I distinguish renminbi movements against the dollar from renminbi-relative repricing around U.S. tariff announcements. Across 26 policy groups, offshore renminbi (CNH) minus a fixed four-currency basket averages 35.077 aligned log basis points. Official reference rates corroborate the relative pattern; pre-event factor adjustment leaves a positive pooled own-CNH residual. Earlier disclosures change the later-period own-CNH sign, while early-to-late attenuation persists. Own-currency event-minus-lead contrasts remain imprecise, and macro-news and dependence screens weaken precision. The evidence supports an RMB-relative association, not a uniformly timed causal depreciation response or verified executable offshore prices.

This study investigates and compares the effects of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)'s negative price suggestion on prices and trading activities in the crude oil futures market to discuss the cause of negative crude oil futures prices. Through event studies, our results show that the COVID-19 pandemic no longer impacts crude oil futures prices in April after controlled market risk, while the CME’s negative prices suggestion can explain the crude oil futures price changes around and around even after April 8 to some degree. Moreover, our study uncovers anomalies in prices and trading activities by analyzing returns, trading volume, open interest, and illiquidity measures using vector autoregressive (VAR) models. The results imply that CME’s allowing negative prices strengthens the price impact on trading volume and makes illiquidity risk matter. Our results coincide with the following lawsuit evidence of market manipulation.

This paper examines a board's decision to hire a star CEO and analyzes the consequences of this decision for firm performance. We propose a new methodology to identify star CEOs by analyzing the texts contained in 18,240 Wall Street Journal news articles. Unlike previous measures, our new metric accounts for the time series variations of executives’ visibility as well as how favorably these executives are portrayed in the business press. The proposed measure indicates that boards with short industry tenure or busy boards are more likely to select a star CEO. Consistent with previous evidence, firms that hire star CEOs perform subsequently worse than firms that hire non-star CEOs. However, in contrast to previous work, we show that this underperformance is attributable to boards with short industry tenure or busy boards, rather than the inabilities of star CEOs. Furthermore, our event studies of stock market reactions to hiring news imply that investors prefer star CEOs selected by boards with long industry tenure. Our work contributes to the literature by offering insights into how board composition affects firm performance.