国有股权对公司绩效的影响，不应简单以公司业绩水平高低评价，公司的风险特 征同样重要。本文就经济危机时期，国有股权与公司的风险缓冲能力进行实证检验，发现在 经济危机时期，相对于非国有公司，受到适度经济冲击的国有公司具有更大的风险缓冲能力。 这种作用主要是因为，相对于非国有公司，受到适度经济冲击的国有公司不仅没有承担沉重 的员工负担具有融资便利优势，而且具有融资便利优势，从而国有股权可以提高受到适度冲 击公司的风险缓冲能力。本文为进一步认识国有股权与公司绩效的关系提供了新的视角和证 据。

Numerous studies have focused on the theoretical and empirical aspects of corporate capital structure since the 1960s. As a new branch of capital structure, however, debt maturity structure has not yet received as much attention as the debt-equity choice. We use the existing theories of corporate debt maturity to investigate the potential determinants of debt maturity of the Chinese listed firms. In addition to the traditional estimation methods, the system-GMM technique is used to explicitly control for the endogeneity problem. We find that the size of the firm, asset maturity and liquidity have significant effects in extending the maturity of debt employed by Chinese companies. The amount of collateralized assets and growth opportunities also tend to be important. However, proxies for a firm’s quality and effective tax rate apparently report mixed or unexpected results. Debt market and equity market conditions are also examined in relation to corporate loan maturity. The system-GMM results show that market factors seem to influence debt maturity decisions. Finally, corporate equity ownership structure has also been found to have some impact on debt maturity mix.

This paper investigates pay dispersion and its effects on firm performance in China’s listed firms. Due to weak investor protection and an inefficient legal system, China is expected to have a lower level of corporate governance. In this weak institutional environment, we argue that awarding sufficient power and high pay to CEOs is helpful to increase firm performance. Using data from 2002 to 2007, we find that pay dispersion is related to tournament incentives and agency factors. Importantly, we find evidence that pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance which is consistent with our primary hypothesis. In addition, the relation is more positive when the firm is controlled by the state. Our results are robust to corrections for endogeneity between pay dispersion and firm performance and to several alternative measures of pay dispersion and firm performance.

Applying the principle of the bonding theory, this study examined the relationship between corporate governance practice and performance of Chinese firms that are listed in the major international stock exchanges, including NASDAQ, New York, Hong Kong, Singapore and London AIM markets, and further investigated whether the Chinese firms that adopted the corporate governance mechanisms of the stock exchanges where they are listed would outperform those of firms listed locally in the Chinese stock exchanges that operates in a weak enforcement mechanism environment. Hypotheses are tested using panel data analysis. The results suggest that the Chinese cross-listings exhibit bonding premium only in U.S. markets, while those non-cross-listed Chinese firms demonstrate better firm performance than those listed in London, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Further, the results reveal that for all the cross-listed Chinese firms, profitability rate and the leverage ratio play a positive role in improving the firms’ performance. The adoptions of Big Four auditing firms and international accounting standard as a must-to-do corporate governance mechanism regulated by the host stock exchange has less effects on firm’s performance. The study suggests that merely borrowing a corporate governance mechanism does not guarantee the improvement of corporate governance of a firm, and therefore to its firm performance; rather, a firm’s own background and country effects also matter.

本文基于La Porta等(1999)终极控制权理论，在非线性框架下研究终极控股股东控制权、现金流权、公司治理与掏空问题。研究结果表明，终极控股股东控制权水平与掏空行为有显著正向关系，且当控制人为政府时尤为明显，而现金流权无法抑制掏空行为；管理层薪酬的增加及政府干预的减少可以有效抑制掏空，而其他公司治理机制对掏空行为没有显著抑制作用。进一步考虑不同水平下控制权和现金流的影响，发现在绝对控制权水平下，控制权的掏空效应尤为明显；高现金流权可以有效抑制掏空，而低现金流权不具有抑制效应。本文的研究加深了对控股股东持股、掏空与公司治理的认识，对进一步完善公司治理机制，保护投资者利益有一定的指导意义。

本文以我国民营上市公司为样本，分析有政治联系的企业是否能够比无政治联系的企业获得更多的财政补贴。结果发现，有政治联系的民营企业确实能够获得更多的财政补贴；而且在制度环境越差的地区，政治联系的这种补贴获取效应越强。进一步的检验结果发现，有政治联系的民营企业获得的财政补贴与企业绩效和社会绩效负相关；而无政治联系的民营企业获得的财政补贴与企业绩效和社会绩效正相关。本文的研究结果支持民营企业建立政治联系的寻租假设，即民营企业通过建立政治联系来俘获掌握着财政补贴支配权的地方政府官员，进而得到更多的财政补贴收入；在制度约束弱的地区，这种寻租行为更加盛行。就地方政府的公共政策而言，本文的研究结果意味着，地方政府基于政治联系的财政补贴支出会导致整个社会稀缺资源配置的扭曲，降低社会的整体福利水平。

国有企业的预算约束是否趋于硬化，是衡量银行制度改革是否有效的重要标志之一。本文通过考察偿债能力很低或者亏损的国有上市公司从银行获得新增贷款的情况，研究了我国银行制度的变迁对国有企业的软预算约束问题的影响。本文发现，从总体上看，1999~2007年间仍然存在偿债能力很低或者亏损的国有企业反而从银行获得了更多新增贷款的现象，但是偿债能力很低或者亏损的国有企业从银行获得新增贷款的情况在此期间不断减少，尤其是在2003年后出现大幅下降。这表明，我国国有企业在银行融资中仍然存在软预算约束问题，但是我国政府对银行业的改革，尤其是2003年以来国有银行的股份制改革，对硬化国有企业的预算约束起到了显著的作用。本文的研究揭示出，解决国有企业的软预算约束问题不仅在于剥离国有企业的政策性负担，还在于深化银行业的改革。

本文试图通过提供经济转型国家公司治理改革路径选择的经验证据，以弥补现有文献主要关注强制性治理而忽视自主性治理的不足。采用2007年925家中国上市公司治理调查的86项指标构建的公司治理指数的研究表明，上市公司在满足合规基础上的自主性治理活动存在很大的差异；自主治理水平的提高与公司绩效显著正相关；而且公司绩效、公司规模和负债水平是影响公司自主治理活动的重要变量。

基于中小企业板上市公司2005 年～2007 年三年的面板数据，本文选用了中小板企业独立董 事制度的相关特征，采用linear 线性回归检验了公司治理中独立董事制度对公司业绩的影响。研究 结果表明：我国中小企业板块上市公司独立董事学历与公司业绩呈负相关，独立董事薪酬、出席董 事会次数和占公司董事会成员比例与公司业绩无显著相关性，有法律专业背景独立董事的公司业绩 比较好，在有技术和法律专业背景独立董事的公司独立董事年龄与公司业绩正相关，在有会计和经 济管理专业背景独立董事的公司独立董事年龄与公司业绩负相关。

本文的学术贡献是建立了企业治理结构选择的理论模型，比较了民主与集权两种治理 结构对于公司业绩的影响，并指出有关治理结构的选择问题依赖于公司在生命周期中所处的 阶段。在创业阶段集权的治理结构更有效率，但要求兼作经理人的创业者有充足的自有资金。 若资金不足，经理人将面临较高的融资成本，作为经理人控制权寻租行为和小股东控制权损 失的补偿；要求其商业能力要显著高于经理人市场的平均水平，即经理人“创业点子”的预期 回报率要高于市场平均水平。故经理人能力同自有资金在一定程度上可相互替代。本文最后 应用指数化期权定价方法给出了小股东控制权损失的定价公式，结果表明，经理人市场平均 商业能力提高越快，控制权损失越大。