This paper examines the role of institutional investors in shaping pricing dynamics within China’s nascent infrastructure Real Estate Investment Trust market. Introduced in 2021, China’s REITs have rapidly gained policy and market attention as a tool for financing large-scale infrastructure projects through equity-based securitisation. Unlike mature REIT markets, China’s infrastructure REITs are characterised by a high concentration of institutional ownership dominated by state-owned financial institutions. Using panel data on first 9 REITs from May 2021 to April 2024, we find that institutional ownership significantly boosts the premium to net asset value. This effect operates primarily through two channels: reduced market liquidity and increased idiosyncratic return volatility, likely reflecting institutions’ trading activity and informational advantages. The findings highlight how institutional capital serves as a confidence signal in China’s emerging REITs ecosystem. The study contributes to the global REITs literature by offering insights from an emerging market context and provides policy recommendations to guide China’s REITs market development toward greater transparency, diversity, and long-term resilience.

We construct a Housing Purchase Intention Index (HPII) using the Baidu Search Index, which captures online search behavior directly reflecting households’ housing purchase intentions. We assess the predictive power of the HPII for the growth rate of housing transaction volume and further examine factors influencing housing purchase intention. The results show that the HPII has significant predictive ability and enhances real-time forecasting accuracy, highlighting the role of search behavior as a behavioral signal in the housing market. We also find that housing purchase intention is shaped by policy, economic, demographic, and supply factors. Specifically, purchase restriction policies exhibit an inverted U-shaped effect; moderate mortgage-rate hikes dampen purchase intention, while persistent increases may induce anticipatory buying. In addition, rising wages, increasing population concentration, and expanded residential land supply consistently strengthen housing purchase intention. These findings provide new behavioral evidence on the drivers of housing demand and underscore the value of search-based indicators for understanding household decision-making in the real estate market.

We revisit cross-asset time-series momentum (XTSM) and single-asset time-series momentum (TSM) in China's stock and bond markets. With a fixed-effects model, we find a positive momentum from bonds to stocks and a negative momentum from stocks to bonds, with both momentum persisting for no more than six months. By employing a cross-grouping method, we find that the choice of lookback periods and asset signals impacts the performance of XTSM and TSM. A comparison between XTSM, TSM, and time-series historical (TSH) portfolios reveals that XTSM outperforms in small/midcap stocks and government bonds, while its performance is weak in large-cap stocks and corporate bonds. A spanning test confirms that XTSM generates excess returns that other pricing factors can not explain. XTSM is more prone to momentum crashes. Increased market stress has similarly adverse effects on XTSM and TSM. Furthermore, Market illiquidity, IPO counts, new investor accounts, and consumer confidence index positively correlate with the returns of XTSM and TSM portfolios, while IPO first-day return and turnover rate correlate negatively. The effects of these sentiment indicators exhibit heterogeneity.

We study tail-risk contagion in Belt and Road (BRI) stock markets by conditioning on shocks from China and global commodities. We construct time-varying contagion indices from conditional higher co-moments (CoHCM) estimated within a DCC-GARCH model with generalized hyperbolic innovations, and apply them to daily data for 32 BRI markets. The higher-moment index isolates two channels: a China-driven financial-institutional channel and a WTI-driven commodity-real-economy channel, whereas a covariance benchmark fails to recover this separation. Furthermore, the system-GMM estimates link the China-conditional channel to institutional quality and financial depth, and the WTI-conditional channel to real activity. In out-of-sample portfolio tests, the WTI-conditional signal improves risk-adjusted performance relative to equally weighted and mean-variance benchmarks, while the China-conditional signal does not. Tail-based measurement thus sharpens identification of contagion paths and yields information that is economically relevant for risk management in interconnected emerging markets.

We examine the effects of issuing green bond on green premium and green signal transmission by matching green bonds with ordinary bonds. We find that the credit spread of green bonds is significantly lower than that of ordinary bonds, especially for those green bonds with lower information disclosure complexity. Besides, issuing green bonds cannot receive a positive response from the stock market, but can significantly reduce issuer’s loan costs and provide more financial subsidies for high polluting issuers. Furthermore, by obtaining discounted loans and financial subsidies, issuing green bonds can increase issuer’s R&D intensity and reduce their carbon emissions. These findings indicate that issuing green bonds can reduce financing costs and convey green signals to market stakeholders with less investment experience.

We conducted a nationwide field experiment with 4,800+ Chinese-listed companies, randomly raising ESG concerns to their management teams via high-visibility and high-stakes online platforms. Tracking the full impact-generating process, we find that companies respond to our concerns by providing high-quality answers, publishing ESG reports, and making commitments to investors. Over time, Environmental (E) inquiries boost stock valuations, while Governance (G) concerns prompt skepticism. Productive and opaque firms are more likely to respond, consistent with a signaling model where costly ESG actions signal firm quality under information asymmetry. Overall, ESG actions are likely driven by profit-oriented signaling rather than values-based motives.

In this paper, we present a rational expectation equilibrium model in which fundamental and ESG traders hold heterogeneous valuations towards the risky asset. Trading occurs based on private information and price signal which is determined by a weighted combination of these diverse valuations. Our findings indicate that higher level of ESG rating disagreement increases ESG information uncertainty, thereby reducing trading intensity among ESG traders and attenuating the price informativeness about ESG. We further discover that allowing fundamental traders access to ESG information increases the coordination possibilities in the financial market, leading to multiple equilibria exhibiting characteristics of strategic substitutability and complementarity. Additionally, through measuring the ESG rating disparities among four prominent agencies in China, we deduce that ESG rating disagreement negatively impacts price informativeness by decreasing stock illiquidity.

Using a comprehensive dataset for Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2021, we find that online media is negatively associated with cash dividend level, and the proportion of positive news has a negative moderating effect on this relationship. Our results support the "information intermediary" effect and exclude the "external governance" and "market pressure" effects. We further propose that online media weakens the positive relationship between cash dividends and past earnings (rather than the future), indicating that cash dividends contain signals of improvement in past earnings and are replaced by online news. We also find that only firms with more positive news pay dividends that have signaling effects, and there is a synergistic effect between positive news and dividend signal. Additional results show that the effect of online media on dividend policy is more pronounced than traditional media, which has almost no influence. Our main conclusions remain valid after addressing potential endogeneity issues and conducting various robustness tests.

We study how politicians' activities affect the stock market and firm performance. Using hand-collected data on China's national leaders' corporate visits, we investigate the industry-wide implications of these visits. We find that over the six days surrounding a visit, an average industry peer's value increases by 2\% of its total assets. This result reflects investors' favourable interpretation of leaders' visits as a signal of more government support for the entire industry. However, the industry peer's profitability plummets by more than 15\% in the next three years. Further analysis reveals that after the visits, industry peers increase their investments, presumably in anticipation of additional government subsidies and credits. However, these resources are insufficient, and the profitability of these firms suffers. Our findings suggest that national leaders' visits do not help boost the targeted industries, and firms should carefully interpret the politicians' activities.

The discussion on the innovative effects of intellectual property pledge financing is a mainstream trend. In this context, this study has improved the existing research from several aspects, such as broadening the dimensions of innovation, adding dynamic analysis, refining multidimensional mediation mechanisms, and employing unique samples. Ultimately, we come to the following conclusions: (1) Intellectual property pledge financing suppresses enterprise innovation, especially innovation quality, but this pattern will be broken by raising the threshold of innovation conditions. The reason is that strict innovation conditions can lead to a poor innovation foundation for enterprises, which are rarely affected by the fluctuation of funds obtained from intellectual property pledge financing. (2) Intellectual property pledge financing has a non-linear effect on firm innovation, characterized by an increase followed by a decrease, suggesting that intellectual property pledge financing in current China can only provide a temporary stimulus for firm innovation. (3) The relationship between intellectual property pledge financing and enterprise innovation is strongly moderated by the ownership, type, and size of the enterprise, with the inhibitory effect of intellectual property pledge financing on enterprise innovation occurring mainly in state-owned enterprises, high-tech enterprises, and small enterprises, while its positive effects are more pronounced in private enterprises, non-high-tech enterprises, and medium-sized enterprises. (4) Financing constraints, internal incentives, external supervision, and signaling mechanisms are indeed key pathways through which intellectual property pledge financing affects firm innovation, especially when we analyse these mechanisms using dynamic models.