We examine how investors who experienced paper gains during a bubble-crash episode, deemed as investors “escaping from death”, adjusted their future risk-taking. Using detailed transaction-level data and a quasi-experiment based on an unanticipated government intervention in the 2007–08 Chinese stock market, we find that investors who “escaped from death” reduce risk-taking behaviors over the next five years. The evidence shows that the change in risk taking is likely at-tributable to reference-dependent preferences. However, the effect diminishes over time and investors “escaping from death” do not exhibit a diminished tendency toward risk-taking when confronted with a stock market bubble crash again.

Using a unique dataset from China spanning 2005 to 2023, we investigate how superstitious beliefs influence mutual fund managers’ risk-taking behavior and how this influence evolves over their careers. We find a significant 6.82% reduction in risk-taking during managers’ zodiac years, traditionally considered unlucky in Chinese culture. This effect is particularly pronounced among less experienced managers, those without financial education backgrounds, and those with lower management skills. The impact also intensifies during periods of high market volatility. Our findings challenge the traditional dichotomy between retail and professional investors, showing that even professional fund managers can be influenced by irrational beliefs early in their careers. However, the diminishing effect of superstition with experience and expertise suggests a gradual transition towards more rational decision-making. Our results provide insights into the process by which financial professionals evolve from exhibiting behavior akin to retail investors to becoming the rational actors often assumed in financial theory.

Compared to previous literature on external FinTech, this paper is more interested in the role played by bank FinTech. Based on panel data from Chinese commercial banks spanning 2010 to 2021, this paper investigates the impact of digital transformation on bank soundness and its potential mechanisms. The empirical findings demonstrate a positive association between digital transformation and bank soundness, driven primarily by strategic and management digitization. Mechanistic analysis indicates that digital transformation improves bank soundness by mitigating risk-taking behavior and promoting diversification. The positive effect of digital transformation is more pronounced in state-owned and joint-stock banks, banks with higher liquidity mismatch as well as in sub-samples with greater levels in external FinTech development and economic policies uncertainty. Additional analysis suggests that digital transformation can still enhance bank soundness even in the presence of relatively easy monetary and macroprudential policies, highlighting the harmonization and complementarity between internal innovation from digital transformation and external regulatory policies in maintaining banking stability. Overall, this paper contributes to the literature on bank FinTech, factors influencing bank stability. And it also provides a novel explanation for the relationship between financial innovation and financial stability.

Macro-prudential policy plays a crucial role in stabilizing the financial system and influencing banks' risk preferences and willingness to take risks. This study examines the influence of macro-prudential policies on bank risk-taking using unbalanced panel data from 126 commercial banks in China between 2010 and 2021. The difference-in-differences model is employed to analyze the data. The empirical findings demonstrate that implementing macro-prudential policies in China effectively enhances bank risk prevention measures. In other words, macro-prudential policy implementation facilitates the digital transformation of banks and subsequently reduces risk-taking behaviors. Moreover, the heterogeneity test reveals that macro-prudential policies have a more significant impact on the risk-taking behavior of commercial banks with higher capital adequacy ratios compared to those with lower ratios. Additionally, commercial banks with strong interbank dependence exhibit more pronounced effects on their risk profiles when subjected to macroprudential policies with stricter capital supervision requirements. Therefore, this study proposes policy recommendations for strengthening bank capital supervision through differentiated approaches, serving as a valuable reference for the regulatory authorities.

Does the ancient farming culture shape the risk-taking behavior of households today? Using a dataset covering over 130,000 households from a Chinese national survey, our study examines the relationship between the culture of rice cultivation and the financial behavior of modern households. We find that households in regions with a higher rate of historical rice cultivation are more likely to invest in the financial market and buy lottery, but less likely to purchase insurance. We also find that the rice area has more households with risk preferences consistent with prospect theory expectations. To account for omitted variable bias, we use average regional rainfall and downstream distance to ancient irrigation systems as instrumental variables for rice cultivation, and our results remain robust. We find that the rice effect cannot be explained by regional economic development, traditional Confucian values, or ethnic diversity. To explore potential mechanisms, we find that households in rice regions are more likely to borrow money from friends and relatives and have interest waived, and historical commercial development has also been influenced by the rice culture.

We develop a portfolio-choice model to investigate how regulatory reforms influence the risk-taking behavior of financial institutions with different capital adequacy levels. The model predicts that either all firms reduce their risk-taking, or there exists a capital-adequacy threshold below which risk-taking increases as regulation becomes more stringent. The Chinese insurance solvency regulatory reform provides a unique natural experiment to test our theory. In 2015, each insurer reported two solvency ratios under the original and the new regulatory systems. The difference between them produces an exogenous and insurer-specific measure of the regulatory pressure shock. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find that increasing regulatory pressure induces greater risk-taking for less capital-adequate insurers, of which the regulator should want to reduce risk-taking mostly. We show that increasing the penalties of insolvency, increasing the risk sensitivity of capital requirements, and reinforcing the qualitative risk assessment are effective policy remedies for this backfiring problem.

This study investigates the effectiveness of the dual-board corporate governance mechanism on enterprise risk management and financial stability in emerging markets. Taking into account both market risk and total risk, we find activities of both boards, board of directors and the supervisory board, in these companies affect corporate risk-taking behaviors significantly, but shed light on different aspects. These findings are of interest and counter-intuitive since prior research concludes ineffectiveness of the dual-board system in China. More detailed issues, such as the endogeneity of board activities and characteristics, reciprocal causality between board behaviors and risk-taking issues, effects of political/governmental policies and ownership structure of controlling shareholders on board behaviors, asymmetrical monitoring effects of two boards on companies with various levels of financial risk, and non-linear effects of meeting frequencies of two boards, are addressed to help better understand the corporate governance-enterprise risk management relationship.