This study investigates how venture capital (VC) reputation affects initial public offering (IPO) exits in the Chinese VC market using a two-sided matching mechanism. Research that distinguishes the sorting and influence effects of VCs in the Chinese market is lacking. To address this gap, Chinese VC transaction data, comprising 3,606 VC firms and 8,173 investment transactions, was used to construct a structural econometric model. The Markov Chain Monte Carlo Bayesian estimation techniques were employed to identify the sorting and influence effects of VC reputation. We demonstrate that the likelihood of IPO exits is considerably increased by VC reputation, whereas historical investment experience has a dampening effect on exit outcomes. The IPO success rates are significantly higher for firms in the biotechnology, electronics, medical, and late-stage industries. The difficulty of IPO exits increases with investment age. Compared to influence effects, sorting effects were the dominant mechanism. VCs with a high reputation systematically selected firms with potential advantages, such as high-quality management teams, to promote IPO success. This study’s novelty lies in its application of an endogenous two-sided matching solution to the Chinese VC market. Using a structural model, we discovered the importance of the reputation sorting effect in the Chinese VC market and refined the VC’s investment preferences in high-tech industries. This study’s practical significance lies in the findings that enterprises must pay attention to the sorting capabilities of VC institutions, the government can guide capital flows to efficient exit industries, and VC institutions should optimize the resource allocation structure.

We examine the effects of issuing green bond on green premium and green signal transmission by matching green bonds with ordinary bonds. We find that the credit spread of green bonds is significantly lower than that of ordinary bonds, especially for those green bonds with lower information disclosure complexity. Besides, issuing green bonds cannot receive a positive response from the stock market, but can significantly reduce issuer’s loan costs and provide more financial subsidies for high polluting issuers. Furthermore, by obtaining discounted loans and financial subsidies, issuing green bonds can increase issuer’s R&D intensity and reduce their carbon emissions. These findings indicate that issuing green bonds can reduce financing costs and convey green signals to market stakeholders with less investment experience.

While it is generally believed that pressure from peers induces employees to improve their efficiency and performance, little is known about whether employees' improved performance is detrimental to the interests of others. Based on a granular dataset at the individual-month level of investment advisors' and customers’ accounts from a large retail bank in China, we find that peer pressure, as measured by the performance of advisors relative to their colleagues in the previous month, can induce the advisors to sell more financial products, but can also exacerbate misselling, resulting in a significant increase in sales of poor-quality financial products ("high-risk-low-return" products). The causal link is identified with an exogenous change of peer size. The peer pressure effects are pronounced among poor performance advisors, and client complaints play a monitoring role in curbing misselling. By exploring the correspondence between advisors and clients, we find that misselling occurs mainly between female advisors and male clients, and between advisors who lack work experience and clients who lack investment experience.

Utilizing a unique P2P dataset, this study employs the PSM-DID method to explore the learning effect brought about by default events on investors. The findings reveal that investors who experience their first default event demonstrate an improved ability to select a higher-quality project the next time. Notably, this positive effect is more pronounced when facing substantial defaults, as opposed to cases where overdue principal and interest are eventually settled. Investors' initial confidence in defaulted projects contributes to a greater enhancement of their investment skills. Furthermore, the beneficial impacts of defaulted events diminish as investors’ investment experience accumulates.

Based on detailed trade records of individual investors who participated in both China’s A- and B- share markets, we find investors are more likely to buy A (B) shares when the A-share premium is lower (higher), when they have already held the same firm’s A (B) shares and when they have previously traded the same firm’s A (B) shares. Given that the correlation between the same firm’s A and B shares is below 70% and that A shares are more expensive, it is sensible for investors to invest more into the B shares. Our evidence suggests that investors accept a less than optimal portfolio due to lack of investment experience.