Equity

  • 详情 Skin in the Game or Selling the Game? Managerial Ownership and Investor Response in Mutual Funds
    This paper examines whether mandatory ownership disclosure aligns incentives or distorts in-vestor beliefs. Using a sample of 1,436 Chinese equity-oriented mutual funds from 2012 to 2023,we find that higher managerial and senior ownership are significantly associated with larger in-flows, suggesting that investors treat ownership as a quality signal. However, we find no evidencethat ownership forecasts superior future returns or risk-adjusted alphas. Mechanism tests showthat the ownership-flow effect is much stronger in low-marketing funds and that managers increaseownership after weak flows, a countercyclical pattern inconsistent with overconfidence and consis-tent with strategic remedial signaling. Overall, ownership disclosure appears to operate primarilythrough investor perception rather than information about managerial ability, weakening the linkbetween capital allocation and true skill in the mutual fund industry.
  • 详情 Beyond Prompting: An Autonomous Framework for Systematic Factor Investing via Agentic AI
    This paper develops an autonomous framework for systematic factor investing via agentic AI. Rather than relying on sequential manual prompts, our approach operationalizes the model as a self-directed engine that endogenously formulates interpretable trading signals. To mitigate data snooping biases, this closed-loop system imposes strict empirical discipline through out-of-sample validation and economic rationale requirements. Applying this methodology to the U.S. equity market, we document that long-short portfolios formed on the simple linear combination of signals deliver an annualized Sharpe ratio of 2.75 and a return of 54.81%. Finally, our empirics demonstrate that self-evolving AI offers a scalable and interpretable paradigm.
  • 详情 Do Implied Volatility Spreads Predict Market Returns in China?The Role of Liquidity Demand
    We examine the information content of the call-put implied volatility spread (IVS) of Shanghai Stock Exchange 50 ETF options. Empirically, the IVS significantly and negatively predicts future SSE50 ETF returns at both weekly and monthly horizons. This predictability is robust both in-sample and out-of-sample, which stands in contrast to prior evidence from the U.S. options market. We explore several potential explanations and show that the IVS is closely linked to the option-cash basis. Its predictability is consistent with the model of Hazelkorn, Moskowitz, and Vasudevan (2023), where the option-cash basis reflects liquidity demand common to both options and underlying equity markets.
  • 详情 Hedge Fund Shadow Trading: Evidence from Corporate Bankruptcies
    Serving on the official unsecured creditors' committee (UCC) of a bankrupt firm provides hedge funds with access to material nonpublic information (MNPI), which can facilitate their informed trading across firms and asset markets. We find that hedge funds increase equity turnover and execute more large trades in the quarters following UCC membership. In contrast, hedge funds do not exhibit such trading behavior after accessing public information about bankrupt firms or holding the bankrupt firm's debt without committee involvement. Importantly, these large trades often target firms with close economic ties to the bankrupt entity. Returns from these MNPI-driven trades are substantial.
  • 详情 Timing the Factor Zoo via Deep Visualization
    We develop a deep-visualization framework for timing the factor zoo. Historical factor return trajectories are converted to two complementary image representations, which are then learned by convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to generate factor-specific timing signals. Using 206 equity factors, our CNN-based forecasts deliver significant economic gains: timed factors earn an average annualized alpha of about 6\%, and a high-minus-low strategy yields an annualized Sharpe ratio of 1.22. The outperformance is robust to transaction costs, post-publication decay, and factor category-level analysis. Interpretability analyses reveal that CNNs extract predictive signals from path boundaries and regime shifts, capturing patterns orthogonal to investor attention.
  • 详情 The Financialisation of China's Infrastructure Through Reits: Does Institutional Capital Matter?
    This paper examines the role of institutional investors in shaping pricing dynamics within China’s nascent infrastructure Real Estate Investment Trust market. Introduced in 2021, China’s REITs have rapidly gained policy and market attention as a tool for financing large-scale infrastructure projects through equity-based securitisation. Unlike mature REIT markets, China’s infrastructure REITs are characterised by a high concentration of institutional ownership dominated by state-owned financial institutions. Using panel data on first 9 REITs from May 2021 to April 2024, we find that institutional ownership significantly boosts the premium to net asset value. This effect operates primarily through two channels: reduced market liquidity and increased idiosyncratic return volatility, likely reflecting institutions’ trading activity and informational advantages. The findings highlight how institutional capital serves as a confidence signal in China’s emerging REITs ecosystem. The study contributes to the global REITs literature by offering insights from an emerging market context and provides policy recommendations to guide China’s REITs market development toward greater transparency, diversity, and long-term resilience.
  • 详情 Information Acquisition By Mutual Fund Investors: Evidence from Stock Trading Suspensions
    Mutual funds create liquidity for investors by issuing demandable equity shares while holding illiquid securities. We study the implications of this liquidity creation by examining frequent trading suspensions in China, which temporarily eliminate market liquidity in affected stocks. These suspensions cause significant mispricing of mutual funds due to inaccurate valuations of their illiquid holdings. We find that investors actively acquire information about suspended stocks held by mutual funds, driving flows into underpriced funds. This information is subsequently incorporated into stock prices when trading resumes. Our findings suggest that mutual fund liquidity creation stimulates information acquisition about illiquid, information-sensitive assets.
  • 详情 Multi-Slice Zoning Policy, Education Capitalization, and Institutional Innovation for Equity: A Quasi-Experimental Study of Four Chinese Cities
    This study employs a Triple-Difference (Triple-DID) model, utilizing balanced panel data at the district level from Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Hangzhou between 2018 and 2024, to critically evaluate the effectiveness of the Multi-School Zoning Policy (MSZP) in suppressing the capitalization of educational resources into housing prices and promoting educational equity. The research explicitly accounts for spatial and institutional heterogeneity as well as household strategic behavior.The results indicate that: (1) MSZP significantly reduced the average housing price premium associated with elite school districts by 15.2%, with the strongest effect observed in Beijing and the weakest in Hangzhou; (2) The policy's effectiveness diminishes as the spatial concentration of high-quality educational resources increases, highlighting persistent structural inequalities; (3) In areas characterized by resource monopolization and strong institutional inertia, the policy's suppressive effect on educational capitalization and its gains in educational equity are both constrained.The findings suggest that MSZP alone cannot fully overcome the "spatial lock-in" effect of high-quality educational resources. Achieving lasting equity requires complementary deeper institutional innovations, such as robust cross-district teacher rotation, transparent resource allocation mechanisms, and adaptive zoning algorithms. This research offers quantitative evidence for optimizing policy and institutional tools in the pursuit of comprehensive urban education reform.
  • 详情 The T+2 Settlement Effect from Heterogeneous Investors
    This study identifies a significant settlement effect in China’s equity options market, where price decline and pre-settlement return momentum exists on the settlement Friday (T+2) due to a temporal misalignment between option expiration (T) and the T+1 trading rule for the underlying asset. We attribute this phenomenon to three distinct behavioral channels: closing pressure from put option unwinding, momentum-generating predatory trading by futures-spot arbitrageurs exploiting liquidity fragility, and an announcement effect that attenuates the anomaly by adjusting spot speculators' expectations. Robust empirical analysis identifies predatory trading as the primary driver of the settlement effect.These findings offer critical insights for market microstructure theory and the design of physically-delivered derivatives.
  • 详情 Investor Risk Concern and Insider Opportunistic Sales
    This paper extracts investor risk concern from the text of investormanagement communications and examines their impact on insider opportunistic sales. Utilizing data from listed companies holding online earnings communication conferences (OECCs) in China from 2007 to 2022, we find that heightened investor risk concern significantly curbs insider opportunistic sales, as manifested by reduced frequency and magnitude of such transactions. This governance effect of investor risk concern persists irrespective of motivation strength behind opportunistic sales. Further analysis reveals that the governance effect intensifies when investors exhibit superior information processing capabilities and when management’s risk statements better align with investor expectations. Notably, while mitigating opportunistic sales, elevated investor risk concern also significantly decreases the firm’s cost of equity capital. Our findings underscore the importance of fostering transparent and engaging investor-management communication in promoting effective corporate governance and mitigating insider misconduct.