Our study examines dynamic innovation through the U.S.-Sino industrial-chain networks and its asset-pricing and financial-fundamental implications amid U.S.-China network disruptions. Innovation synergy captures similarity between firms’ learned innovation processes, in which firm characteristics and network information are used to predict patent output. Using an annually reconstructed joint network of Chinese and U.S. firms, we form peer-return, peer-R&D, and peer-patent measures and estimate their associations separately in the two markets. The annual R&D- and patent-based measures are positively associated with firms' own R&D intensity in both markets, their gross-profitability associations are stronger for large firms, and tangible-asset associations become more positive after 2017. The R&D- and patent-based long–short portfolios have positive Fama–French three-factor alphas in both markets, while the return-based signal is stronger in China than in the United States.

Firm characteristics help estimate conditional factor loadings. Larger libraries contain new and overlapping information. We use the cross-sectional distribution of firm characteristics as a ruler to evaluate IPCA loading spaces. With factor counts fixed, expanding from 36 to 153 characteristics can improve in-sample fit while representing momentum and size positions less fully. Reallocating shared exposures changes attribution without changing joint fitted returns. With coefficients fixed, exposure references alter holdings, trading, and subsequent risk at the same characteristic target. Statistical factor models should be evaluated not only by return fit, but also by the exposures they represent and the investment decisions they support.

Traditional portfolio optimization typically relies on a single fitted return distribution, thus ignores non-normality and uncertainty across distributional states. Mean–variance–ambiguity (MVA) models, motivated by the smooth-ambiguity preferences of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) and the KMM-to-MVA Arrow–Pratt reduction of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Ruffino (2013), extend conventional risk penalties to account for distributional uncertainty, but they missed how state-conditional return distributions affect portfolio optimization stability. We develop Deep Mean–Variance–Ambiguity (Deep MVA) to resolve this gap by learning state-conditional return distributions and embedding the resulting conditional information loss into the ambiguity penalty. The resulting local certainty equivalent combines reduced-law mean–variance risk with a quadratic penalty for second-order disagreement. Conditional-mixture state resolution yields a Deep ambiguity covariance equal to the Traditional ambiguity covariance plus a positive-semidefinite state-feature increment. This increment is the conditional L2 loss from averaging state-specific distributions before optimization. On compact convex feasible sets, we show that the state-resolving program has stronger ambiguity-relevant curvature, lower mean-input sensitivity, and a unique global solution under restricted positive curvature or a common ridge; its projected iterations converge linearly. An LSTM-MDN learns state-conditional distribution densities from 60-minute bars, and Probability and VoV scores enter weekly MVA, with GARCH_Resid as a comparator. Tests on the SSE 50, CSI 300, and CSI 500 universes from 2017–2025 find statistically significant Sharpe out-of-sample improvements over Traditional MVA and MVO across all three universes and ambiguity specifications.

Less informative strategic advice can produce more informative prices. We study an informed adviser who both trades on his own account and receives compensation linked to the post-report price. Holding private information fixed, we show how promotion can restrain manipulation motivated by trading profits. At sufficiently high reputation, raising compensation enough to eliminate false bad news used to buy cheaply improves market price informativeness in every equilibrium, even though the strategic adviser’s report becomes uninformative. Under further sufficient conditions, always-favourable strategic reporting yields the most informative current prices among equilibria at every interior reputation. We also derive analytical sufficient conditions under which higher reputation lowers the adviser’s expected payoff and worsens prices within the same equilibrium. Financial influencers motivate the joint incentives: a reward for higher prices can counteract the incentive to depress prices before buying, while greater credibility need not benefit its holder.

We examine whether and how the cultural background of corporate chairpersons, specifically clan culture, influences firm-to-firm lending decisions. Using hand-collected data on Chinese entrusted loans, a major segment of the country’s shadow banking sector, we find that firms led by chairpersons from prefectures with stronger clan culture are more likely to originate entrusted loans and charge lower spreads. We identify distinct mechanisms governing affiliated versus nonaffiliated transactions. In affiliated lending, our evidence suggests an in-group favoritism channel: culturally embedded chairpersons support affiliated parties despite higher ex-post default risk. Conversely, non-affiliated lending operates via an informational channel, where the positive impact of clan culture is more pronounced when geographic barriers are low, and manifests in larger size dispersion. Overall, our findings highlight the dual role of cultural norms in shadow banking, demonstrating that clan culture facilitates credit allocation while generating sharply different efficiency implications across relationship-based and arm’s-length markets.

We examine whether the characteristics of economically linked firms predict stock returns in the Chinese A-share market. We construct two peer-based signals: a peeraverage (PA) signal that aggregates the characteristics of fundamentally similar firms, and a peer-deviation (PD) signal that summarizes a firm’s characteristic deviations from industry-peer averages. PA captures shared fundamental information, whereas PD benchmarks a firm’s relative position against economically comparable peers. Portfolio sorts, factor-spanning tests, and Fama–MacBeth regressions reveal economically meaningful and statistically significant return predictability for both signals, with generally larger portfolio returns among non-state-owned enterprises. Both signals retain significant incremental predictive power after controlling for the full set of own-firm characteristics and flexible machine-learning forecasts based solely on these characteristics. Changes in both signals also predict future earnings, while return predictability is generally stronger among firms receiving less investor attention, consistent with limited-attention-induced underreaction. These findings highlight the distinct informational and benchmarking roles of economic networks and their predictive value beyond firms’ own characteristics.

This paper examines whether subjective macroeconomic expectations predict equity risk premia in China. Using professional macro forecasts from the Wind database over 2011- 2023, we construct a composite macroeconomic expectation index via PLS. We find that the index significantly and positively predicts future equity premia both in-sample and out-ofsample, implying a countercyclical equity premium. The predictive power is robust to a wide range of macro-financial controls and delivers economically meaningful gains in portfolio allocation. Further analysis shows that controlling for forecast errors does not attenuate predictability, and the subjective index largely subsumes the information in realized macro variables, suggesting that it captures forward-looking macroeconomic conditions rather than belief bias. Cross-sectional and long-horizon results reinforce this interpretation.

Firms frequently overstate digital transformation in public disclosures while committing less in observable investment, a phenomenon known as digital catering. We examine whether digital public financial infrastructure can discipline such symbolic behavior. Using a staggered difference-in-differences design on Chinese A-share listed firms over 2014--2024, we find that exposure to China's e-CNY pilot reduces digital catering by roughly 14% relative to the sample mean. The decline is driven almost entirely by reduced rhetorical digital transformation, while balance-sheet-based digital commitment rises only marginally: the e-CNY pilot is associated with substantially less digital talk, but not with a commensurate increase in digital walk in the short run. The effect operates through lower agency costs and reduced information asymmetry, and follows an amplification--substitution pattern---stronger among digital-sector and accounting-opaque firms, weaker where internal controls and institutional ownership are already strong. The evidence identifies financial-transaction verifiability as a novel source of discipline over corporate cheap talk: CBDC-related infrastructure constrains unsupported symbolic claims without immediately accelerating substantive digital investment.

We examine the relationship between government data opening and corporate leverage manipulation. Leveraging the staggered establishment of province-level open government data platforms in China as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that government data opening significantly reduces corporate leverage manipulation. This policy effect is more pronounced among firms with low capital intensity, firms with limited analyst coverage, and those located in regions with low banking competition. Mechanism analysis suggests that government data opening affects the cost-benefit tradeoff of corporate leverage manipulation by alleviating financing constraints and enhancing corporate governance, thereby mitigating leverage manipulation practices. Our research contributes to the literature on government data opening, highlighting its role in reducing leverage manipulation and offering valuable implications for mitigating significant financial risks.

This paper develops a delegation-based framework to explain how institutional design shapes pricing incentives under risk. Using China’s 2016 IPO reform—which abolished prefunding requirements and transferred payment obligations from investors to underwriters—as a natural experiment, we show that introducing subscription-payment risk (SPR) renders underwriter’s partial residual claimants with respect to unpaid allocations. Building on Baron’s (1982) delegation model, we argue that the reform amplifies information asymmetry and induces underwriters to adopt more conservative pricing strategies to manage perceived payment risk. Empirically, IPOs exposed to SPR exhibit greater underpricing and lower offer prices, particularly when investor bids reflect stronger valuation pessimism. The effect tends to be less pronounced for reputable underwriters and when foreign institutional investors participate. Overall, the evidence demonstrates how risk redistribution and institutional frictions jointly shape underwriter behavior and pricing efficiency in primary equity markets.