The process of internationalization of China’s banking industry began in 1917. After a hundred years of development, China’s banking internationalization has made great achievements. However, there is still a big gap between China’s banking industry and the financial institutions in some developed countries in the field of internationalization. In the process of internationalization, China's banking industry are now still facing the dilemma of backward development concept, lack of effective risk control system and international talents. This thesis mainly introduces the history, present situation and difficulties of the internationalization of China’s banking industry. The first part gives a description to the history of the internationalization of China’s banking industry, which starts in the year of 1917. An analysis of the current situation of China’s banking industry’ internationalization is given in the second part of this article. And the third part summarizes the difficulties that are faced by China’s banking industry.

Emissions data collection and management are crucial to operationalizing an emissions trading scheme (ETS). Regulators need high-quality data to allocate emissions allowances and monitor compliance. However, collecting such data can be costly, challenging various actors. Emitters may misreport data, weighing the cost against their interest, while governments may struggle with limited resources in managing compliance. Third-party verification is a solution but tends to be ineffectual and causes new problems unless with sufficient oversight and support. This quality-cost dilemma becomes even more complex in multi-level ETSs, as in China’s national ETS (NETS). Despite increased regulatory efforts to address data challenges, there remains a lack of in-depth legal analysis on the relationship between data quality and cost. This Article establishes a three-element analytical framework—data quality, cost concerns, and intergovernmental relations in data management—to shed light on the nuances of data regulation. Using China’s NETS as a case study, we gain a deeper understanding of the three elements in a specific jurisdiction and the legal institutions, practices, and challenges involved. Governments, emitters, and third-party verifiers each have unique roles and limitations in this process. We suggest legal and regulatory strategies for finding solutions. Our actor-centered analytical model and practical recommendations for the NETS can serve as a valuable guide for jurisdictions facing similar data challenges.

We examine the dynamic connection between competition and bank risk within the credit market through the lens of moral hazard affecting banks and borrowers. By combining the perspectives of “competition-fragility” and “competition-stability”, we reveal the intricate influence that competition exercises over bank risk in this financial landscape. Our research scrutinizes these theoretical constructs empirically, drawing upon a dataset comprising 236 rural commercial banks in China from 2012 to 2020. The findings indicate a curvilinear relationship between competition and bank risk, as an inverted U-shape. Furthermore, competition plays a dual role - it improves borrowers’ moral hazard dilemma while exacerbating it for banks. This highlights both riskshifting and risk-margin effects within the competitive dynamics. Ultimately, the nonlinear association between competition and bank risk emerges due to the intricate interplay between the moral hazard factors affecting borrowers and banks.

Insurance was one of industries that were opened very first after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. During 2002 to 2005, there was a peak of the foreign insurers’ entry, with the rapid growth of their market share. However, in recent years, the foreign insurers found themselves not able to grow as fast as they have expected, which was described as their “Seven Year Itch” in China. Several cases of equity transactions have taken place in 2009-2010, mainly involved with the foreign insurers reducing their shareholdings. This was regarded as the sign of foreign insurers changing their strategies in Chinese market. In this paper we found strong evidence to show that the current performance of foreign insurers in China was relatively worse than that in the other major insurance markets. From the comparison of the regulatory environment and market performance, we can say for sure that regulation restrictions should be at least one of the major reasons for the current situation. Also we found that the “50-50” shareholding structure which was adopted initially by many life foreign insurers could be blamed for the slow growth recently. And poor bancassurance business performance could explain the shareholding reductions recently for some of the foreign life insurers.

We study financial market contracts and signals in a transitional economy where state-controlled banks may lend to weak firms to avert unemployment and social instability. Our sample of Chinese corporate borrowers reveals that that poorer financial performance and higher managerial expenses increase the likelihood of obtaining a bank loan, and bank loan approval predicts poor subsequent borrower performance. Furthermore, negative event-study responses are observed at bank loan announcements, particularly if the borrower measures poorly on quality and creditworthiness. Our results document the dilemmas that arise in a state-led financial system and the local stock market’s sophistication in interpreting news.