This study examines how emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) respond to cross-national diversity in environmental regulation. Prior research suggests that internationalization exposes EMNEs to diverse environmental standards and may facilitate regulatory learning, yet offers a limited understanding of the mechanisms through which such exposure translates into green innovation. Drawing on institutional theory, we argue that green innovation is particularly fostered when EMNEs operate across host countries whose environmental regulatory regimes are more stringent than those in the home country, and when such exposure varies across multiple host locations. We theorize that this form of environmental regulatory diversity creates learning pressures and legitimacy incentives that motivate EMNEs to upgrade their environmental capabilities through green innovation. Using panel data comprising 9,362 firm-year observations from 1,088 Chinese MNEs over the period 2008–2021, we find support for our arguments. We further show that these effects are contingent on organizational and institutional conditions, specifically top management teams’ technological expertise and the strength of intellectual property enforcement in home-country locations. These findings advance research on EMNE learning and sustainable innovation under complex global environmental governance.

The Central Environmental Protection Inspector (CEPI) is a critical regulatory measure in China aimed at improving ecological quality. From a compliance cost perspective, we examine the impact of the CEPI on corporate environmental governance. The findings reveal an asymmetry in the CEPI's influence: it significantly promotes environmental governance efforts on the non-production side of enterprises, while having no substantial effect on the production side. Additionally, government environmental subsidies do not provide a resource incentive in the process of the CEPI influencing corporate environmental governance. However, local environmental governance pressure mitigates this asymmetry, leading the CEPI to significantly enhance environmental governance on both the production and non-production sides. Further analysis shows that under the synergistic effect of local environmental governance pressure, the CEPI encourages state-owned enterprises to focus on environmental governance on the production side, while non-state-owned enterprises tend to focus on the non-production side. Moreover, political connections reduce the positive impact of the CEPI on production costs under local environmental governance pressure. Finally, the CEPI also significantly encourages enterprises to expand their production scale. These findings offer valuable insights for refining the CEPI system to better promote corporate environmental governance.

Following the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the central government elevated the construction of ecological civilization to a central position within national strategy and introduced environmental governance indicators as mandatory criteria for evaluating officials, alongside GDP. These indicators served as an additional "threshold" for performance assessments. In the context of changes in the central government's development ideology and policies, this study utilizes matched data on the turnover of municipal party secretaries and local enterprise carbon emissions from 293 prefecture-level cities in China between 1990 and 2021. The research finds that turnovers of municipal party secretaries after the 18th National Congress have led to a significant reduction in carbon emissions from local enterprises, a trend that was not evident prior to the congress. This effect is more pronounced in situations where official turnover is primarily driven by promotion incentives, and less influenced by collusive behavior between the government and enterprises. Further analysis reveals that the decline in carbon emissions is more significant for private enterprises, non-heavy polluting enterprises, those located in the eastern region, and those in general prefecture-level cities, before and after municipal party secretary turnovers. This study enhances understanding of the relationship between the promotion incentives of Chinese officials and the carbon emissions of local enterprises, offering valuable insights for improving the official promotion assessment system and advancing local carbon reduction efforts.

How enterprises can leverage frontier technologies to achieve synergy between environmental governance and high-quality development has become a critical issue amid the deepening global push for sustainable development and the green economic transition. Based on micro-level data of Chinese enterprises from 2009 to 2023, this study systematically examines the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on corporate green governance performance and explores the underlying mechanisms. The findings reveal that AI significantly enhances green governance performance at the enterprise level, and this effect remains robust after accounting for potential endogeneity. Mechanism analysis shows that AI empowers green transformation through a dual-path mechanism of “cognition–behavior,” by strengthening environmental tendency and increasing environmental investment. Further heterogeneity analysis indicates that the positive effects are more pronounced in nonheavy polluting industries and state-owned enterprises, suggesting that industry characteristics and ownership structure moderate the green governance impact of AI. This study contributes to the theoretical foundation of research at the intersection of digital technology and green governance, and provides empirical evidence and policy insights to support AI-driven green transformation in practice.

The role of Market-incentive environmental regulation (MIER) within the framework of environmental governance is patently evident. While extant literature lauds the advantageous outcomes attributed to the environmental protection tax (EPT) which as a representative of MIER, our empirical inquiry presents a contrasting narrative. By employing the sophisticated Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference (DDD) methodology and utilizing data from A-share listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2015-2022, our investigation reveals a significant decrease in firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) following the implementation of EPT. Our core assertion is fortified through the discernment of two plausible mechanisms, namely, the production downsizing effect and the production capital crowding-out effect. Building upon this revelation, we delve into the nuanced pathways through which firms can strategically mitigate the impacts of EPT, encompassing the enhancement of human capital, amplification of research and development (R&D) investments, and fortification of overall firm resilience. Heterogeneity analysis discloses a notably heightened impact of EPT on TFP of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), larger enterprises and enterprises located in eastern regions. Ultimately, an approximately cost-benefit analysis conclusively demonstrates that the benefits derived from EPT far surpass the costs incurred by the concomitant industrial output reduction, which further illustrates the rationale for the implementation of EPT.

This study documents how the political hierarchy plays a significant role in determining corporate environmental governance. By conducting difference-in-differences analysis to investigate listed firms in China, this study demonstrates that local and central SOEs headquartered in jurisdictions far removed from central government supervision have worse environmental governance than POEs. Verticalization reforms implemented in 2016 enable provincial environmental protection bureaus to direct lower-level bureaus. Local governments cannot control environmental protection bureau leaders for economic development. This study finds that the corporate environmental governance of local SOEs has significantly improved following the reform, as local environmental protection bureaus no longer have conflicts of interest with local governments. However, the reform has not resulted in improvements to corporate environmental governance in central SOEs, whose executives occupy higher status than provincial Environmental Protection Bureau leaders, nor in POEs, which were already managed before the reform. Further evidence indicates that local SOEs experience an increase in abatement investments and relationship building expenses following the reform. Lastly, our study reveals that verticalization reform costs are negligible. Local SOEs have not experienced a decline in financial performance or corporate valuation. This study suggests that policymakers should consider the political ranking of government agencies and enterprises to improve environmental governance.

We conducted a nationwide field experiment in China to evaluate the direct and indirect impacts of assigning firms to public or private citizen appeals treatments when they violate pollution standards. There are three main findings. First, public appeals to the regulator through social media substantially reduce violations and pollution emissions, while private appeals cause more modest environmental improvements. Second, experimentally adding “likes” and “shares” to social media appeals increases regulatory effort, suggesting visibility as an important mechanism. Third, treatment pollution reductions are not offset by control firm increases, based on randomly varying the proportion of treatment firms at the prefecture-level.