rapid growth of China's economy and benefits a lot from the massive financial restructuring of state-owned banks.

银行并购是银行业变革在组织机构上的体现，这种变革的发生会对并购银行本身、相关国家及国际银行业产生深远影响。中国经过20多年的改革，银行业发生了巨变。随着经济增长回升和经济效益改善，银行业的竞争力明显提高，已初步具备了现代商业银行特征。然而，一些诸如竞争性不强、规模不经济；稳健性不够、盈利能力不强等深层次问题依然突出。通过分析，银行并购可以提升中国银行业的竞争力，解决规模不经济问题，培育大型企业集团等，是一种较为理想的改革中国银行业的途径。 It is bank’s M&A that embodies the change of banking on the organization.While inevitably exert a far-reaching effect on the banks themselves in the M&A, it will influence the relevant country and international banking. In China, the banking structure has been improved since 1978. But from the data in the paper, we can conclude that Chinese banking market structure is oligopoly and Chinese banking is inefficient. It is just the Bank’s M&A that can promote the competitive power of Chinese banking, improve the reasonable allocation of financial resources, and ensure the stability of financial system. Bank’s M&A is a comparatively ideal way to reform Chinese banking.