This paper, based on data from Chinese A-share listed companies between 2009 and 2019, employs the implementation of the "Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect" as a landmark event of capital market liberalization, utilizing a difference-in-differences model to empirically examine the impact of market openness on firms' cross-region investment behavior and its underlying mechanisms. The findings indicate that: (1) the launch of the "Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect" has significantly promoted the establishment of cross-provincial and cross-border subsidiaries by the companies involved; (2) capital market liberalization influences firms' cross-region investment through three dimensions: finance, governance, and stakeholders. In terms of finance, the openness alleviated financing constraints and improved stock liquidity; in governance, it pressured companies to adopt more digitalized and transparent governance structures to accommodate cross-regional expansion; in the stakeholder dimension, it attracted the attention of external investors, accelerating their understanding of firms and alleviating the trust issues associated with cross-region expansion. (3) The effect of capital market liberalization on promoting cross-border investments by private enterprises is particularly pronounced, and this effect is further strengthened as the quality of corporate information disclosure improves. Firms with higher levels of product diversification benefit more from market liberalization, accelerating their overseas expansion. (4) Capital market liberalization has elevated the level of cross-region investment, thereby significantly fostering innovation and improving investment efficiency. The conclusions of this study provide fresh empirical evidence for understanding the microeconomic effects of China's capital market liberalization, the intrinsic mechanisms of corporate cross-region investments, and their economic consequences.

Using unique data on Alipay users' investment accounts, we find that, in addition to generating better performance than investors’ self-directed portfolios, robo-advising has a positive spillover effect on its adopters in terms that it improves their investment behaviors. Investors have more diversified portfolios and exhibit fewer behavioral biases in portfolio management and fund choices in their self-directed accounts after adopting robo-advising. The spillover effect is more prominent for adopters who interact with the service more actively and who were less sophisticated before adopting the app. We also find that adopters learn from the robo-advisor by simply imitating its portfolios or strategies. Collectively, this study provides large-sample, non-laboratory evidence that robo-advising effectively plays a role in educating investors through repeated interactions with its adopters and setting investment models that are easy to follow.

机器人投资顾问（RIA）能为投资者提供信息，帮助其决策，已出现在多种投资平台上。利用2020和2021年中国最大投资平台的账户数据，本文检验了机器人投资顾问提供的不同服务。总体上看，机器人投顾的使用率越高，未来的净收益和风险调整后收益也越高，资产更多元，风险也越高。和信息服务相比，建议服务能对未来交易行为产生更大影响；这可能是因为机器投顾的建议比较简单，容易理解，因此能更好地被遵循，这与信息服务提供的海量信息形成对比。本文没有发现现有机器人投顾能移除行为偏差的证据。

Working with unique data on land values in 35 major Chinese markets and a panel of firms outside the real estate industry, we estimate standard investment equations that yield no evidence of a collateral channel effect. This is markedly different from previous work on the United States and Japan which finds economically large impacts. One reason for this appears to be that some of the most dominant firms in China are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which are unconstrained in the sense that they do not need to rely on rising underlying property collateral values to obtain all the financing necessary to carry out their desired investment programs. However, we also find no collateral channel effect for non-SOEs when we perform our analysis on disaggregated sets of firms. Norms and regulation in the Chinese capital markets and banking sector can account for why there is no collateral channel effect operating among these firms. We caution that our results do not mean that there will be no negative fallout from a potential real estate bust on the Chinese economy. There are good reasons to believe there would be, just not through a collateral channel effect.

This study examines the relation between political connections and investment efficiency in China. For listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), we find that the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities is significantly weaker for those with than without political connections. Politically connected SOEs over-invest significantly more than non-connected SOEs. This negative impact of political connections is primarily observed in SOEs controlled by local governments and/or in SOEs without sufficient investment opportunities. However, for private enterprises, investment expenditure is significantly more sensitive to investment opportunities and over-investment is significantly less in politically connected firms than in those without such connections. We further show that over-investment reduces firm value across the board for both SOEs and private enterprises. Taken together, our findings suggest that political connections distort investment behavior, reduce investment efficiency, and damage firm value in listed SOEs in China, but for listed private enterprises, political connections improve investment efficiency, reduce over-investment, and consequently enhance firm value.

This paper extends Lerner and Schoar’s (2004) argument on illiquidity puzzle of private equity funds. We examine the roles that investment illiquidity, along with bounded rationality and rent-seeking behavior, plays in private-equity buyouts. Collectively, investors employ club deals to screen out fund managers who might misuse discretionary rights to engage buyout deals. A club deal is launched by a group of private equity firms that pool their assets together, make a joint bid for a buyout target, and monitor the buyout processes collectively. Thus, this paper aims at clarifying whether or not such discretionary rights improve the choice of buyout target by, as well as the performance of private equity funds. We found that the performance of buyout funds persisted and affected the choice of the club deal as the major monitoring mechanism. This paper contributes to our understandings of investment behavior in private equity buyouts as follows. First, the performance of buyout funds has improved for at least two time periods between 1999 and mid-2007. The phenomenon that fund performance affects the choice of club deals is consistent across a variety of private equity funds, such as buyout, venture, growth, and mezzanine funds. Moreover, risk preference does not affect choice of club deals directly; instead, it has a moderating effect on choice of club deals through its interaction with the location of reference point for risk aversion. Finally, both fund size and fund sequence have U-shaped relations to the choice of club deals, while deal value of buyouts is related positively to the choice of club deals.