While a wide range of managerial practices suggest that coopetition plays a crucial role in advancing firm innovation, how this effect occurs and the boundary conditions remain unclear. The literature revealing the specific mechanisms by which inter-firm coopetition affects firm innovation, including mediating mechanisms and boundary conditions, is still insufficient. By integrating the resource dependence theory and the capability view, this study explores how firm agility links inter-firm coopetition and open innovation within industrial clusters. In addition, based on conceptualizing coopetition as a concept containing three elements (cooperation, constructive conflict, and destructive conflict), this study examines government intervention in industrial clusters as a boundary factor and explores how it affects the relationship between inter-firm coopetition and firm agility. Based on the analysis of a sample of 181 industrial cluster firms in China, the results of this study show that firm agility mediates the relationship between cooperation, constructive conflict, and open innovation, respectively, and that government intervention diminishes both the facilitating effect of constructive conflict on firm agility and the negative effect of destructive conflict on firm agility. The findings contribute to the understanding of how and when coopetition affects open innovation and provide a theoretical basis for firms to utilize coopetition to innovate successfully.

When examining corporate governance in China, it is crucial to recognize the unique socio-economic structures and legal systems at play. The mechanisms of corporate governance theorized in the West might not necessarily have the same impact in China. In particular, given China’s distinct feature of the domestic economy and its socio-political structure, the results of introducing a hostile takeover system might not align with common anticipations that scholars and policymakers in China and elsewhere broadly share. In greater detail, this paper highlights the significant market imperfections in the Chinese economy, stemming from information asymmetry, imperfect product markets, and capital-market inefficiency. These market imperfections suggest that an active hostile takeover regime might not function effectively in China, as its disciplinary mechanism operates successfully in other advanced countries. Additionally, this paper underscores that due to China’s distinctive features—including its state-owned corporate landscape, the dominance of controlling shareholders in private corporations’ ownership structures, and its unique brand of socialism—the introduction of an active takeover regime could produce unintended consequences in the Chinese economy. Overall, challenging the prevailing perspective, I posit that within the Chinese hostile takeover framework, corporate governance is not as influential as one might assume.

This study explores how the application of democratic rule in land reform decision-making determines villagers’ political trust towards different levels of the government in China. Based on analyses of a two-period household survey data we find that in China’s most recent Collective Forest Tenure Reform, the use of democratic rule improves villagers’ trust for town and county cadres, whereas the impact on trust towards village cadres is only significant for the democracy involving all the villagers or households in a village. This pattern of trust is partly explained by our findings that the democratic process helped decrease the unresolved inter-village forestland disputes whilst there seems no such impact on the within-village land disputes. Heterogeneity analyses show that democratic decision-making has a more pronounced effect in improving trust for villagers with lower income, and those without affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or to the village committee.

The discussion on the innovative effects of intellectual property pledge financing is a mainstream trend. In this context, this study has improved the existing research from several aspects, such as broadening the dimensions of innovation, adding dynamic analysis, refining multidimensional mediation mechanisms, and employing unique samples. Ultimately, we come to the following conclusions: (1) Intellectual property pledge financing suppresses enterprise innovation, especially innovation quality, but this pattern will be broken by raising the threshold of innovation conditions. The reason is that strict innovation conditions can lead to a poor innovation foundation for enterprises, which are rarely affected by the fluctuation of funds obtained from intellectual property pledge financing. (2) Intellectual property pledge financing has a non-linear effect on firm innovation, characterized by an increase followed by a decrease, suggesting that intellectual property pledge financing in current China can only provide a temporary stimulus for firm innovation. (3) The relationship between intellectual property pledge financing and enterprise innovation is strongly moderated by the ownership, type, and size of the enterprise, with the inhibitory effect of intellectual property pledge financing on enterprise innovation occurring mainly in state-owned enterprises, high-tech enterprises, and small enterprises, while its positive effects are more pronounced in private enterprises, non-high-tech enterprises, and medium-sized enterprises. (4) Financing constraints, internal incentives, external supervision, and signaling mechanisms are indeed key pathways through which intellectual property pledge financing affects firm innovation, especially when we analyse these mechanisms using dynamic models.

Facing external shocks, maintaining and stabilizing imports is a major practical issue for many developing countries. We first document that sourcing market switching (SMS) is widespread for Chinese firms (For 2000-2016, SMS firms account for 76.29% of all import firms and 96.30% of total import value). Then we use Chinese firm-level data to show that SMS can significantly mitigate the negative impacts of international uncertainty on imports, which further stabilizes firm employment and innovation, leading to increases in national and even world welfare. Possible motivations for SMS include stabilizing import supply, lowering import tariffs, raising the real exchange rate, and increasing product switching. We also find that the effects of SMS vary by the type of uncertainty, firm ownership, productivity, credit constraints, trade mode, and product features.

ESG is emerging as a new benchmark for measuring a company's sustainable development capabilities and social impact. As a measure of ESG performance, ESG ratings are increasingly receiving attention from companies, the general public, and government institutions, and are becoming an important reference factor influencing their decision-making. This paper investigates the impact of corporate ESG ratings on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and its mechanisms of action. Focusing on listed companies in China, we find that higher ESG ratings contribute to improving a company's TFP, and this conclusion remains valid after robustness tests and addressing endogeneity issues. Further exploration into the reasons behind this result reveals that ESG ratings can be seen as a signal that a company sends to the outside world, representing its overall performance. Higher ESG ratings enhance a company's TFP by reducing market financing constraints and obtaining government subsidies. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the positive impact of ESG ratings on TFP is more pronounced for companies with higher levels of attention, reputation, and audit quality. Additionally, we explore whether ESG ratings can serve as a predictive indicator for measuring a company's TFP. This hypothesis was tested using machine learning algorithms, and the results indicate that models incorporating ESG rating indicators significantly improve the accuracy of predicting a company's TFP capabilities.

Informal institutions can play a crucial role in fostering corporate and policy innovation, especially when formal institutions are weak. However, their intangible nature makes them difficult to quantify. In this paper, we proxy the strength of kinship-based informal institutions using surname homogeneity among business owners, specifically, the extent to which they share a limited number of surnames within the same county. Our analysis reveals that a one-standard-deviation increase in the strength of informal institutions leads to a 21.1% increase in patent filings and an 18.9% increase in policy innovation. We find that kinship-related informal institutions foster corporate innovation by compensating for weak formal institutions, enhancing protection for intellectual property rights, facilitating access to finance, improving public service delivery, and promoting supply chain cooperation. We also suggest that kinship-related informal institutions encourage local governments to engage in policy experimentation, which relies on the collaboration of business owners. This experimentation process is easier to coordinate and monitor in counties dominated by a few kinship networks. Both informal institutions and policy innovation contribute to economic development and foster entrepreneurial market entries. However, the positive impact of informal institutions declines over time as formal institutions strengthen in China.

The stock price of a firm is dynamically influenced by its own factors as well as those of its peers. In this study, we introduce a Graph Attention Network (GAT) integrated with WaveNet architecture—termed the GAT-WaveNet model—to capture both time-series and spatial dependencies for forecasting the stock price crash risk of Chinese listed firms from 2012 to 2021. Utilizing node-rolling techniques to prevent overfitting, our results show that the GAT-WaveNet model significantly outperforms traditional machine learning models in prediction accuracy. Moreover, investment portfolios leveraging the GAT-WaveNet model substantially exceed the cumulative returns of those based on other models.

This paper explores the impact of government intervention on local analysts’ earnings forecasts, based on a scenario of financial misconduct in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The results show that, under the influence of the government, local analysts’ earnings forecasts for SOEs with financial misconduct are less accurate and more optimistically biased. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that forecast bias by local analysts is greater when officials have stronger promotion incentives, when regions are less market-oriented and have a larger share of the state-owned economy, and when SOEs contribute more to taxation and employment. In further analysis, we find that local analysts have a more optimistic tone in reports targeting non-compliant SOEs. Local analysts who depend heavily on political information will also issue more biased and optimistic forecasts on SOEs with violations. Finally, as a reward for achieving government goals, the local brokerages affiliated with these analysts and providing these optimistic forecasts are more likely to become underwriters in seasoned equity offerings of SOEs. This paper reveals that government intervention significantly influences analyst forecasts, providing implications for understanding the sources of analyst forecast bias.

Developing countries are taking advantage of FinTech tools to provide more people with convenient access to financial market investment through digital wealth management. Using COVID-19 as an uncertainty shock, we examine whether and how digital wealth management affects the resilience of consumption to shocks based on a unique micro dataset provided by a leading Big Tech platform, Alipay in China. We find that digital wealth management mitigates the response of consumption to uncertainty shocks: residents who participate in digital wealth management, especially in risky asset investments, have a lower reduction in consumption. Importantly, digital wealth management helps improve financial inclusion, with a more pronounced mitigation effect among residents with lower-level wealth, living in less developed areas, and those with lower-level conventional finance accessibility. The mitigation effect works through the wealth channel: those who allocate a larger proportion of risky assets in their portfolio and obtain a higher realized return show more resilience of consumption to negative shocks. We also find that digital wealth management substitutes for conventional bank credit but serves as a complement to FinTech credit in smoothing consumption during uncertainty shocks. Digital wealth management provides a crucial way to improve financial inclusion and the resilience of consumption to shocks.