In recent years, the attempt to curb state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has resulted in dedicated rules in trade agreements. This paper reveals significant paradigm shifts in cross-border SOE regulation by exploring the emerging SOE rules and contrasting them with SOE disciplines in WTO agreements. First, the emerging SOE rules shift the emphasis from regulating trade measures to the competitive behaviour of SOEs. More importantly, the emerging SOE rules are characterized by excessive focus on behaviour analysis and a per se approach. Under a per se approach, a violation of the emerging SOE rules could be established regardless of whether the behaviour of an SOE caused a harmful trade or competition effect. Finally, in light of SOE reform in China, the article contends that the emerging SOE rules’ behaviour analysis deviate cross-border SOE regulation from its primary goal of levelling the playing field.

构建商业银行竞争力指数对中国14个代表性上市商业银行8年的竞争力水平进行测度和比较，发现加入WTO后，各个银行在2002-2006年间的综合业绩增长缓慢。国有商业银行在剥离大量不良资产后，其竞争力有所提升，但与股份制银行和城市商业银行还有一定差距；选取面板数据进行逐步回归检验，发现流动性能力、盈利能力、公司治理能力、资本充足度等传统因素对银行竞争力影响显著，而高级要素科技创新、业务结构等对银行竞争力的恭献度不大。

Given that the impact of the world economy on the China economy and its stock market may have increased substantially in the last few decades, we examine whether US economic variables can predict the Chinese stock market. We find that although before China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the end of 2001, the US economic variables generally do not show significant predictive power on the Chinese stock market, they do provide significant predictive power after 2001. Moreover, we show that the US economic variables can be used in conjunction with China economic variables to achieve better return forecasts for the Chinese stock market, which turn out to be economically important from an investment perspective.

Given that the impact of the world economy on the China economy and its stock market may have increased substantially in the last few decades, we examine whether US economic variables can predict the Chinese stock market. We find that although before China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the end of 2001, the US economic variables generally do not show significant predictive power on the Chinese stock market, they do provide significant predictive power after 2001. Moreover, we show that the US economic variables can be used in conjunction with China economic variables to achieve better return forecasts for the Chinese stock market, which turn out to be economically important from an investment perspective.

Insurance was one of industries that were opened very first after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. During 2002 to 2005, there was a peak of the foreign insurers’ entry, with the rapid growth of their market share. However, in recent years, the foreign insurers found themselves not able to grow as fast as they have expected, which was described as their “Seven Year Itch” in China. Several cases of equity transactions have taken place in 2009-2010, mainly involved with the foreign insurers reducing their shareholdings. This was regarded as the sign of foreign insurers changing their strategies in Chinese market. In this paper we found strong evidence to show that the current performance of foreign insurers in China was relatively worse than that in the other major insurance markets. From the comparison of the regulatory environment and market performance, we can say for sure that regulation restrictions should be at least one of the major reasons for the current situation. Also we found that the “50-50” shareholding structure which was adopted initially by many life foreign insurers could be blamed for the slow growth recently. And poor bancassurance business performance could explain the shareholding reductions recently for some of the foreign life insurers.

透明化已经蔚为世界范围内中央银行制度变革的基本趋势之一。随着我国中央银行制度的建立健全，人民银行的目标透明度、操作透明度、知识透明度稳步提高。2001年加入WTO和2003年SARS危机积极推动我国的治道变革。目前，人民银行透明度与《货币和金融政策透明度良好行为准则：原则宣言》、《货币和金融政策透明度良好行为准则辅助文件》等国际标准还有较大差距，是今后我国中央银行法制建设的重点。

The separation of the government from the industry in telecommunications sector was carried out in a gradualist or experimental manner to make sure a “reform without losers”. Both the supervising ministries and local governments became the “early winners” who were in favor of the status quo. A meaningful industrial reform started from 1994 but ended in 1998. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was just right on time to secure the outcome of the reforms. However, determined by the nature of uncompetitiveness and state monopoly, the telecommunications sector was against the liberalization requested by the GATT/WTO members. Close administrative and financial connections between the supervising ministry and subordinate sector caused a high degree of convergence of their interest that in turn implies that the ministry had strong incentives of protecting the sector. After having terminated the fragmented governance since 1995, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) successfully prevented the sector from giving much concession compared to the other sectors during Sino- US negotiations. Although a limited concession was made, it is possible that the supervising ministries would not fulfil its commitment. On the one hand, the MII would refuse to cut off its administrative and financial ties with the enterprises. On the other hand, the enterprises would still be willing to be protected by the government for the monopolistic benefits. Even though the door is half-open to international competition, the Ministry had developed other means to block the entry of foreign service providers. A new form of fragmented governance is taking shape since 2003 when the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was founded. It created tensions between the bureaucracies and might create loopholes for the foreign entry in the future.

The People’s Republic of China has taken substantial steps to reform its financial system, especially the banking sector, since 1995. The speed of banking reform has accelerated after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001. This study examines the impact of recent banking reforms and of WTO accession on the cost efficiency of the Chinese banking sector. We use a non-parametric approach to investigate the efficiency trend and productivity growth of banks in China between 1998 and 2006. We also compare the efficiency and productivity growth of different banking ownership groups prior to and after joining the WTO. We find that, on average, domestic banks outperform their foreign counterparts over the sample period in terms of overall and allocative efficiency, but they fall behind in terms of overall technical efficiency. The comparison of efficiency indexes pre and post WTO accession reveals that the efficiency of domestic banks has declined post accession, while foreign banks have enjoyed an improvement rise in their cost efficiency post WTO accession in 2001.The findings of this study further suggest that the total factor productivity of Chinese banks has weakened over the period under study. However, a pre and post analysis of WTO accession results shows that total factor productivity has improved for both domestic and foreign banks after China joined the WTO, equally owing to efficiency improvement and technological progress

The People’s Republic of China has taken substantial steps to reform its financial system, especially the banking sector, since 1995. The speed of banking reform has accelerated after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001. This study examines the impact of recent banking reforms and of WTO accession on the cost efficiency of the Chinese banking sector. We use a non-parametric approach to investigate the efficiency trend and productivity growth of banks in China between 1998 and 2006. We also compare the efficiency and productivity growth of different banking ownership groups prior to and after joining the WTO. We find that, on average, domestic banks outperform their foreign counterparts over the sample period in terms of overall and allocative efficiency, but they fall behind in terms of overall technical efficiency. The comparison of efficiency indexes pre and post WTO accession reveals that the efficiency of domestic banks has declined post accession, while foreign banks have enjoyed an improvement rise in their cost efficiency post WTO accession in 2001.The findings of this study further suggest that the total factor productivity of Chinese banks has weakened over the period under study. However, a pre and post analysis of WTO accession results shows that total factor productivity has improved for both domestic and foreign banks after China joined the WTO, equally owing to efficiency improvement and technological progress

The Article first presents a brief history or survey of some of the earlier problems that associate with China’s banking and financial institutions. The Article then addresses specific problems, in the context of the rules, procedures, and practices of the banking and finance sector, which widely range from non-performing loans, to China’s money market and interbank lending business. These problems also directly associate with the liberalization of the banking and finance sector of the economy, and the requirements of both the WTO rules and China’s WTO Protocol on accession. The Article also briefly explores the US sub-prime mortgage crisis and its contagion effect throughout the world, including the Asian region. In the context of China and the subprime crisis, the Article summarizes some of the problems that associate with China banking and financial institutions, by focusing on the policy implications of the history of banking and finance in China, and what this means in terms of both WTO compliance and greater liberalization of banking and financial institutions, especially pursuant to the WTO GATS, as service industries. All of this, eventually, allows for the presentation of certain conclusions concerning China banking and finance in the new era of a global subprime crisis.