This paper aims to investigate the transmission mechanism through which trade policy uncertainty (TPU) impacts bank risk-taking via firms’ capital market performance. The research reveals that TPU significantly affects firms’ capital market performance, leading to reduced stock liquidity, increased stock price crash risk, decreased stock price synchronicity, and lower stock returns. These effects are transmitted to bank risk-taking, resulting in an overall increase in banks’ passive risk-taking and a decrease in their willingness to undertake active risk-taking. Furthermore, we discover that the impact of TPU on bank risk-taking varies across different categories of firms, revealing heterogeneity in this transmission process. This study uncovers the critical mechanism through which TPU propagates in financial markets, offering important theoretical insights and policy implications for understanding and managing financial risk.

We examine the dynamic connection between competition and bank risk within the credit market through the lens of moral hazard affecting banks and borrowers. By combining the perspectives of “competition-fragility” and “competition-stability”, we reveal the intricate influence that competition exercises over bank risk in this financial landscape. Our research scrutinizes these theoretical constructs empirically, drawing upon a dataset comprising 236 rural commercial banks in China from 2012 to 2020. The findings indicate a curvilinear relationship between competition and bank risk, as an inverted U-shape. Furthermore, competition plays a dual role - it improves borrowers’ moral hazard dilemma while exacerbating it for banks. This highlights both riskshifting and risk-margin effects within the competitive dynamics. Ultimately, the nonlinear association between competition and bank risk emerges due to the intricate interplay between the moral hazard factors affecting borrowers and banks.

Macro-prudential policy plays a crucial role in stabilizing the financial system and influencing banks' risk preferences and willingness to take risks. This study examines the influence of macro-prudential policies on bank risk-taking using unbalanced panel data from 126 commercial banks in China between 2010 and 2021. The difference-in-differences model is employed to analyze the data. The empirical findings demonstrate that implementing macro-prudential policies in China effectively enhances bank risk prevention measures. In other words, macro-prudential policy implementation facilitates the digital transformation of banks and subsequently reduces risk-taking behaviors. Moreover, the heterogeneity test reveals that macro-prudential policies have a more significant impact on the risk-taking behavior of commercial banks with higher capital adequacy ratios compared to those with lower ratios. Additionally, commercial banks with strong interbank dependence exhibit more pronounced effects on their risk profiles when subjected to macroprudential policies with stricter capital supervision requirements. Therefore, this study proposes policy recommendations for strengthening bank capital supervision through differentiated approaches, serving as a valuable reference for the regulatory authorities.

We explore the relationship between fintech, macroprudential policies, and commercial bank risk-taking. Based on system generalized method of moment modeling on a panel data of 114 commercial banks in China from 2013 to 2020, results show that there are functional differences in the impact of fintech on bank risk-taking. Payment and settlement technology (PST), capital raising technology (CRT) and investment management technology (IMT) are positively correlated with bank risk-taking. In contrast, market facility technology (MFT) negatively correlates with bank risk-taking. We also find that macroprudential policies weaken the promotion effect of CRT on bank risk-taking and strengthen the inhibition effect of MFT on bank risk-taking while having no significant moderating effect on PST and bank risk, IMT and bank risk. Further, the micro characteristics of banks (capital adequacy ratio, asset scale, liquidity level) affects the moderating strength of macroprudential policies. Various robustness tests confirm our conclusions.

The purposes of this research are to examine bank risk taking behavior and its relationship with bank charter value, particularly whether the responses of risk measures to charter value are different for banks with high and low level of charter value for the five European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) during the period 1993-2002. By employing Galloway et al’s (1997) empirical model, the findings are partially consistent with their results. The consistency is the acceptance of the ‘moral hazard’ hypothesis that banks with low charter value are more apt to engage in high risk taking strategies. Further analyses found this behavior was constrained in the early 2000s. Moreover, it is interesting that the results also illustrate that risk taking increased with bank charter value over the period, which rejects the ‘bankruptcy cost’ hypothesis that when banks charters are valuable, they are more likely to be risk aversion due to the fear of potential losses of their valuable charters. Overall, the pooled data indicate that there is a non-linear relationship between risk taking behavior and bank charter value.