首先，本文基于GHM模型探究交易环境的积极变化对担保机构事前投资效率的影响，依托担保有效性的微观分析视角，检验地方政府性债务管理改革是否提升了金融市场的运行效率。其次，本文利用2010-2018年3728只城投债样本进行实证检验，得到以下结论：第一，地方政府性债务管理改革减弱了政府隐性担保与行政干预，提升了担保机构增信的有效性。第二，“43号文”的颁布对高信用平台公司发行城投债的担保增信有效性的提升作用更为显著。第三，在财政压力较小的地区，地方政府性债务管理改革对担保机构增信有效性的提升作用较好。最后，本文提出应提升政策叠加效应，增加专业担保机构在城投领域的担保供给量等政策建议。

每个国家有能力创业并做大做强成为企业家的都是极少数人，企业家是宝贵的国家战略资源；他们发展需要资金，到资本市场融资，是国家人民利益所在，理所当然要支持。但也要看到，社会主义初级阶段，不少企业家的社会责任道德水准同普通群众没有太大不同，上市为了圈钱套也是有的。我国14亿人口，无风险识别能力群体庞大，股市散户主导；严监管，失去活跃度，企业难融资；放松监管，垃圾概念漫天飞。过去现在和将来很长时间内，二级市场都很难实现总体上的等价交换。过去上市的大多是国企，国有股减持还能充实社保，都是公共利益；存量股份二级市场简单全流通说得过去。而今来上市的是清一色的民营企业，越垃圾越贵越减持越涨，股市集腋成裘让极少数人一夜暴富，于情于理都说不通。眼下原始股上市流通的注册制已经行程近半，相关配套监管如不尽快跟上，近2亿个家庭、8亿人口的财富难免被极少数海内外机构和私人老板们反复收割，批量制造富翁大量制造新生贫困人口，整个国家社会阶层有形成目前香港倒金字塔型社会的危险：极少数人富可敌国，绝大多数人却贫穷潦倒，其后果党国家和人民无法承受。必须站在国家人民利益立场，寻求最大公约数。我国是社会主义国家，资本市场改革要以国体政体为中心，要以等价交换和公平交易为条件，要以共同富裕为目标；证券市场既要大力支持企业家融资，发展经济，又要抑制其一夜暴富的利益冲动。建议证券市场注册制下辅以如下配套政策：非公有制企业上市增加骨干员工持股强制性条款，上市公司存量股份改大宗交易平台封闭流通，以强制信托责任大力发展负责任的爱国机构投资者，将新股上市审批权归还给人民，革新红利税，改造监管队伍，强化一定温度下的严监管，以持续现金分红能力作为退市主要依据。

为了实现A股长期稳健发展的夙愿，使之成为长期资金可以依托的健康市场，我们对中美股市进行了多指数（中美四个指数）、多收益（差价收益和全收益）、多算法（自然年份、年度长周期和交易日长周期）、多周期（1-20年）的“四多”统计与分析。数据显示，A股的年度和长周期收益率波动性都很大，尤其是最高收益率超过美股。美股在长达百年的历程中虽经世界风云变幻，相对于A股，其实没有特别高的波动记录，但却有多年连续牛市的记录，尤其是1980年代以来的40年间已经出现了三次“准十年牛市”。从统计分布来看，美股指数呈现比较良性的“负偏态”，A股则几乎与此相反。其实，自沪深交易所成立以来，至今A股的累计涨幅是高于美股的，所以A股有条件走得比美股“更美”。本文建议从宏观、微观两个层面消除股市投机性暴涨、防止透支中国经济基本面、使A股积累内生的正常涨跌基因。

本文基于城投债和地方债的发行和交易数据构建了各省地方债务风险综合指标，发 现各省风险有共同的趋势，存在风险联动现象。为了研究我国地方政府债务省际风 险传导机制，本文运用含外生变量的结构化向量自回归模型(SVAR)来识别风险传 导途径和重点风险地区。实证发现本文设定的风险关联关系矩阵是地方债务风险传 导的重要途径，可以很好的解释地方债务风险的共同趋势。进一步地，我们通过广 义预测误差方差分解衡量了各省的风险传导性，并在此基础上通过脉冲响应分析发 现吉林省风险正向冲击对其他省份有持续显著的正向影响。此外，本文还从地方财 政收入构成角度考察了影响地方债务风险传导性的主要因素。本文的研究为防控和 治理地方债务风险具有重要价值。

Using a large sample of over 5,000 start-ups across various industries and 524 media outlets in China between 2000 and 2016, we examine the effects of media coverage of start-ups on VC investment decisions and performance. To the best of our knowledge, for the first time in the finance literature, we have discovered that media coverage of start-ups significantly affects VC investment decisions and exit performance. Specifically, such coverage, especially positive coverage, significantly increases the probability and amount of VC investments in start-ups. It also significantly improves the exit performance of VC investments. The significant effects of media coverage of start-ups on VC investments are driven by market-oriented instead of state-controlled media. We further find that VC investments in a focal start-up are significantly influenced by the average media coverage of other start-ups in the same industry or the same city. Our results are robust to a battery of robustness tests. Our research contributes to the behavioral finance literature by showing that an increasingly prominent type of institutional investors, venture capitalists, just like individual investors, are also subject to limited attention. Our research also extends the research by You, Zhang and Zhang (2018) by revealing the heterogeneous effects of market-oriented and state-controlled media on VC investments. Last but not the least, we are the first to discover that peer start-ups’ media coverage matters for VC investments in the focal firms, thereby pushing the frontier of research on the roles of media in finance.

This paper examines the effects of Chinese venture capital (VC)’s final exit on their portfolio companies. We find that, compared to other early investors, VCs achieve significantly higher returns from their exit of the portfolio companies. We use the presence of VC directors and the introduction of high-speed rail to address identification concerns. Announcements manipulation and earnings management are plausible channels through which VCs achieve higher returns when they exit from the companies. VCs’ exit negatively influences their portfolio companies’ long-term performance. Our paper sheds new light on the value creation role played by VCs and discovers a previously ignored adverse effect of VCs – the exploitation of their portfolio companies.

本文以2003-2016年我国A股上市公司的异地并购事件为研究对象，考察了异地风投在企业异地并购中的咨询功能。研究发现，当主并公司拥有来自目标公司所在地的异地风投股东时，企业异地并购绩效更好，且这种作用在民营企业中更明显；当异地风投为国有背景、经验更为丰富、持股比例较低、独立风投时，咨询作用更明显。进一步研究发现，信息优势机制与社会网络机制是异地风投发挥咨询功能的重要潜在机制。同时，异地风投的咨询作用还会影响主并公司的并购决策，表现在具有异地风投背景的企业进行异地并购的可能性更低、聘请财务顾问与律师顾问的可能性更高、进行重大交易事件的可能性更高、使用股票支付的可能性越高，说明风险投资在发挥咨询作用时会更加谨慎，更倾向于参与对企业发展产生重大影响的并购活动，有利于降低并购过程中目标公司与主并公司之间的信息不对称程度，提升目标公司对主并公司价值的认可程度。本文揭示了异地风投利用其信息优势和社会网络资源帮助主并公司突破异地并购障碍的咨询功能，首次为风险投资的咨询功能提供了直接的实证证据支持，同时说明了异地风投在我国资本要素市场分割的情形下能够作为一种替代性的制度安排。

本文基于权力制约与冲突的视角，探究CEO和董事长的权力差距对公司绩效波 动的影响。我们采用中国上市公司任职网络中CEO和董事长的“接近中心度”来衡量他们各自的权力，发现公司绩效波动与CEO和董事长之间的权力差距呈U型关系。首先，当CEO或董事长中一方的权力过大时，两者之间因缺乏有效的制约会导致公司绩效出现大的波动；其次，当CEO和董事长的权力充分接近时，双方既有可能因有效制约而提升公司绩效，也有可能会由于高层内斗而损害公司绩效。本文进一步用CEO和董事长的离任率及公司违规行为验证了权力制约与冲突的逻辑机制。

Audits are a standard mechanism for reducing corruption in government investments. The quality of audits themselves, however, may be affected by relationships between auditor and target. We study whether provincial chief auditors in China show greater leniency in evaluating prefecture governments in their hometowns. In city-fixed-effect specifications – in which the role of shared background is identified from auditor turnover – we show that hometown auditors find 38 percent less in questionable monies. This hometown effect is similar throughout the auditor’s tenure, and is diminished for audits ordered by the provincial Organizations Department as a result of the departure of top city officials. We argue that our findings are most readily explained by leniency toward local officials rather than an endogenous response to concerns of better enforcement by hometown auditors. We complement these city-level findings with firm-level analyses of earnings manipulation by state-owned enterprises via real activity manipulation (a standard measure from the accounting literature), which we show is higher under hometown auditors.

We use China's recent anti-corruption campaign as a natural experiment to examine the (market expected) equilibrium consequences of (anti-)corruption. We argue that the announcement of inspections of provincial governments by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) on May 17, 2013 represents a significant departure of past norms of anti-corruption campaigns, and thus serves a rare empirical opportunity to examine the equilibrium effects of anti-corruption campaigns for firms. We first present a conceptual framework to illustrate the channels through which anti-corruption actions can influence firms. Using an event study approach and May 17, 2013 as the event date, we find that, overall, the stock market responded positively to the announcement of strong anti-corruption actions. The announcement returns are significantly lower for luxury-goods producers, and SOES, large firms, or politically connected firms earn lower returns than private, small, or non-connected firms. We also find that existing local institutions play a crucial role in determining the announcement returns across firms. Moreover, a long-term difference-in-differences analysis shows that higher returns during the event window are associated with more subsequent entries of new firms and faster expansions of existing firms. Finally, we also provide direct evidence consistent with the endogenous grits effect.