While it is generally believed that pressure from peers induces employees to improve their efficiency and performance, little is known about whether employees' improved performance is detrimental to the interests of others. Based on a granular dataset at the individual-month level of investment advisors' and customers’ accounts from a large retail bank in China, we find that peer pressure, as measured by the performance of advisors relative to their colleagues in the previous month, can induce the advisors to sell more financial products, but can also exacerbate misselling, resulting in a significant increase in sales of poor-quality financial products ("high-risk-low-return" products). The causal link is identified with an exogenous change of peer size. The peer pressure effects are pronounced among poor performance advisors, and client complaints play a monitoring role in curbing misselling. By exploring the correspondence between advisors and clients, we find that misselling occurs mainly between female advisors and male clients, and between advisors who lack work experience and clients who lack investment experience.

We examine the impact of political connections on the investment decisions of Chinese mutual funds. We identify a direct link between mutual funds’ political connections and stocks held from the same political network using hand-collected information on the professional backgrounds of Chinese mutual fund managers and fund management company (FMC) shareholders. While mutual funds tend to allocate more investments to stocks based on their political connections, this effect alleviates somewhat after the 2012 anti-corruption campaign. Our findings suggest that anti-corruption campaigns can help to reduce the political effects of government-related agencies on fund holdings and contribute to better market fairness.

We investigate whether and how environmentally inclined politicians (EIPs), i.e., politicians with prior environment-related work experience, affect local environmental performance in China. We find that firms located in cities with EIPs have lower levels of sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions. The effect is attenuated when the politician is in his/her second term and among firms that are economically important. Firms in cities with EIPs commit fewer environmental violations, receive more green subsidies from the local government, and choose to establish new polluting subsidiaries in cities without EIPs. We also find that the economic performance of cities governed by EIPs is not statistically different from that of cities governed by non-EIPs. Furthermore, the promotion likelihood of EIPs is negatively related to local emission levels. The findings overall suggest that local officials strategically leverage their expertise in environment protection to allocate more effort on environmental causes.

Using both the onset of the US-China trade war in 2018 and the most recent Russia-Ukraine conflict and associated trade tensions, we show that government-linked firms increase their importing activity by roughly 33% (t=4.01) following the shock, while non-government linked firms trading to the same countries do the opposite, decreasing activity. These increases appear targeted, in that we see no increase for government-linked supplier firms generally to other countries (even countries in the same regions) at the same time, nor of these same firms in these regions at other times of no tension. In terms of mechanism, government supplier-linked firms are nearly twice as likely to receive tariff exemptions as equivalent firms doing trade in the region who are not also government suppliers. More broadly, these effects are increasing in level of government connection. For example, firms that are geographically closer to the agencies to which they supply increase their imports more acutely. Using micro-level data, we find that government supplying firms that recruit more employees with past government work experience also increase their importing activity more – particularly when the past employee worked in a contracting role. Lastly, we find evidence that this results in sizable accrued benefits in terms of firm-level profitability, market share gains, and outsized stock returns.

We ask whether CFO's managerial skills affect corporate tax avoidance using a sample of Chinese-listed companies. To that end, we develop a CFO managerial skills index based on four dimensions of the CFO's work experience: (1) the number of current positions a CFO holds, (2) the number of functional departments a CFO has worked in during his career, (3) the number of firms he has worked for, and (4) whether the CFO has political connections. We find that CFOs with high managerial skills are more likely to engage in aggressive tax avoidance. This effect is weakened when CFOs are in their first year of employment, approaching retirement, and are too busy. Moreover, we find that CFOs with general management skills are more likely to adjust corporate tax avoidance to levels similar to their peers.