详情
An Equilibrium Model of Asset Pricing and Moral Hazard
This paper develops an integrated model of asset pricing and moral hazard. In particular, we
combine a version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) with a multi-agent moral hazard
model. The excess dollar returns for risky stocks, optimal contracts for managers (agents) that
involve relative performance, and equilibrium stock prices are explicitly characterized. We show
that the CAPM linear relation in terms of the expected dollar returns still holds in the presence of
moral hazard and that our is given by the ratio of the covariance between a firm’s stock return
and the market return over the variance of the market return, with both returns adjusted for the
compensation to the managers. The equilibrium price of a stock decreases with its idiosyncratic
risk, but the expected excess dollar return of the stock is independent of it. Consequently, the
risk premium, which is defined as the ratio of the excess return to the stock price, increases with
idiosyncratic risk. We also show that the risk aversion of the principal in our model leads to less
emphasis on relative performance evaluation than in a model with a risk-neutral principal. This
result may shed light on why the empirical evidence for relative performance evaluation is mixed,
even though the theoretical prediction based on a risk-neutral principal strongly supports it. In
addition, we show that if the manager of a firm is compensated based solely on his own performance,
then the expected dollar return of the firm increases with its idiosyncratic risk. This exercise
illustrates that, in the presence of moral hazard, contracting plays a key role in the determination of
the expected return of a stock. Furthermore, we show that under certain conditions, the equilibrium
contract is a linear combination of the stock price and the level of the market portfolio.