SOE reform

  • 详情 The Origins of Private Sector Entry in China's Economic Transformation
    China's late-1990s reforms triggered a substantial increase in private sector entry. We explore the origins of this expansion using cross-city variation in pre-reform distress among state-owned and collectively-owned enterprises (SOEs and COEs) within a difference-indifferences framework. We find that private sector entry originated not from the state sector, but from the withdrawal of the once-vast collective sector. SOEs underwent restructuring rather than exiting, consolidating market power and failing to facilitate private entry. Conversely, COE withdrawal released critical market space and resources, spurring broad private expansion. Most entrants were de novo firms, reflecting resource reallocation rather than purely ownership relabeling or privatization. This effect was particularly pronounced in competitive, downstream, and labor-intensive industries. These decentralized COEs, originally embedded in the pre-1978 planned system, preserved latent market capacity that smoothed the transition. Our findings help reconcile the puzzle of how China embraced market forces alongside a strengthening state economy.
  • 详情 Is Mixed-Ownership a Profitable Ownership Structure? Empirical Evidence from China
    Despite nearly twenty years of privatization, mixed-ownership reform has been the mainstay of SOE reform in China in recent years. This raises the question of whether the financial performance of mixed-ownership firms (Mixed firms) is better than private-owned enterprises (POEs). Although Mixed firms suffer more from government intervention, unclear property rights, and interest conflicts between state shareholders and private shareholders, they can also benefit from the external resources controlled by the state. Therefore, the performance of Mixed firms is still unclear. Collecting data from the Chinese A-share listed market, we divide the firms into POEs, Mixed firms controlled by the state (MixedSOEs), and Mixed firms controlled by the private sectors (MixedPOEs). Measuring profitability using ROA and ROE, we find that on average, POEs perform better than Mixed firms, and MixedPOEs have a higher profitability than MixedSOEs. Within Mixed firms, more state shares are related to lower profitability, and more private shares are related to higher profitability. Using the NBS survey data, we further find that on average, SOEs exhibit the lowest profitability, with MixedSOEs and MixedPOEs in the middle, and POEs have the highest profitability. We try to address the endogeneity challenge in several ways and get similar results. Overall, our analysis provides new evidence on the financial performance of mixed-ownership firms.
  • 详情 Is Mixed-Ownership a Profitable Ownership Structure? Empirical Evidence from China
    Despite nearly twenty years of privatization, mixed-ownership reform has been the mainstay of SOE reform in China in recent years. This raises the question of whether the financial performance of mixed-ownership firms (Mixed firms) is better than private-owned enterprises (POEs). Although Mixed firms suffer more from government intervention, unclear property rights, and interest conflicts between state shareholders and private shareholders, they can also benefit from the external resources controlled by the state. Therefore, the performance of Mixed firms is still unclear. Collecting data from the Chinese A-share listed market, we divide the firms into POEs, Mixed firms controlled by the state (MixedSOEs), and Mixed firms controlled by the private sectors (MixedPOEs). Measuring profitability using ROA and ROE, we find that on average, POEs perform better than Mixed firms, and MixedPOEs have a higher profitability than MixedSOEs. Within Mixed firms, more state shares are related to lower profitability, and more private shares are related to higher profitability. Using the NBS survey data, we further find that on average, SOEs exhibit the lowest profitability, with MixedSOEs and MixedPOEs in the middle, and POEs have the highest profitability. We try to address the endogeneity challenge in several ways and get similar results. Overall, our analysis provides new evidence on the financial performance of mixed-ownership firms.
  • 详情 From Effect to Behaviour – Regulating State-Owned Enterprises as Competitors in Trade Agreements
    In recent years, the attempt to curb state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has resulted in dedicated rules in trade agreements. This paper reveals significant paradigm shifts in cross-border SOE regulation by exploring the emerging SOE rules and contrasting them with SOE disciplines in WTO agreements. First, the emerging SOE rules shift the emphasis from regulating trade measures to the competitive behaviour of SOEs. More importantly, the emerging SOE rules are characterized by excessive focus on behaviour analysis and a per se approach. Under a per se approach, a violation of the emerging SOE rules could be established regardless of whether the behaviour of an SOE caused a harmful trade or competition effect. Finally, in light of SOE reform in China, the article contends that the emerging SOE rules’ behaviour analysis deviate cross-border SOE regulation from its primary goal of levelling the playing field.
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