Minority shareholder activism (MSA) on online interactive platforms is a new form of corporate governance in China. This paper investigates whether and how dividend-related MSA affects corporate dividend policies. We find listed firms are more likely to pay dividends and raise payout ratios with MSA. Our baseline findings are robust to a variety of robustness checks. We establish a causal relationship between MSA and future dividend payouts, with both instrumental variable approach and PSM-DID approach, and we provide evidence to show the increasing effect of MSA can be explained by exit threat and voting attendance. Our focused MSA complements the formal voting rights of minority shareholders and overcomes the absence of institutional investor monitoring. Overall, our findings suggest that minority shareholders can effectively monitor management when they are empowered with voice in the age of information.

This paper identiffes culture as an important factor affecting corporate cash holdings by using China and its national culture, Confucianism, as the setting. We find that firms located in regions with stronger Confucian culture hold persistently higher levels of cash. We employ an instrumental variable to draw causal inference. The culture effect is stronger for more ffnancially-constrained and riskier ffrms, suggesting precautionary motives as the underlying mechanism. We ffnd that the culture effect remains intact after controlling for corporate governance heterogeneity, which rules out the agency motives. Lastly, ffrms’ operating performance indicates that high cash holdings is an efffcient outcome.

The rapid development of the digital economy is driving profound changes in production methods, lifestyles, and corporate governance. Human society has entered a new era where digital technology is rapidly advancing and playing an important role. In the era of digital economy, although the production (labor) tools of enterprises are digitized, intelligent, and networked, and new characteristics and scenarios have emerged in the operation and labor methods of enterprises, the human capital possessed by workers has become the driving force for the sustainable development of entrepreneurial enterprises. Workers who master digital technology play a decisive role in the sustainable and healthy development of entrepreneurial enterprises. The article briefly introduces the establishment and development of human capital theory, pointing out that in the digital economy era, human capital has greater potential for appreciation, and its marginal returns show a trend of increasing; Human capital is a key factor in economic growth and development. The surplus of producers in an enterprise refers to the income that producers receive in excess of their production costs. The owners of human resources should receive a portion of the investment return that should belong to human capital from the enterprise in the form of "producer equity", "labor stock", or equity incentives in proportion. Equity incentives have become an important corporate governance mechanism in the capital market. The article also elaborates on the modern partnership system, which can motivate partners to collaborate and innovate, and is an upgrade of the manager system; Briefly introduced the achievements made by Xiaomi Group and Huawei in implementing the business partner system.

This paper explores the relationship between ESG ratings and real earnings management using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2008 to 2021. We find that ESG ratings and real earnings management are negatively correlated. It reveals that the improvement of ESG rating will help to improve the level of corporate governance, standardize the business activities of enterprises and thus help to reduce the real earnings management of enterprises. Our findings still hold after controlling for potential endogeneity and robustness issues. Further analysis shows that internal and external oversight of companies further strengthens the negative relationship between ESG ratings and true earnings management. Overall, the impact mechanism of ESG rating on real earnings management revealed by us has clear policy implications for how managers can improve the quality of information disclosure in emerging markets.

Direct experience of a peer’s punishment might have a sobering effect above and beyond deterrence (information about punishments). We test this mechanism in China studying the reactions to listed state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) punishments for fraudulent loan guarantees by firms in the same location or industry (peers) and non-peer firms, across SOEs and non-SOEs. After experiencing SOEs’ punishments, peer SOEs cut their loan guarantees by more than non-peer SOEs and peer non-SOEs, even if information is common to all firms. The reaction is stronger for peer SOEs whose CEOs have higher career concerns or face lower costs of cutting guarantees.

Using a director-level dataset of board proposal voting by independent directors of public companies, we analyze the effects of career concerns and current reputation stock on independent directors in their voting behavior. Younger directors and directors in their second (and last) terms, who have stronger career concerns, are more likely to be aligned with investors rather than the managers. Their dissenting behavior is eventually rewarded in the market place in the form of more outside career opportunities. Directors with higher reputation stocks (measured by positive news media mentioning and the number of directorships) are also more likely to dissent. Finally, we find that career concerns are significantly stronger among directors who already enjoy higher reputation.

Using the staggered opening of governmental public data platforms in China, we employ the difference-in-difference approach to investigate how public data access affects stock price synchronicity. We find that stock price synchronicity significantly drops after the public data platform is established in a firm’s headquarters city. The underlying mechanism is reducing information acquisition costs rather than increasing market attention or corporate information disclosure quality. Furthermore, the informational role of public data platforms magnifies under higher informed trade risk, poorer corporate governance, or better regional economic and innovation capacity. We highlight the role of public data in facilitating financial market efficiency.

How to shape a firm’s stock price resilience in the increasingly uncertain environment has become an important topic. This paper investigates the effect of important market participantsfinancial analysts-on stock price resilience. Based on data from 3,444 listed firms from China, we find that firms with higher analyst coverage are more resilient during the Covid-19 induced crisis, which is manifested by a lower pandemic-induced decline in stock price, shorter duration of decline period, higher recovery probability, and shorter duration of the recovery period after the shock. This positive relationship is more prominent for small firms but does not depend on ownership type, and the ratio of star analyst coverage. Further channel tests show that analysts could help in attracting attention from media and institutional investors, improving corporate governance, and reducing financial constraints, which in turn enhance the ability of stock prices to absorb pandemic shocks.

In this paper, we construct a content analysis structure to explore whether corporate governance information in voluntary disclosures can predict management expenses in the next term. Employing the site visit information disclosure of firms listed on the Chinese A-share market from 2012 to 2021, we find that corporate governance information disclosure is motivated by ownership concentration,and that corporate governance information can predict management expenses and comprises incremental information, indicating that the content analysis we construct is valuable and the disclosure of corporate governance information can mitigate the agency problems.There is a difference between state-owned listed firms and nonstate-owned listed firms.

Distinct from existing studies on general institutional investors and institutional investor cliques, this study examines how common institutional owners, who simultaneously hold more than 5% equity blocks in at least two publicly traded firms within the same industry, influence firms’ bad mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in China. Contrary to the “conspiracy tort” view, according to which common institutional owners are more likely to vote for bad M&A deals to pursue internalized gains from industry portfolios (Antón et al., 2022b), our results strongly support the “synergy governance” view, according to which common institutional owners perform more actively and effectively in monitoring against bad M&As and improving M&A quality. There is further evidence that common institutional owners with greater peer linkages and industry power and longer-term holdings are more likely to oppose deals with negative acquirer returns. Finally, we find that the effect of common institutional ownership on M&As is more pronounced among firms with stronger earnings management, moderate stock return synchronicity, less management shareholding and higher management expenses. The results are consistent with the “synergy governance” hypothesis whereby common institutional owners are able to leverage their advantages of industry information and supervisory experience to improve the information environment and corporate governance of the firms they hold. Overall, in China’s market, common institutional owners play an active external governance role and effectively improve M&A quality.