The disordered and rampant local tax incentives have interfered with regular business competition and resource allocation, and whether they have the rationality of existence has also become an urgent problem to be clarified. In China, the government has undertaken a new round of policy adjustment to comprehensively sort out and standardize tax incentives, trying to realign value-oriented tax competition among local governments. Thus, this paper examines the real effect of standardizing tax incentives using China's State Council documents Nos. 62[2014] and No. 25[2015], with the measurement of abnormal tax burdens and abnormal fiscal subsidies. The result shows that this round of policy governance has maintained the steadiness of the overall tax burden and fiscal subsidy, and only abnormal tax burdens and fiscal subsidies have been reduced through structural adjustment; In addition, it has also taken into account the difference among regional economic development. The governance in the Midwest is generally lighter than in the East. Meanwhile, the effect of governance among different property companies has presented a reduced tendency as "state-owned enterprises -- local state-owned enterprises -- private enterprises".

利率工具作为央行货币政策的重要组成部分，也是实施货币政策的主要手段之一。中央银行根据货币政策实施的需要，适时地运用利率工具，对利率水平和结构进行调整，以此影响社会资金供求状况，调节微观经济主体的具体经济行为，进而实现既定的货币政策目标。 自2008年经济危机以来，中国人民银行多次利用存款准备金率和利率工具对国家宏观经济进行调节，特别是2010年以来为了应对由之前过度宽松货币政策导致的严重通胀形势，央行5次提高存贷款基准利率，12次提高存款准备金率至21.5%的历史高位。尽管如此，但是国内利率水平依然处在低位，实际利率持续为负。存准率过度提高导致货币供给大幅减少，利率水平维持低位使货币需求上升，这样扭曲的货币政策导致了我国宏观经济在各方面的失衡，并且遭到了来自各界的非议。究竟利率工具的宏观经济调控效果如何呢，为何央行不愿意使用价格型货币政策工具——利率进行调控呢？虽然目前存准率工具的使用次数要远多于利率工具，但是随着今后利率市场化改革的深入推进和我国金融体制的开放改革，今后利率调控工具将会成为央行调节宏观经济运行节奏的主要手段。因此，研究利率政策调控对宏观经济的影响将有助于我们明确利率调控的效果、认清宏观经济变化的原因，在利率市场化的背景下也能够为央行制定科学的货币政策提供决策依据。 本文是按照“回顾改革以来利率政策的调整历史→实际利率变动对主要宏观经济目标的实证检验→影响利率政策效果的原因分析→增强利率调控效果的政策建议”的基本思路，展开全文的分析讨论。在对改革开放三十年以来的利率政策历史回顾分析的基础上，采用定性和定量分析相结合的方法，对利率变动与经济增长率、通货膨胀率以及城镇登记失业率进行实证检验，得出不同阶段实际利率的变化对不同宏观经济目标的影响。在此基础上得出全文结论，实际利率与经济增长率的关系从正相关逐渐发展为负相关，与通胀率则是显著的负相关，而实际利率与城镇登记失业率则呈现很弱的相关性。然后具体分析影响我国利率政策调控宏观经济效果的原因，主要包括利率管制政策、金融市场发展建设及经济主体行为三个方面。最后在前文讨论的基础上提出增强利率调控效果的政策建议，主要包括放松利率管制、继续推进利率市场化改革、完善货币市场发展建设、加强央行宏观调控能力等方面。 Interest rate policy is an important component of monetary policy，also the one main instruments of monetary policy implementation．According to the People’s Bank of China monetary policy needs in a timely manner，use of interest rate tools，include the level of interest rates and interest rate structure in order to affect the supply and demand of funds，micro-economic regulation of the main acts，and to achieve monetary policy objectives． After 2008 world economic crisis, the interest rate and deposit-reserve ratio has been changed more times to adjust China’s macroeconomic. Especially since 2010 to cope with the serious inflation caused by the prior overly lax monetary policy, the central bank raised the benchmark deposit and lending interest rates 5 times and 12 times to raise the deposit reserve ratio to 21.5% highs. In spite of this, but the domestic interest rate level is still low, the real interest rate is negative for longtime. Money supply is greatly reduced by the excessive increase of deposit reserve ratio, and monetary demand rises because the level of interest rates remains low. Such distortion of the monetary policy in our country makes our macro economy imbalance in all aspects, and has received criticism from all walks of life. How about the interest rate tool of macroeconomic regulation and control effect, why the central bank is not willing to use price monetary policy tools -- interest rate regulation? Although the deposit-reserve ratio has been changed more than the interest rate, but with the market-oriented reform of interest rate and financial system, interest rate regulation will be the main method of macroeconomic adjusting control. So studying on macroeconomic effects of real interest rate would help us to be more clearly knowing the results of the interest rate policy and understanding the reasons for changes in the economy. Furthermore，in our country, the interest rate is not fully market-oriented, the study is also helpful for authorities to make the correct monetary and interest rate policy. “Review the history of interest rate policy adjustment from Reform and Opening up→the empirical test of real interest rate on the main macroeconomic goals→the reasons analysis which have influence on the effects of interest rate policy→the policy recommendations which make interest rate regulation more effective" This is the main train of thought of this paper, around which expand the analysis and discussion. Based on the review of the history of interest rate policy after Reform and Opening-up from 1980, used the combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, through analyzed the effects of real interest rates which impacted on the three macroeconomic objectives, include the GDP growth rate、the inflation rate and the urban registered unemployment rate, we get the result that in different stages, the interest rate policy have different impacts on economic objectives. At the last, we get the whole conclusion and analyzed the reasons which caused interest rate policy to be ineffective on the macro economy. Finally, according to China’s financial market, this paper gave some reform suggestions which can make interest rate policy to be more effective on macro economic adjusting control.

A government policy aimed at the reduction of state shares in state-owned enterprises (SOE) triggered a crash in Chinas stock market. The sustained depression and spillover even after the policy adjustments were over constitute a puzzle the so-called state-share paradox. The empirical study finds evidence in two dimensions. First, a regime switching model with an absorbing state suggests that government policy switches the regime to liquidity black holes. Second, there is no evidence of light-to-liquidity during the crash, suggesting to model the crash as an aggregate phenomenon of the whole market. To carefully match the evidence, a theoretical model is set up within the framework of market microstructure. The state-share paradox is not a simply instance of news-driven crash. The model shows that Chinas stock market has distinctive features of liquidity production and price discovery. The irregularities of a representative liquidity supporter generate an inverted-S demand curve and give rise to potential liquidity black holes. Multiple equilibria and the resulting large drop in prices arise from supply dynamics of short-run investors, who buy the stock from the primary market liquidate their long positions in the secondary market. This study contributes a rational panics hypothesis to the literature. The rational panics hypothesis is neither an rational model with noise traders, nor a standard rational expectation model under the asymmetric information framework. It is based on homogeneous agents with incomplete information, and is consistent with the evidence of absorbing regime switching and the recent literature on state-dependent preference. Our findings have larger implications for ine¢ ciency of Chinas stock market.

A government policy aimed at the reduction of state shares in state-owned enterprises (SOE) triggered a crash in the Chinese stock market. The sustained depression and spillover even after the policy adjustments were over constitute a puzzle---the so called "state-share paradox". The empirical study finds evidence in two dimensions. First, a regime switching model with an absorbing state suggests that government policy switches the regime to liquidity black holes. Second, there is no evidence of flight-to-liquidity during the crash, suggesting to model the crash as an aggregate phenomenon of the whole market. To carefully match the evidence, a theoretical model is set up within the framework of market microstructure. The model shows that the Chinese stock market has distinctive features of liquidity production and price discovery. The irregularities generate an inverted-S demand curve, gives rise to potential liquidity black holes, and are key features to explain the state-share paradox. This study contributes a rational panics hypothesis to the literature. The rational panics hypothesis is neither a herding model with or without behavioral assumptions, nor a standard rational expectation model under the asymmetric information framework. It is based on homogeneous agents with incomplete information, and is consistent with the evidence of absorbing regime switching and the recent literature on state-dependent preference. Our findings have larger implications for theoretical modeling and policy design.

This paper examines the optimal path of dividend policy adjustments for a growth company facing the likely threat of takeover. Departing from the common framework of inefficient managers resisting takeover attempts, the formal analysis here focuses on defensive payout strategy of value-maximizing management under the circumstances of random stock market valuation errors, and the bidders’ perceived synergistic gains. A dynamic model, incorporating acquisition activity stochastically, is formulated for a growth firm drawing funds from both internal and external sources. An optimal “bang-bang” reinvestment strategy is derived with control theory, and it is found to be consistent with the firm’s objective of stock-value-maximization. It is also shown theoretically that an immediate threat of takeover shortens managerial planning horizon. The model provides an explanation of dividend adjustment behavior observed in growth firms, and offers an insight into the impact of anti-takeover costs on the firm’s value over time.