This paper studies the trading behavior of investors facing a large number of firm-initiated stock trading suspension events during the Chinese stock market crisis in July of 2015. Using account-level trading data from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, we find that investors with a higher fraction of holding value in suspension sell less (or purchase more) of non-suspended stocks. Consequently, non-suspended stocks whose shareholders having high average account- level suspension fraction experience a relative price appreciation, which subsequently reverses. These evidences indicate that trading suspension can calm down investors and therefore helps to stabilize the volatile market in crisis time.

Abstract: Traditional research about the passive investors and index were mainly focus on the tracking error and the performance of mutual funds. However, they ignored that, deceptive by name, the passive investors, such as index-tracking funds and ETFs, may have an active impact on the value of the company through large-scale transactions of these passive investors. Focused on the Chinese stock market, this paper investigates whether specific passive investors, the funds and ETFs that track MSCI China index, will actively influence the market valuation after MSCI Index Rebalance. When the passive shareholders, which are always the mutual funds, exceeds a threshold, I find that firms added to the index will have a significant positive return, about X%, to the index itself. Also, I find the firms eliminated out to the index have a significant negative return, about X%, to the index itself. One potential interpretation of these results is that index-rebalancing will lead the index-trackers to buy those stocks added to the index, and these transactions represent a large buy power that will lead the demanding of those stocks to exceed the selling power and this dynamic of trading plus the following transactions of other investors eventually cause a premium and positive return. The firm size will also have an impact on stock performance when the index get rebalanced, partially in that the weight of the index is calculated according to the market value, a calculate method that leads to the higher weight of large companies. If large companies are added to or removed from the index, the trading volume will be larger, causing more transactions dynamic on those stocks.

This paper studies the trading behavior of investors facing a large number of firm-initiated stock trading suspension events during the Chinese stock market crisis in July of 2015. Using account-level trading data from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, we find that investors with a higher fraction of holding value in suspension sell less (or purchase more) of non-suspended stocks. Consequently, non-suspended stocks whose shareholders having high average account level suspension fraction experience a relative price appreciation, which subsequently reverses. These evidences indicate that trading suspension can calm down investors and therefore helps to stabilize the volatile market in crisis time.

Using comprehensive account-level data from 2016 to 2019, we examine retail investor trading behavior in the Chinese stock market. We separate millions of retail investors into five groups by their account sizes and document strong heterogeneity in their trading dynamics and performance. Retail investors with smaller account sizes cannot predict future price movements correctly, in the sense that they buy future losers and sell future winners. These investors fail to process public news and display behavioral biases such as overconfidence and gambling preferences. In sharp contrast, retail investors with larger account balances predict future returns correctly, incorporate public news in their trading, and gain more in stocks which are more attractive to investors with behavioral biases. For liquidity provision, the smaller retail investors follow daily momentum strategies, demanding immediate liquidity, while they become contrarian over weekly horizons, and they contribute positively towards firm-level liquidity. On the contrary, larger retail investors ae contrarian at daily horizons, providing immediate liquidity, but their potentially informed trades demand liquidity over longer terms.

This paper examines whether there is evidence of spillovers of volatility from the Chinese stock market to its neighbours and trading partners, including Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan and USA. China's increasing integration into the global market may have important consequences for investors in related markets. In order to capture these potential eects, we explore these issues using an Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) return equation. A univariate GARCH model is then adopted to test for the persistence of volatility in stock market returns, as represented by stock market indices. Finally, univariate GARCH, multivariate VARMA-GARCH, and multivariate VARMA-AGARCH models are used to test for constant conditional correlations and volatility spillover eects across these markets. Each model is used to calculate the conditional volatility between both the Shenzhen and Shanghai Chinese markets and several other markets around the Pacic Basin Area, including Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan and Singapore, during four distinct periods, beginning 27 August 1991 and ending 17 November 2010. The empirical results show some evidence of volatility spillovers across these markets in the pre-GFC periods, but there is little evidence of spillover eects from China to related markets during the GFC. This is presumably because the GFC was initially a US phenomenon, before spreading to developed markets around the globe, so that it was not a Chinese phenomenon.

Are the returns of Chinese American Depositary Receipts (ADR) more affected by the U.S. stock market or their underlying home market? Since there is non-synchronous trading between U.S. and the Chinese stock markets, we decompose the Chinese ADR daily returns into day and night returns to investigate the different market factors in Chinese ADR pricing. This paper also attempts to separate "homeless" ADRs from home-based ADRs to see if they are affected differently by market factors. We include a sample of 76 Chinese ADRs with the daily data from January 2000 to July 2010. Through regression and Vector Autoregressive analyses, we find that the U.S. market dominates the day returns of Chinese ADRs. We also find the Hong Kong market factor dominates the ADR night returns over the mainland China market for the whole sample. These results are particularly strong for “homeless” ADRs.

Given that the impact of the world economy on the China economy and its stock market may have increased substantially in the last few decades, we examine whether US economic variables can predict the Chinese stock market. We find that although before China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the end of 2001, the US economic variables generally do not show significant predictive power on the Chinese stock market, they do provide significant predictive power after 2001. Moreover, we show that the US economic variables can be used in conjunction with China economic variables to achieve better return forecasts for the Chinese stock market, which turn out to be economically important from an investment perspective.

This paper assesses the impact of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) on the stock market of China. Our results indicate that the Chinese stock market reacts rapidly to the SARS epidemic. We provide strong empirical evidence that the epidemic has an immediate impact on the pharmaceutical and tourism industries. In particular, pharmaceutical companies are benefited from the outbreak of SARS, while the tourism sector is adversely affected. Our results imply the existence of a profitable trading rule during an epidemic.

What are the effects of policy reversals which were initiated by the US bureaucracy in response to the 2008 global financial crisis? Answering this question is challenging because US capital markets are relatively mature and policy reversals are far and in between in recent years. Specifically, the challenges include the one-time nature of these US policy reversals, the confounding effects of many programs targeting interrelated segments of the capital markets at the same time as well as possible endogeneity issues. China, on the other hand, offers a natural experiment to study the effects of policy reversals. In the last three decades, the Chinese government has initiated many policy changes to liberalize the capital markets and some of these have been reversed several times. Using hand-collected data of policy reversals targeting the Chinese stock markets from 1994 through 2009, we are able to address the first two challenges. To resolve any endogeneity issue, we focus on the impact of such policy reversals (targeted at the Chinese stock markets) on the Chinese repo markets, which trade market-driven interest rates. We find that the Chinese policy reversals are indeed effective in reducing the term spread, the volatility of the interest rate, and the volatility of the term spread. Our results suggest that the policy risk is systematically priced in financial securities, implying that policy makers can rely on financial market indicators to objectively evaluate their policy decisions.

What are the effects of policy reversals which were initiated by the US bureaucracy in response to the 2008 global financial crisis? Answering this question is challenging because US capital markets are relatively mature and policy reversals are far and in between in recent years. Specifically, the challenges include the one-time nature of these US policy reversals, the confounding effects of many programs targeting interrelated segments of the capital markets at the same time as well as possible endogeneity issues. China, on the other hand, offers a natural experiment to study the effects of policy reversals. In the last three decades, the Chinese government has initiated many policy changes to liberalize the capital markets and some of these have been reversed several times. Using hand-collected data of policy reversals targeting the Chinese stock markets from 1994 through 2009, we are able to address the first two challenges. To resolve any endogeneity issue, we focus on the impact of such policy reversals (targeted at the Chinese stock markets) on the Chinese repo markets, which trade market-driven interest rates. We find that the Chinese policy reversals are indeed effective in reducing the term spread, the volatility of the interest rate, and the volatility of the term spread. Our results suggest that the policy risk is systematically priced in financial securities, implying that policy makers can rely on financial market indicators to objectively evaluate their policy decisions.