We investigate the impact of financial geographic density on corporate financial asset holdings in emerging market. We proxy for financial geographic density by calculating the number of financial institutions around a firm within a certain radius based on the geographic distance between the firm and financial institutions. Using data on publicly listed A-share firms in China from 2011 to 2021, we find that financial geographic density has a positive impact on nonfinancial firms’ financial asset investments, especially for the firms located in regions with a larger number of banking depository financial institutions or facing greater market competition. An increase in the number of financial institutions surrounding firms increases corporate financial asset holdings by alleviating information asymmetry. Moreover, we document that Fintech has little impact on the relationship between financial geographic density and corporate financial asset holdings. As the rise of financial geographic density, firms hold more financial assets for precautionary motives, which contribute to corporate innovation.

We provide a novel explanation for the geographic dispersion of borrower-lender relationships based on information frictions rather than competition. Firms may strategically select distant banks to increase lenders’ information production costs, securing larger loans under information-insensitive contracts. Our model predicts that higher-quality firms prefer distant lenders for information-insensitive contracts, while lower-quality firms use local lenders with information-sensitive terms. Using transaction-level data from a major Chinese bank, we find strong empirical support: higher-rated firms exhibit greater propensity for distant borrowing; local loans show stronger negative correlation between amounts and interest rates; and distant loan pricing demonstrates weaker sensitivity to defaults.

Based on the sample data of Chinese listed companies, this paper finds that the increase in customer concentration significantly reduces the level of enterprise employment. The research results are robust to a series of tests. Further analysis shows that the increase of financing constraints, the increase of enterprise risk and the decrease of profitability are the mechanism of customer concentration affecting enterprise employment. In addition, the negative correlation between customer concentration and enterprise employment is stronger for enterprises with small size, fierce industry competition, and increasing economic policy uncertainty.

This study examines the impact of strategic alliances on corporate green innovation. We find that strategic alliances significantly promote corporate green innovation. Mechanism tests indicate that strategic alliances promote green innovation through channels of attracting market attention, alleviating agency problems, and stimulating collaborative innovation. Heterogeneity analysis demonstrates that the effects of strategic alliances are more pronounced for firms in areas with stringent environmental regulations and a favorable business environment, and firms facing intense product market competition. The findings provide new insights into the green transformation and upgrading of enterprises.

“How does a firm’s bankruptcy affect its regional environment?” is an open empirical question that has received little attention in the literature. We hypothesize that because enterprises provide funds to protect their regional environment, their default risk negatively impacts that environment. We analyze the impact of corporate default risk on environmental deterioration in the international setting to answer this question. Using a firm-level corporate default risk quarterly data from 2013q1 to 2020q4, we find that corporate default risk is positively associated with CO2 emissions and decomposed components. These findings are reliable in low-income and highly uncertain countries but weak in countries having more market competition. We also find that the negative impact of corporate default risk on the environment is more robust in countries with more population density and fewer forest area thresholds. Finally, using the instrumental variable approach, we provide preliminary evidence that firm-level political risk (for US and Canadian firms only) increases corporate default risk, leading to a degrading environment. Our findings are robust to alternative measurements of a firm’s default risk and environmental deterioration. Our research will help environmental authorities to consider corporate default risk as a determinant when formulating environmental-related strategies.

This paper provides evidence on the cost of political interference on banks with Chinese Private Enterprise Survey data between 2002 and 2012. Using regional political turnovers as a proxy for political influence, we show that political motivations for future promotions distort the bank lending decisions and crowd out lending to private firms. Besides, firms with business connections are more sensitive to turnover, while political connections are not significantly affected. These lending distortions are more considerable where competition for future promotion is more intense and where incumbents have more influence over banks. Moreover, the effect is especially pronounced for small firms. As a result of reduced bank credit, firms’ total credit availability decreases and they have to cut investments. Overall, our results suggest that preferential lending to politically important sectors has negative spillovers and can lead to costly crowding-out of private sectors.

This study investigates whether corruption differentially affects contracting through auctions and negotiations. Using data on Chinese land-market transactions, where corruption is known to be present, we first show that, on average, it exerts similar effects on transactions carried out via auctions and negotiation. However, this finding masks important heterogeneity – auctions featuring healthy competition are less affected by corruption, and significantly less so than negotiation. We then develop a simple model of bidding under the possibility of corruption that rationalizes our findings.

We study the role of firm heterogeneity and imperfect competition for global production networks and the gains from trade. We develop a quantifiable trade model with two-sided firm heterogeneity, matching frictions, and oligopolistic competition upstream. More productive buyers endogenously match with more suppliers, thereby inducing tougher competition among them to enjoy lower input costs and superior performance. Transaction-level customs data confirms that downstream French and Chilean firms import higher values and quantities at lower prices as upstream Chinese markets become more competitive over time, with stronger responses by larger firms. Moreover, suppliers charge more diversified buyers lower mark-ups. Counterfactual analysis indicates that entry upstream benefits high-productivity buyers, while lower matching or trade costs benefit all buyers, with the biggest boost to mid-productivity buyers. All three shocks generate sizeable welfare gains, especially under package reforms. Global production networks thus mediate bigger effects and cross-border spillovers from industrial and trade policies.

We find a negative relation between share repurchase and corporate risk-taking using a sample of Chinese listed companies covering the period of 2014–2021. Our analysis yields consistent evidence even after consideration of endogeneity issues and the conducting of other robustness tests. We find that the impeded effect of share repurchase on corporate risk-taking is more pronounced for Chinese non-state-owned enterprises, firms with high competition in the product market, and firms located in low marketization regions. The possible mechanisms underlying these dynamics include share repurchase increasing the restrictions on low-cost financing and reducing over-investment. Our findings provide important implications for policyand low-making and are generalizable to other emerging markets.

Exploiting the unexpected Central Environmental Inspections (CEI) in China as a quasinaturalexperiment, we find that public firms in polluting industries experience significant gains in both profitability and market valuation after the regulatory shock, relative to firms in nonpolluting industries. The outperformance of public firms can be explained by the retreat of their private competitors, many shut down due to poor environmental performance. Because firms seeking public listing are required to meet high environmental standards, CEI significantly strengthen public firms’ competitive position, leading to increased sales growth and market share. Moreover, the outperformance is more pronounced for firms with more eco-friendly technologies, consistent with strict environmental regulations increasing the marginal benefit of these technologies. We provide novel evidence of the bright side of environmental regulation by highlighting the importance of industry dynamics.