This study investigates how the interaction of political accountability and local officials’ career incentives shapes the market for Municipal Corporate Bonds (MCBs) in China, taking the 2017 local government debt personal responsibility rule as a quasinatural experiment. We develop a stylized incomplete-information bargaining model to analyze how the rule reshapes the bargaining equilibrium by rendering officials’ observable characteristics credible signals of bailout incentives. Using a dataset of prefecture-level MCBs from 2008 to 2020, we empirically test the model’s predictions and focus on separating officials’ incentive effects from their inherent ability. Our core findings show that post-announcement of the rule, each additional year of a local party secretary’s remaining time to retirement, a proxy for bailout incentives, reduces MCB spreads by approximately 2.5 basis points and increases issuance volume by about 2.0%. These effects are significantly amplified in fiscally stressed cities. Notably, under the 2017 rule, cities led by party secretaries with stronger bailout incentives can expand MCB issuance, which is contrary to the rule’s original intent to rein in local borrowing.

A central premise of mandatory disclosure regulation is that greater transparency reduces information asymmetry and lowers borrowing costs. We challenge this premise by examining industry-level operational disclosure - a regulatory form that reveals horizontally comparable information across peer firms rather than refining individual firm fundamentals. Exploiting the staggered introduction of mandatory industry-specific disclosure guidelines by Chinese stock exchanges between 2013 and 2019, we find that enhanced industry disclosure significantly widens bond credit spreads by approximately 54 basis points - the opposite of what standard disclosure theory predicts. This counterintuitive effect is more pronounced in non-homogeneous industries, among smaller firms, and for bonds restricted to institutional investors. Mechanism tests confirm two opposing channels: disclosure reduces information asymmetry while simultaneously intensifying product market competition by exposing strategically sensitive operational metrics. Our evidence challenges the one-size-fits-all approach to disclosure regulation and highlights that the competitive implications of disclosed information - not merely its quantity - shape credit risk pricing.

We propose a clustering-based dimensionality reduction approach to minimum variance portfolio optimization. Rather than constructing the global minimum variance (GMV) portfolio over the full stock universe, which is subject to severe estimation error due to high-dimensionality, we apply Ward’s hierarchical clustering to partition stocks into groups of similarly behaving assets, select one representative per cluster, and optimize on the resulting low-dimensional sub-universe. We show theoretically that clustering preserves the factor structure and yields a better-conditioned covariance matrix than random selection. Empirically, on the Chinese A-share market, the proposed strategies substantially outperform the full-universe benchmark, with gains robust to transaction costs.

We examine the unintended consequences of bankruptcy court establishment on corporate behavior. Using data on Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2019 and a staggered difference-in-differences model, we find that the establishment of bankruptcy courts increases accrual earnings management by about 17% among high bankruptcy risk firms relative to low-risk firms. While bankruptcy courts improve bankruptcy efficiency and justice, reduce local government intervention, and accelerate the exit of zombie firms, they also induce greater earnings management. This effect is driven mainly by survival pressure and managerial reputation concerns, rather than by efforts to correct external evaluations. Consistent with this interpretation, we do not observe improvements in long-term operations, governance, performance, or real earnings management. Overall, this paper enriches the literature on earnings management from the perspective of judicial governance and on the economic consequences of creditor-friendly bankruptcy institutions.

每日指标拆解 第1期｜社融-M2剪刀差 + 居民长期贷款：钱到底流到实体了吗？

The global AI inference market—reaching approximately $90–100 billion annually and growing at 18% CAGR—operates without organized exchange infrastructure. We document three market failures: resource misallocation (80% of China’s newly built compute capacity sits idle), price opacity (100-fold price dispersion across providers of equivalent quality), and unhedged risk exposure (85% of enterprises miss AI cost forecasts by more than 10%). Following the market design tradition of Roth [2002] and Budish et al. [2015], we propose the AI Service Right (ASR) as a transferable property right on AI compute and the AI Service Unit (ASU) as a quality-adjusted, cross-platform unit of account grounded in hedonic price theory [Rosen, 1974]. The ASU is modality-neutral: billing prices across text, image, video, and speech modalities are unified via eq-token conversion factors (κimg ≈ 2,667 eq-tokens per image; κvid ≈ 2,667 per second of video; κspc ≈ 7 per second of audio), and modality-appropriate benchmark sets (MMLU/HumanEval for language; FID/CLIP Score for image; FVD/CLIPSIM for video; MMBench for multimodal) supply the quality in dex via PCA. We design a hybrid secondary market architecture synthesizing mechanisms from four orthogonal market traditions: foreign exchange markets (cross-platform exchange rates and PPP-analog arbitrage via the ASU); equity markets (Central Limit Order Book, market making, clearing); electricity markets (Compute Locational Marginal Pricing for spatial scarcity signals); and decentralized finance (Automated Market Maker for long-tail liquidity). We establish nine formal propositions: bilateral trading is generically inefficient; Compute Locational Marginal Pricing decomposes nodal prices into system marginal cost, capacity congestion, and bandwidth premia; no-arbitrage equi librium holds with capital constraints (extending Shleifer and Vishny 1997); the ASR market Pareto-improves over bilateral trading; market prices are more in formative under ASR; the hybrid CLOB-AMM architecture weakly dominates either mechanism alone; platform adoption admits multiple equilibria with a coordination trap; financialization may improve or reduce price informativeness depending on speculator-hedger composition; and a hedonic micro-foundation justifies the ASU definition. Calibrated agent-based simulation (500 steps, 30 Monte Carlo runs) provides computational validation: the hybrid architecture reduces price dispersion by 90% relative to bilateral trading, and order-of-magnitude welfare estimates suggest enterprise procurement cost savings of 0.2–20% (net of ASR transaction costs; see Table 7) and potential TFP gains from compute reallocation of up to $29.9 billion annually. We propose a phased implementation roadmap from shadow ledger to full financialization, and we engage critically with the concern that financialization may not reduce intermediation costs [Philippon, 2015].

山江湖工程实施四十余年来，江西在生态制度创新方面积累了深厚土壤，但鄱阳湖湿地生态补偿仍面临"拨付滞后、标准与贡献脱钩、用途监管难"三大痛点。本文基于数字人民币2.0"账户体系+币串+智能合约"技术架构，设计鄱阳湖湿地碳汇"按效付费"智能合约方案。针对鄱阳湖碳汇显著的源汇动态转换与年际波动特征，提出"三年滚动平均+气候调整因子"的核算机制与"智能合约计算、人工确认释放"的半自动触发模式，以永修县40公顷湿地为最小可行试点（MVP），设定50元/吨CO₂当量的补偿单价与500吨/年的增量阈值，构建"碳汇监测—滚动核算—合约计算—人工确认—资金直达—用途管控"的闭环。本文明确央行"平台提供者+融资支持者"的边界，建立"央行建平台、银行做应用、地方配设备"的成本分担机制，确保补偿资金全额用于生态保护，并给出从MVP验证到全湖区推广的渐进路径。

Hyman Minsky (1919–1996), a prominent post-Keynesian economist, argued that capitalist financial systems are inherently unstable. During prolonged prosperity, firms and financial institutions increase leverage and adopt more fragile forms of financing, shifting from hedge to speculative and Ponzi finance. This gradual buildup of financial fragility can eventually trigger a sudden collapse of asset values—later termed a “Minsky moment.” After the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, Minsky’s ideas gained renewed attention, and current financial developments once again bring his insights to the forefront.

This study examines the impact of Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) on the stock price crash risk of Chinese commercial banks. In addition, it explores how Governance and Digital Transparency curtail the effect of EPU on stock price crash risk. Using a sample of 50 Chinese A-share-listed banks from 2012 to 2024, the study reveals that EPU significantly increased the banks’ stock price crash risk. The findings are robust to alternative measures of EPU and stock price crash risk. Further, governance and FinTech adoption mitigate the positive effect. The mitigating effect persists across high- and low-risk bank subsamples. In addition, we perform a battery of analyses to support our main findings. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications.

This paper examines the use of finance leases in China’s local government debt. Using a unique dataset of government finance lease transactions, we document that local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) rapidly adopted finance leases, with the outstanding amount growing from virtually nothing in 2013 to a cumulative total of 1.02 trillion RMB by 2018. Our difference-in-differences (DID) analysis reveals that the central government’s restrictive financial policies account for a substantial portion of this surge. Because these restrictive policies confined LGFVs’access to conventional borrowing channels, finance leases emerged as a key alternative, particularly through bank-affiliated leasing firms. While LGFVs' use of finance leases offers low-cost financing for local governments, the low quality of the underlying assets poses significant risks to the leasing firms.