As companies and investors globalize, we are increasingly faced with estimation questions about the risk associated with this globalization. When investors invest in China Mobile, Infosys or Vale, they may be rewarded with higher returns, but they are also exposed to additional risk. When Siemens and Apple push for growth in Asia and Latin America, they clearly are exposed to the political and economic turmoil that often characterize these markets. In practical terms, how, if at all, should we adjust for this additional risk? We will begin the paper with an overview of overall country risk, its sources and measures. We will continue with a discussion of sovereign default risk and examine sovereign ratings and credit default swaps (CDS) as measures of that risk. We will extend that discussion to look at country risk from the perspective of equity investors, by looking at equity risk premiums for different countries and consequences for valuation. In the fourth section, we argue that a company’s exposure to country risk should not be determined by where it is incorporated and traded. By that measure, neither Coca Cola nor Nestle are exposed to country risk. Exposure to country risk should come from a company’s operations, making country risk a critical component of the valuation of almost every large multinational corporation. In the final section, we will also look at how to move across currencies in valuation and capital budgeting, and how to avoid mismatching errors.

How do global and domestic investors process institutional signals in emerging markets? We use China’s refined-oil pricing announcements as institutional communications to construct high-frequencymarketization surprises as deviations between actual prices and formula-implied expectations (2013–2025). Three heterogeneous patterns emerge. First, a 1% deviation toward weaker marketization triggers $30m equity and $10m bond outflows internationally while domestic futures appreciate. Second, Kalman filtering extracts latent institutional information differing across markets, with near-zero correlation. Third, international responses amplify quarterly while domestic dissipate immediately. A+H dual-listed firm analysis reveals implicit guarantees and market segmentation jointly drive this divergence.

We examine the influence of foreign equity flows on China's unique retail-dominated stock market, identifying a novel channel through which investors’ herding creates significant market externalities. We find that the daily disclosure of foreign investors' positions induces local investors to imitate these trades, resulting in observable short-term price distortions followed by reversals. Our analyses, which include inflow predictability tied to disclosure timing and path analysis decomposition, confirm that the herding effect, largely driven by retail participants, is more impactful than the direct effect based on the informational content of foreign capital. Furthermore, inflated stock prices resulting from the herding behavior cause public firms to overvalue and overinvest, leading to reduced investment efficiencies. These findings highlight potential adverse consequences stemming from specific stock market liberalization designs.

This study constructs a three-dimensional space model based on fund investment styles, using a sample of open-end equity and mixed funds from 2005 to 2021 to measure the degree of style convergence. The research explores how style convergence impacts fund managers’ window dressing behavior. The results indicate that, after accounting for the effects of fund performance, style convergence exacerbates window dressing behavior among fund managers. Specifically, this is reflected in fund managers increasing their holdings in winning stocks and selling off losing stocks, which indirectly highlights the intense competition within China’s open-end fund industry. The findings remain robust after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests. Further analysis reveals that style convergence contributes to the risk of client attrition, thereby intensifying the agency problem within the fund industry. The window dressing effect due to style convergence is particularly pronounced in funds managed by individuals with lower educational backgrounds, lower investment skills, smaller family sizes, and lower institutional investor ownership. The paper offers valuable insights into the agency problems arising from investment style convergence and provides guidance for mitigating fund managers' self-interested behavior.

We propose the AI Narrative Gap as a novel firm characteristic—the systematic divergence between a firm’s AI strategic narrative intensity and its subsequent AI capital expenditure commitment—and document its capital market consequences. Using Chinese A-share listed firms from 2015 to 2022, we show that firms with a wider AI Narrative Gap attract significantly more optimistic and less accurate analyst earnings forecasts. These distorted expectations, in turn, predict lower subsequent stock returns, lower industry-adjusted abnormal returns, and weaker future accounting performance. A double-sort portfolio placing firms simultaneously in the highest tercile of the AI Narrative Gap and highest tercile of analyst optimism earns a mean return 22.8 percentage points below that of the lowest tercile on both dimensions (t = −5.10). The return reduction in the AI Narrative Gap coefficient is attenuated but not eliminated after controlling for optimism, consistent with a partial expectation-distortion channel. Collectively, these results establish the AI Narrative Gap as a cross-sectionally informative firm characteristic that captures the credibility of a firm’s AI strategic identity, with systematic implications for analyst expectations and asset prices.

This paper examines whether mandatory ownership disclosure aligns incentives or distorts in-vestor beliefs. Using a sample of 1,436 Chinese equity-oriented mutual funds from 2012 to 2023,we find that higher managerial and senior ownership are significantly associated with larger in-flows, suggesting that investors treat ownership as a quality signal. However, we find no evidencethat ownership forecasts superior future returns or risk-adjusted alphas. Mechanism tests showthat the ownership-flow effect is much stronger in low-marketing funds and that managers increaseownership after weak flows, a countercyclical pattern inconsistent with overconfidence and consis-tent with strategic remedial signaling. Overall, ownership disclosure appears to operate primarilythrough investor perception rather than information about managerial ability, weakening the linkbetween capital allocation and true skill in the mutual fund industry.

This paper develops an autonomous framework for systematic factor investing via agentic AI. Rather than relying on sequential manual prompts, our approach operationalizes the model as a self-directed engine that endogenously formulates interpretable trading signals. To mitigate data snooping biases, this closed-loop system imposes strict empirical discipline through out-of-sample validation and economic rationale requirements. Applying this methodology to the U.S. equity market, we document that long-short portfolios formed on the simple linear combination of signals deliver an annualized Sharpe ratio of 2.75 and a return of 54.81%. Finally, our empirics demonstrate that self-evolving AI offers a scalable and interpretable paradigm.

We examine the information content of the call-put implied volatility spread (IVS) of Shanghai Stock Exchange 50 ETF options. Empirically, the IVS significantly and negatively predicts future SSE50 ETF returns at both weekly and monthly horizons. This predictability is robust both in-sample and out-of-sample, which stands in contrast to prior evidence from the U.S. options market. We explore several potential explanations and show that the IVS is closely linked to the option-cash basis. Its predictability is consistent with the model of Hazelkorn, Moskowitz, and Vasudevan (2023), where the option-cash basis reflects liquidity demand common to both options and underlying equity markets.

Serving on the official unsecured creditors' committee (UCC) of a bankrupt firm provides hedge funds with access to material nonpublic information (MNPI), which can facilitate their informed trading across firms and asset markets. We find that hedge funds increase equity turnover and execute more large trades in the quarters following UCC membership. In contrast, hedge funds do not exhibit such trading behavior after accessing public information about bankrupt firms or holding the bankrupt firm's debt without committee involvement. Importantly, these large trades often target firms with close economic ties to the bankrupt entity. Returns from these MNPI-driven trades are substantial.

We develop a deep-visualization framework for timing the factor zoo. Historical factor return trajectories are converted to two complementary image representations, which are then learned by convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to generate factor-specific timing signals. Using 206 equity factors, our CNN-based forecasts deliver significant economic gains: timed factors earn an average annualized alpha of about 6\%, and a high-minus-low strategy yields an annualized Sharpe ratio of 1.22. The outperformance is robust to transaction costs, post-publication decay, and factor category-level analysis. Interpretability analyses reveal that CNNs extract predictive signals from path boundaries and regime shifts, capturing patterns orthogonal to investor attention.