本文以2003—2010年沪深两市家族上市公司样本为研究对象，实证研究了家族控制权特征与银行信贷合约之间的关系，以检验家族控制权寻租效应和效率效应的适应性情景，结果发现，家族通过金字塔结构和超额董事席位两种控制权增强机制对上市公司的超额控制程度越高，其获得银行信用借款的比例越低，获得担保借款比例越高。家族对企业的超额控制权传递着公司未来预期和信息风险，增加了银行面临的代理成本，属于寻租观而非效率观。进一步研究发现，家族控制程度与银行信用借款之间的负相关性在具有政治关联、较高公司声誉和公司透明度的企业中会降低。地区法律制度水平会降低家族超额控制引发的代理成本和信贷违约风险。银行业腐败会降低银行对借款企业超额控制所引发的信贷风险的评估能力。此外家族控制权结构影响企业信用借款的机制是通过提高企业债务违约风险来实现，家族对企业超额控制程度越高，企业债务违约概率越高。

This paper surveys how and why the share spilt reform enhance the corporate governance using agency cost as proxy from the perspective of stockholders’ conflict and liquidity increase in the process of share spilt reform respectively. We find that share spilt reform brings significant governance improvement. Besides, we use some governance effect and liquidity theory proposed by Edmans et al. (2011) to testify by which means the share split reform enhance the corporate governance. What is more, we find that the corporations with great difficulty, which represented for severe shareholders’ conflict, in carrying forward the reform tend to have severe governance problems while it was this kind of corporation that benefited most from the reform and formed the main driving force of the realization of the goal of reform. It has some implication on China’s current reform; that is, only when toughest problems have been overcome will the goal of reform be achieved.

The deviation of control right and cash flow right is a common problem of corporate governance in East Asian companies.With Taiwan's listed companies as samples, this paper discusses whether the degree of deviation of control right and cash flow right will affect the company’s earnings distribution policy. The results reveal that, regardless of using stock right or the number of directors to measure the control right, companies of higher degree of deviation of control right and cash flow right have higher proportions of employee bonuses against the shareholder dividends, In this case, the company is more biased in the care of the employees at the expense of the minority shareholders. The company is especially likely to exploit the minority shareholders by controlling the board of directors and paying cash dividends to employees. As investors believe that the controlling shareholders of companies with high degree deviation of control right and cash flow right, and high proportion of employee bonuses are intended to exploit the minority shareholders, such companies have significantly lower declared earnings distribution remuneration compared with companies with low degree of deviation and low employee bonuses.

This study investigates the impact of ultimate government ownership or control on the cost of debt of Chinese listed corporations. We first examine the relative level of cost of debt of corporations under government control compared to corporations under individual or family control. We then explore circumstances under which government control is likely to reduce a corporation’s cost of financing. Our results suggest that the benefits of government control are conditional on firm-specific financial circumstances and internal- and external-corporate governance environment. We find that, on average, government controlled corporations have lower cost of debt but the effect is not homogeneous. Government controlled corporations have lower cost of debt when they are highly financially constrained and have higher risk of being expropriated by controlling shareholders and in provinces where the local government is less effective, but not otherwise.

This study examines relation between financial development and the cost of equity capital and finds the following main results: (1) stock market development in general reduces cost of equity, consistent with its role in liquidity provision, information asymmetry reduction, and risk diversification helping to reduce systemic risk; (2) banking development only weakly decreases the cost of equity, consistent with the pervasive state-ownership in large banks constraining their efficiency. Further analysis reveals that the relation between stock market development and cost of equity is more pronounced in large firms and in firms with lower growth potentials, suggesting that stock market development fails to support small and/or growth firms. Moreover, the relation is more pronounced in region with low accounting quality, weak law enforcement, or lower market integration, and in period prior to split share structure reform. The evidence suggests that stock market developments and other institutional arrangements substitute each other in reducing cost of equity. This study contributes to literatures on financial development and cost of equity, and also holds immediate policy implications.

This study examines the effects of acquirer characteristics, information asymmetry on method of payment of Chinese acquirers based on a sample of 1370 mergers and acquisitions that occur between 1998 -2008. Using both Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) and Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (CTAR) approaches, we find that Chinese acquirers experience pre-acquisition abnormal returns ranging from 14.29%-121% over the period 12-36 months prior to the acquisition relative to 3 different portfolio benchmarks. In the pre-bid period, acquisitions financed by shares outperform acquisitions financed by cash. However, in the post-acquisition period, we document no significant difference between cash- and equity-financed acquisitions. We document a number of factors that determine the method of payment by Chinese acquirers: acquirer market value, Tobin’s Q, state ownership and leverage have significant effects on the method of payment.

本文基于Jensen&Murphy(1990)论文的计量思想，采用2009年到2012年的上市公司样本数据观察高管薪酬与公司绩效之间的相关性，发现尽管上市公司高管薪酬与公司绩效之间是正相关的而且在统计上也是显著的，但是这种相关性显然是比较小的。本文认为目前中国上市公司高管的薪酬结构并不合理，尽管高管薪酬的决定因素与公司绩效相关，好的公司绩效对应较高的高管薪酬，但薪酬中来自于绩效的激励性部分太小因而很难起到激励的作用，而决定上市公司高管薪酬的主要因素是公司规模和所处行业。

提 要：简要分析了传统商品货币五大职能在法币金融体系中的演化、突出强调了法币征税与分配新职能、简介了几种代表性货币锚理论、提出基于平均劳动生产率货币锚理论的超主权货币新金融体系建设设想、分析了法币悖论原因及其法币多样化管理策略、同时强调了用好法币的几个基本条件。

In the developing Chinese capital market which dominated by individual investors and potentially suffer from more behavioral biases, we simultaneously examine the trading and monitoring role of mutual funds (as the largest institutional investor in China) in corporate acquisition activities where there are potentials for a wide disparity of interest between institutional investors and controlling shareholders. We find the level of holding by all mutual funds is not a superiors indicator of deal quality, there are some evidence that the collective holdings by the largest fund management companies positively relate to the deal quality and they potentially play the monitoring role in M&A event. Our paper contributes to the existing literature that “transient investors” can also gain from monitoring in the market where institutional investors has less dominant position.

本文以2008年全球金融危机为研究背景，以中国上市公司为研究样本，从公司层面研究企业微观特征对于金融危机冲击的影响，并进一步从股票回报率和财务业绩两方面考察货币政策和财政政策是否起到了预期的效果。我们发现：就金融危机冲击而言，行业特征、公司偿债能力，尤其是短期偿债能力，对于公司的表现有显著的影响，而且危机前扩张速度快、估值水平高的公司在金融危机冲击中表现更加脆弱。与已有的针对其它国家研究结论的不同，我们并没有发现公司治理对公司在危机中的表现有显著影响的证据。就政策效果而言，货币政策并没有起到纾缓公司流动性困难和财务困境的作用；四万亿财政政策仅在短期内对其重点支持行业的公司起到了刺激作用，但就长期而言也没有起到预期的效果。