This study examines the relationship between industry litigation risk and corporate misconduct using China's A-share listed companies’ data from 2007 to 2022. The findings indicate a significant and negative association, where companies in industries with higher median litigation amounts relative to their assets exhibit reduced incidents of misconduct. This suggests that businesses in high-risk litigation sectors may adopt more cautious practices to mitigate legal challenges and protect their reputations. The robustness of these findings is confirmed through a variety of tests, including a quasi-experimental setting of the chief judges rotation implemented in 2008. Furthermore, the study finds that external monitors including financial analysts’ site visits and local law firms moderate the negative relationship between litigation risk and misconduct. We further show that legal enforcement and moral capital are the two channels through which industry litigation risk impacts corporate misconduct. Our findings underscore the role of litigation risk in shaping peer firms' behavior.

Site visits allow visitors to physically inspect productive resources and interact with onsite employees and executives face-to-face. We posit that, by allowing visitors to acquire investmentrelated information and monitor the management team, site visits offer disciplinary benefits for corporate investments. Using mandatory disclosures of site visits in China, we find that corporate investments become more responsive to growth opportunities as the intensity of site visits increases, consistent with the notion that site visits yield disciplinary benefits. We also find that the positive association between site visits and investment efficiency is more pronounced when visitors can glean more investment-related information and when they have stronger incentives and greater power to monitor managers. This positive association is also stronger among firms with more severe agency problems and higher asset tangibility. The overall evidence supports the notion that site visits serve as a unique venue for institutional investors and financial analysts to acquire valuable information and serve a monitoring function, which generates disciplinary benefits for corporate investments.

Corporate site visits provide investors with opportunities to obtain non-standard, tailored "soft" information about the firm. In this study, we investigate the impact of information disclosed from corporate site visits on stock market stability from the perspective of stock return volatility. Our findings suggest that it is the information disclosed rather than the visits themselves that significantly reduce stock return volatility, primarily by mitigating information asymmetry. Moreover, we observe that the volatility-mitigating effect of site visits is more pronounced when the visit information better aligns with investors' concerns and when it is more effectively disseminated. Our study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that the timely disclosure of site visit details serves as a stabilizing mechanism for stock prices through effective information mining and dissemination.

By exploring additional information, both institutional investors’ site visits and analyst coverage can stimulate corporate innovation. However, because analysts are more specialized in information exploration, their existence should weaken the effect of institutional site visits on corporate innovation. By using Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2013, we investigate the effect of institutional site visits on firms’ innovation output, with a focus on its heterogeneity from analyst coverage. We use patent citation records to accurately measure firms’ innovation output. We find that institutional site visits significantly enhance corporate innovation among firms without analyst coverage, among firms with low analyst coverage, while this effect turns insignificant among firms with high analyst coverage. IV estimations confirm the causality. Additionally, we find that our major results exist only among non-SOEs, firms with a lower quality of information disclosure, firms with lower liquidity, and newly listed firms. Overall, this paper helps better understand the interaction between institutional site visits and analyst coverage regarding information exploration.

In recent years, numerous Chinese peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms have collapsed, prompting us to investigate the regulation and monitoring of the fintech industry. Using a unique dataset of P2P lending platforms in China, we examine the effect of government monitoring on platform collapses. Exploiting platforms’ locational proximity to regulatory offices as a proxy for government monitoring, we show that greater geographical distance results in a higher likelihood of platform collapse. Specifically, for every 10% increase in the driving distance from the platform to the local regulatory office, the likelihood of collapse increases by 10.2%. To establish causality, we conduct a differencein-differencesanalysis that exploits two exogenous shocks: government office relocation and subway station openings. We further explore two underlying channels: the information channel through which greater regulatory distance reduces the likelihood of regulators’ onsite visits and the resource constraint channel, through which greater regulatory distance significantly increases the local regulatory office’s monitoring costs. Overall, this study highlights the importance of onsite regulatory monitoring to ensure the viability of online lending platforms.

This paper examines whether sell-side analysts struggle to cope with macroeconomic uncertainty. We find that analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts when facing higher economic policy uncertainty, which conflicts with the conclusions in the US. We provide a novel explanation for this finding and exclude the view that forecast accuracy improvement comes from analysts’ efforts to actively collect private information through site visits. Further evidence supports that heuristic cognitive bias and emotional framing effect hold back analysts’ tendency to optimism in China, resulting in higher forecast accuracy. As to why Chinese analysts do not work harder but issue more accurate forecasts, we suggest that it is mainly due to the different market regimes faced by analysts in the two countries. Our study sheds light on how macroeconomic uncertainty affects analysts’ unethical behavior and explains the cognitive processes involved.

We explore whether Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) can provide incremental information to peers. Using Chinese stock market data, we find that positive peers' MD&A tone encourages firms to hold more cash, particularly for industries with fewer institutional investors' site visits. Moreover, this association is moderated by predation risk and decision-making environment. Specifically, this effect is more pronounced for firms which are market followers or financial constrained, and it is also stronger for firms operating under higher economic policy uncertainty or solely in domestic market. Overall, our findings enrich the information channels of peer effects in cash policy.

In recent years, numerous Chinese peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms have collapsed, prompting us to investigate the regulation and monitoring of the fintech industry. Using a unique dataset of P2P lending platforms in China, we investigate the effect of the information environment on regulatory monitoring and platform collapse. Using the platforms’ proximity to regulatory offices as a proxy for information asymmetry, we show that an increase in distance reduces regulatory monitoring and increases the likelihood of platform collapse. Specifically, for every 1% increase in the driving distance between the local regulatory office and a P2P lending platform’s office, the platform’s likelihood of collapse increases by 1.011%. To establish causality, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis that exploits two exogenous shocks: government office relocation and subway station openings. We provide evidence that proximity enhances monitoring quality by facilitating soft information collection, reducing platform failures. We further find two channels of this effect: (1) the information channel through which greater regulatory distance reduces the likelihood and frequency of regulators’ on-site visits and (2) the resource-constraint channel, through which greater regulatory distance significantly increases the local regulatory office’s monitoring costs. Overall, this study highlights the importance of the acquisition of soft information for regulatory monitoring to ensure the viability of fintech firms.